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EPISODE TRANSCRIPT

Mimesis as Make-Believe (Kendall L. Walton): How Fiction Moves Us

Automatically transcribed from the episode audio. Some words and names may be inaccurate.

00:00:00Think about the last time you found yourself sitting on your couch, totally terrified, gripping the armrests because, I don't know, something on the screen was lurking in the shadows. Right. Your palms are sweating. Your heart is legitimately racing. Exactly. You were experiencing real physical stress. But if I walked into the room right then, paused the TV and asked, are you actually in danger? You'd immediately say no. You know you're completely safe. Yeah. You are fully aware that you're just sitting in a safe room looking at colored pixels So why on earth is your body reacting as if the threat is real? It really is the ultimate paradox of human engagement with art, isn't it?

00:00:41We willingly subject ourselves to these intense sometimes really agonizing emotional states And we do it all while knowing on a conscious level that it's a complete fabrication Exactly, we treat the fake as if it were real, but and this is key. We don't actually act Like it's real. Right. Because if there were an actual monster in your living room, you wouldn't just sweat and keep eating your popcorn. No, you would call the police or you'd run for your life. The physiological reaction is totally there, but the behavioral imperative like the need to run away is totally absent. It's a very weird cognitive loophole.

00:01:17It is. And usually when we talk about high art. whether it's, you know, a breathtaking oil painting or a classic novel, we treat it with this extreme reverence. Absolutely. We put these things on literal and metaphorical pedestals. We build these huge silent marble floor temples to house them. We quarter them off from ordinary life as if they exist on some higher spiritual plane or something. We treat aesthetics as sacred ground. Right, like a painting isn't just a painting, it's a masterpiece. A novel is this vessel of profound human truth. And they command this absolute hushed awe from us. We're essentially taught to look at them as mechanisms of higher truth.

00:02:00But then, you know, you step into the world of aesthetics and the philosophy of mind, and suddenly that pristine marble floor turns into mud. It really does. The conceptual landscape we are looking at today looks a lot less like a cathedral and, well, a lot more like a kindergarten playground. Which brings us to our mission for this deep dive. We are going to meticulously, chapter by chapter, unpack a genuinely seminal text. Right. Kendall L. Walton's 1990 book, Mimasis as Make -Believe, on the foundations of the representational arts. And our goal today is to basically dismantle the artificial wall between child's play and high culture entirely. Because Walton demands a total paradigm shift from us. He asks us to look at, say, Seurat's famous painting, Sunday on the Island of La Grangeotte. Or even a sweeping historical novel. Exactly. And he wants us to recognize that the underlying cognitive mechanics of how we interact with them are completely identical to how a five -year -old interacts with a doll.

00:02:59Or a toy truck, or a stick they pretend is a sword. Okay. Let's unpack this, because before we can even begin to dissect a masterpiece hanging in the Louvre, we have to start at the root. We have to look at how human imagination operates at its most raw, fundamental level. Right. What does it actually mean to imagine something? And Walden draws this very sharp, I think fascinating distinction between spontaneous imagining and deliberate imagining. That distinction really forms the bedrock of his entire thesis in chapter one. Because if we want to understand representational art, we have to understand the raw material of the human mind first. So let's talk about deliberate imagination. Yeah. Walton uses a hypothetical guy named Fred for this. So imagine Fred is sitting at work, utterly bored at his job selling shoes.

00:03:46We've all been Fred. Right. And to pass the time, Fred intentionally embarks on a daydream. He decides step by step to imagine winning the lottery. He imagines telling off his boss, moving to a villa in the south of France. Fred is basically the auteur of his own daydream. He really is. He is calling every single shot. He decides the color of the sports car, the temperature of the air in France. But because Fred is the one pulling all those cognitive strings, Walton says there is a hard limit on how vivid or how real. that daydream can ever feel. Exactly. The entire time he's constructing this fantasy, he remains hyper -aware of his own authorship. Glaring evidence of his actual reality, like the smell of the shoe store, the uncomfortable chair he's sitting in, it's constantly fighting against his daydream.

00:04:34He knows he is manufacturing the illusion, and because of that, he can't ever be truly surprised by it. But then, compare that to spontaneous imagining. Let's say you're walking through a dense forest at dusk. The shadows are getting long. You're already a little on edge. And suddenly, you see this massive, dark, lumpy shape just off the trail. Before you even have time to form a conscious thought, your brain screams, bear! Your stomach drops. Your adrenaline spikes. Right. You didn't deliberately choose to imagine a bear. The thought just hijacked your brain completely unbidden. And that spontaneous imagination is infinitely more vivid than Fred's daydream. It physically grips you, because you didn't consciously author the thought. It feels as though the idea exists entirely independently of your own will.

00:05:21You are essentially acting as a spectator to your own imagination. That's a great way to put it. Walton points out that when the evidence of your own fabrication is forcefully imposed on you, like Fred actively choosing the sports car, it severely dilutes the vividness. But in the woods, that lumpy stump bypasses all of that. Walton calls the stump a prompter, right? Yes, exactly. It bypasses your conscious mechanics entirely. You aren't focusing on the fact that your brain is generating an image. You're entirely focused on the bear. The stump is a prompter.

00:05:54Nature provides this highly suggestive visual cue, and the brain just takes off running without even asking for permission. But humanity realized thousands of years ago that relying on random stumps in the woods to prompt our imaginations is highly inefficient. Yeah, we can't just wait around for a spooky shadow if we want to feel something. Right. If we want to consistently access that vivid, spontaneous, imaginative state, we have to manufacture our own prompters. So we sculpt clay, we carve wooden figures, we paint on cave walls. Which introduces the core mechanism of the entire book. The concept of the prop.

00:06:30A prop. It's a very specific, culturally loaded type of prompter. A prop in Walton's framework is an object that is given a specific social function. And that function is generating fictional truths based on conditional rules. OK, let's ground that in the playground. Imagine a group of kids playing in the mud. They decide to play a game of make believe where mud pies are real pies. So the conditional rule of their specific game is that whenever someone forms a clump of mud into a circle, it counts as a pie. Right. So when a kid hands over a circle of mud, it becomes a fictional truth within their game that they just handed over a baked good. The mud is the prop that makes that proposition true in the universe of their game. It prescribes specific imaginings. It dictates exactly what the players are mandated to imagine if they want to participate correctly. Like if someone drops the mud pie on the ground, what happens? It automatically becomes a fictional truth that the pie is ruined.

00:07:23The players don't have to call a timeout and deliberately agree, OK, let's all imagine the pie fell. Exactly. The prop does the heavy lifting for them. It coordinates their shared imagination automatically, which allows the game to flow effortlessly. So Walton is demanding that we take that exact same mechanism, the mud generating fictional truths on a playground, and apply it to high art. He is. He's saying that Seurat's Le Grand Chat, that massive, pointless canvas in the museum, is essentially just a highly complex mud pie. It's just a sophisticated prop. The pattern of oil paint on the canvas acts in strict accordance with the conditional rules of our specific cultural games of visual make -believe.

00:08:04Those rules dictate that when we observe those specific arrangements of pigment we are prescribed to imagine a couple strolling or a woman holding a monkey on a leash. The painting makes it a fictional truth that those things are happening in the world of the artwork. The canvas itself is just a machine for generating those truths. Think of reading a dense Victorian novel. We often treat reading as, you know, receiving this profound message from a brilliant author. But Walton is saying you should think of it more like buying an incredibly detailed action figure.

00:08:36Charles Dickens is just manufacturing a very intricate toy. He is providing the prop. The book itself is inert. It's just dried ink on mashed trees. It doesn't actually do anything until you, the reader, take it out of the box and actively play the game of make -believe with it. That act of participation is what makes art functional. We really shouldn't view make -believe as merely frivolous play or childish escapism. Not at all. It is a fundamental, deeply ingrained psychological survival mechanism. Children across all cultures devote an astonishing amount of their cognitive development to make -believe.

00:09:14It's how we map out social roles, how we process overwhelming feelings, and how we test scenarios. Walton actually cites a profoundly dark but very illuminating example regarding this. Right, the example of children imprisoned in the Auschwitz concentration camp. Yeah. They were observed playing a game they called Going to the Gas Chamber. It is entirely chilling to even think about. But from a psychological standpoint, it reveals something massive about human nature. It demonstrates that make -believe is a vital tool for cognitive mapping. Those children were not playing for amusement. No, of course not. They were utilizing the innate mechanics of make -believe to earnestly confront and try to mentally structure this utterly incomprehensible reality they were subjected to. Make -believe allows the human mind to toy with reality, to explore the darkest unknowns, and to experience the crushing emotional weight of different scenarios within a protected psychological sandbox. You see, it's just the real -world cost of catastrophe. You can sit in a theater and experience the total devastation of Romeo and Juliet. You get to process the grief, the loss, the existential unfairness of the universe. And then the curtain drops and you walk out your car completely physically unharmed. We get all the profound cognitive and empathetic benefits of hard emotional experience for free. It really is a psychological evolutionary hack, which is why it's so incredibly strange that for decades philosophers of language and art theorists completely ignored this playful psychological reality. They try to jam art into a completely different framework, and this is exactly what Walton is reacting against in chapter two. Right, the pretend assertion theory. If art is fundamentally just a prop for a game of make -believe, why did the smartest philosophers of the 20th century treat fiction as a form of elaborate lying? Or what they called pretend truth -telling. To understand why they did that, we have to look at the obsession of 20th century philosophy. The philosophy of language.

00:11:13Exactly. Philosophers like John Searle were heavily invested in turning all human communication into neat, logical prepositions that could be evaluated as strictly true or strictly false. They categorized communication into speech acts or elocutionary acts, like making a promise, giving an order, or most importantly, making an assertion about reality. Right. If I say to you, the sky is blue, I am making an assertion about the real world, and you can test it to see if I'm telling the truth. But fiction broke their neat logical system completely. Because how do you evaluate the truth of a sentence like, Sherlock Holmes lived at 221B Baker Street? It's not a true assertion, obviously, because Sherlock Holmes never existed.

00:11:58But it also doesn't feel like a malicious lie, right? Because the author isn't trying to trick us into believing Holmes is real. So Searle and others developed this pretend assertion theory to solve the problem. They argued that when Arthur Conan Doyle wrote those words, he was simply pretending to make an assertion. He was mimicking the act of telling the truth, engaging in this socially acceptable form of deceit. Yeah, where the author pretends to be a historian or a journalist, and the reader just plays along with the joke. It reduces all of literature to an elaborate parlor trick. It's essentially saying art is just failed nonfiction. And Walton aggressively dismantles this by pointing out a glaring fatal flaw. He says the linguistic model completely collapses the second you leave the library and walk into a sculpture garden. This is such a good point. Look at Jacques Lipschitz's famous bronze sculpture guitar player. Under Searle's theory, we would have to say that Lipschitz is pretending to make an assertion with a hunk of bronze. Which is ridiculous. You don't make truth claims with a welding torch and molten metal.

00:13:02That makes zero sense. Painting and sculpting are not standard mediums for performing illocutionary speech acts. To claim a painter is mimicking a tradition of making truth claims with a brushstroke is incredibly forced. It's deeply unnatural. A sculptor is not pretending that a piece of bronze is a real person any more than a company that manufactures a plastic baby doll is trying to trick children into thinking they've created biological life. They are manufacturing a prop. And Walden argues that literary fictions are doing the exact same thing. The author of a novel isn't pretending to make assertions about reality.

00:13:37They are systematically building a textual prop designed specifically to guide the reader's imagination. I find that incredibly liberating. It frees art from the burden of being judged constantly against reality. I agree, but I do want to push back on this a little bit. What happens when the lines blur? What do you mean? Like, what about a massive, heavily researched historical novel like Hilary Mantel's Wolf Hall? or a meticulous novel about Abraham Lincoln. Okay, I see where you're going. The author is using actual historical facts, real dates, real people. If the author is utilizing objective reality, where does Walton draw the line between work of nonfiction, like a Lincoln biography, and a historical novel? That's a great question. For Walton, the dividing line has absolutely nothing to do with whether the statements inside the book are objectively true or false in the real world. Really? What is the distinction based on? It relies entirely on the social function of the work. A biography of Abraham Lincoln has the established social function of communicating facts. Its primary utility is to be believed by the reader. Okay, but a historical novel about Lincoln? Even if the novel happens to be 99 % factually accurate to the historical record, its primary social function is serving as a prop in a game of make -believe. Its structural purpose is to prescribe imaginings. So... If a historical novel contains the sentence, Lincoln was the 16th president, that statement is factually true in the real world. Yes. But within the context of the novel, its job isn't to educate you on presidential history. Its job is to say, within the boundaries of this game we are playing, it is a fictional truth that Lincoln is the president.

00:15:20Please imagine that. That is the exact crucial distinction. And this function applies heavily to cultural myths and religious texts as well. Oh, right, because many societies have origin myths. And whether the individuals reciting those myths believe them to be historically, scientifically true is actually secondary to the text's social function. The myth operates as an incredibly powerful prop to guide the collective imagination of a culture. It establishes a web of shared fictional truths that bind a community together and dictate cultural values. The objective truth value is far less important than the shared imaginative engagement the text demands. Okay, so if we accept that artworks are props, that there are tools we use to play a structured game, how do we actually know the rules of the game? This takes us into chapters three and four, the mechanics of fictional worlds. Because no prop gives you all the information, right? A painting of a house only shows you the front facade. It doesn't paint the backyard.

00:16:17Right. Or a 900 -page fantasy novel doesn't stop to tell you how many times the character blinks or whether they have a circulatory system. The art is always incomplete. So how do we, as players, know how to fill in the massive blank spaces the artist leaves behind? Exactly. How do props generate truths that aren't explicitly stated? Before we look at how we extrapolate, Walton asks us to look at what the props are fundamentally anchoring themselves to, which he calls objects of representation. Okay, because sometimes props point at real -world things, like a painting of Julius Caesar points at the historical Caesar.

00:16:53Yes. The painting doesn't just mandate that you imagine a generic man in a toga. It mandates that you imagine of the actual Julius Caesar that he is standing there. But then Walton introduces this mind -bending category called reflexive representations, right? Yes. These are works of art that represent themselves. They are props that prescribe imaginings about their own physical existence. Give me an example of a reflexive prop because that sounds like an absolute paradox.

00:17:24Walton points to John Barth's story, Frametale. Have you seen this? I don't think so. So the physical story is literally just a few words printed on a strip of paper. On one side, it says, once upon a time there. And on the reverse side, it says, was a story that began. OK. The reader is explicitly instructed to cut the strip out, give it a half twist, and tape the ends together to form a Mobius strip. Oh, wow. So when you trace it with your finger, it just endlessly reads, once upon a time, there was a story that began, once upon a time, there was a story that began in a continuous infinite loop? Exactly.

00:18:00OK. The text represents itself as a story, representing itself as a story. It generates fictional truths about its own physical looping existence as a piece of paper. That is so weird. Are there movies that do this? Definitely. Consider the Millbrooks film Blazing Saddles. Oh, I love that movie. In the climax of the movie, The characters physically break out of the fictional Western town. They spill over onto the Warner Brothers studio lot, fight through a cafeteria, and eventually run down a street to a movie theater. Right, and they sit down and watch the end of Blazing Saddles on the silver screen. The movie appears inside itself. It is a prop that mandates you to imagine that the prop itself exists within the fictional universe you are watching. It completely shatters the boundaries of the game by making the game piece part of the game itself. That is brilliant.

00:18:46It's very meta. But let's get back to filling in the blanks for more traditional art. Walton outlines two primary engines that power our ability to extrapolate fictional truths. The reality principle and the mutual belief principle. Right. Let's tackle the reality principle first. OK, let me see if I can map this one out. See, I'm reading a thriller. And the author writes, the detective walked into the room. OK. The text doesn't explicitly say, the detective breathed oxygen. or gravity kept the detective's feet on the floor. But I inherently know those things are true within the story. Exactly. The Reality Principle, or RP, means you use the actual laws of physics and reality as the default operating system for the fictional world, unless the author explicitly tells you otherwise. You're utilizing reality as the baseline blueprint. If the text generates a primary fictional truth, like he walked into a room, we ask, what else would logically follow if that event occurred in the real world?

00:19:46We automatically generate a massive web of implied truths without the author having to waste ink explaining basic biology or physics. That seems pretty intuitive, right? But the mutual belief principle is where it gets incredibly culturally specific. OK, so think about watching an action movie from the 1980s. The hero shoots the bumper of a parked car with just a standard handgun, and the car instantly detonates into a massive three -story fireball. A classic trope. Right. Now, if we strictly applied the reality principle, we would say, well, the bullet lodged in the fiberglass bumper and absolutely nothing else happened. Because that's how physics works. But we don't do that. We instinctively accept that in this specific genre, cars are essentially constructed entirely out of volatile explosives.

00:20:30That is the mutual belief principle at work, right? It is. The perfect modern example. The mutual belief principle or MBP dictates that we should not assume the fictional world operates like the actual real world. We assume it operates how the artist's society or genre mutually believed or conventionally agreed the world worked. Walton uses a really great historical example of a silent film from 1910. The movie shows a family eating dinner and the table is covered with a checkered tablecloth. Okay, just a standard tablecloth?

00:21:04Well, if you strictly apply the reality principle, a checkered tablecloth implies absolutely nothing about a family's socioeconomic status. Rich people and poor people both own checkered fabric. Right, it's just a textile pattern in reality. But if we apply the mutual belief principle, we have to look at what a 1910 cinema audience mutually understood about that specific visual symbol. What did they understand? In the cultural context of early 20th century theater and film, a checkered tablecloth was a universally understood, incredibly efficient shorthand for a poor but honest family.

00:21:38Oh, wow. So the MVP dictates that it is a fictional truth in the world of that movie that the family is poor but honest. Yes. The actual reality of tablecloths doesn't matter. The mutual belief of the audience dictates the rules of the game. We are constantly. seamlessly code -switching when we consume art. We are negotiating this really complex treaty between the laws of reality and the laws of genre or culture. The artist knows we will read the checker tablecloth a certain way, so they use it to save time. The MVP gives the artist massive narrative leverage. But the reality principle allows the audience to immerse themselves, to investigate the fictional world deeply, as if it had real weight and consequence.

00:22:19Exactly. It's a balance. Okay, so we've constructed the world. We understand the props. We know how to generate the implied truths. We know the rules of gravity and genre. But this raises a massive logistical problem for me. What's the problem? Where are we? Where does the audience physically and psychologically fit into this landscape? Because usually we talk about the fourth wall. Right. The idea that there is the fictional world happening on stage and we are sitting in the dark, safe and separate, looking through an invisible window. Yeah, that's how we're taught to think about it. Well, in chapters 5, 6, and 7, Walton basically takes a sledgehammer to the concept of the fourth wall. Really? How so? He argues that we are not outside the fiction looking in.

00:23:05We are active players situated inside our own game of make -believe. Wait, he argues that our act of observing is part of the fiction itself? Yes. When you stand in a museum and look at a painting, the artwork is a prop in your personal game. It becomes a fictional truth within your game that you are observing the events depicted. So, like, take Michelangelo's creation of Adam painted on the ceiling of the Sistine Chapel. It depicts God reaching out to spark life into the first human being. A very famous moment.

00:23:36Right. But logically and biblically, there were absolutely no other humans present to witness this moment. So how can we be looking at it? Where's the camera positioned? We have to play a game where we are invisible, omnipresent witnesses. Walton calls this seeing the unseen. Seeing the unseen. The artwork actively prescribes that you imagine yourself seeing it. It is a fictional truth in your game of make believe that you are present, witnessing a fundamentally unwitnessable event. You are not just a passive receptacle for an image. You are a participant. Your physical act of looking is incorporated directly into the fiction. It makes the act of walking through an art gallery an incredibly active, almost athletic endeavor. You are constantly stepping into new roles. But participation isn't just about where we are standing in the fictional space, right?

00:24:28It's about what is happening in our nervous system. Yes. Which circles back to the paradox we started the show with. The paradox of fictional emotions. Let's talk about Charles in the slime. This is my favorite part of the theory. It is perhaps Walton's most famous contribution to aesthetics. Imagine a man named Charles sitting in a movie theater watching a horror film. Okay, Charles is in the theater. On the screen, a giant radioactive green slime is oozing its way toward the camera. Charles screams, he clutches the armrests, his heart rate spikes, he starts sweating. He is exhibiting every physiological symptom of sheer terror. But if you tap Charles on the shoulder and ask, are you in physical danger? He will say no. Because if he genuinely, cognitively believed a radioactive slime was about to consume him, he would spread out the emergency exit.

00:25:18Exactly. Charles has the physiological symptoms of fear, but he lacks the behavioral imperatives, the need to run, fight, or hide, that define genuine real -world fear. So how does Walton solve this? He solves this paradox by introducing the concept of quasi -emotions. Charles is experiencing a very real, undeniable physiological reaction. His adrenaline is pumping. Right. Walton calls this raw physiological state quasi -fear. But Charles is not experiencing actual directed fear.

00:25:52Instead, it is a fictional truth in Charles's game of make -believe that he is afraid of the slime. Yes. Let me make sure I'm capturing the nuance here though. The sweating, the elevated heart rate, the adrenaline, that is entirely real. But the emotion of fear, specifically directed at the fictional slime, is a pretense. Exactly. Charles is playing a psychological game where he imagines himself to be terrified. Think of a child playing cops and robbers. Oh, that's a perfect analogy. The child gets tagged, falls to the grass, and yells, you shot me, I'm dying.

00:26:26The child is genuinely experiencing a rush of adrenaline, excitement, and exertion. But they are fictionally experiencing the agony of a gunshot wound. Charles is genuinely feeling quasi -fear, but he is fictionally afraid of the slime. He is psychologically participating in the game using his own nervous system as part of the apparatus. This brilliantly explains why we intentionally seek out tragedy. When you put on a movie that you know will make you sob uncontrollably, you aren't doing it because you are a masochist who wants to be genuinely depressed. No, if a close friend died in real life, that would be actual grief, and it would be traumatizing, debilitating, and chaotic. But when you watch a tragic film, you experience quasi -grief. You get to fictionally experience the profundity, the catharsis, and the deep connecting empathy of human loss, but within a strictly bounded container. You get all the emotional weightlifting without the risk of dropping the barbell on your neck and crushing your windpipe. It is an incredibly adaptive psychological tool. We are safely rehearsing our emotional capacities, but this raises a practical problem for me. What's that? Experiencing the quasi -fear of a giant visual slime monster on a massive movie screen is a highly visceral sensory experience.

00:27:44How does this same game work when we transition from a movie to a book? That's a good distinction to make. Like, does a painting of a landscape trigger the exact same mechanics as reading a chapter of text? Walton actually acknowledges a profound difference in the mechanics here, dividing them into depicting representation and verbal representation in chapters eight and nine. Okay, let's start with depicting representation. That encompasses visual games like paintings and sculptures. Pictures provoke what he calls rich and vivid perceptual games. So when you look at a painting, you aren't just handed a piece of data to imagine. You are prescribed to visually explore it. He uses the example of a 17th century Dutch landscape by Hobbema, the water mill with the great red roof. Have you seen it? Yeah, it's very detailed, lots of trees and little figures. When you stand in front of that painting, it isn't just a fictional truth that a water mill exists. It is a fictional truth that you are looking at the mill and you can dart your eyes around the canvas to discover what else is there. You scan the painted trees to see if there are birds. You look at the doorway to see if someone is standing there. Your actual physical act of moving your eyes across the canvas corresponds directly to the fictional act of scanning a real landscape. That is a visual game of make -believe. And different artists force us to play different variations of this visual game, right? The way Vermeer makes you play is entirely different from the way Matisse makes you play. It's a spectacular comparison. Take a Vermeer painting, like girl reading a letter at an open window. Vermeer is famous for his light. Exactly. Vermeer uses incredibly explicit, highly detailed cues of light and shadow. The light falls across the drapery with photographic precision. So in our game of make -believe, the fictional truths about the three -dimensional space, the depth of the room, the distance between the girl and the window, are generated directly by our observation of those shadows. We see the rendered light, and the light dictates the shape of the room to our brains. But Matisse strips all of that away entirely. Oh, yeah. Look at Matisse's The Red Studio. It depicts a room, but the walls, the floor, the furniture are all painted in this flat, vibrant, uniform red. There are absolutely no shadows. The objects are just thin outlines. So in Vermeer, the light tells us about the objects. In Matisse, the objects, like the outlines of a chair or the angle of a table, force us to deduce the space. We have to reconstruct the 3D space indirectly because the explicit visual cues of light and depth are entirely missing. The game requires a different kind of perceptual heavy lifting from the viewer.

00:30:25We are forced to imagine a three -dimensional room, despite the canvas aggressively reminding us that it is a flat, two -dimensional surface. The cognitive dissonance is the point of the game, and this applies even to purely abstract art. Wait, really? Yes, Walton's take on Kazimir Malevich's Suprematist painting completely rewired how I look at modern art. Refresh my memory. What does that painting look like? The painting's literally just a yellow rectangle painted slightly over a green rectangle. Right. And many critics would argue that is non -representational art.

00:30:58It's just geometry on canvas. It doesn't represent anything outside itself. But Walton argues it is a representation. Because when you look at it, human visual processing inevitably sees the yellow rectangle as being in front of the green one. Even though you know the canvas is completely flat, there is zero actual depth. Exactly. But the painting forces your brain to play a visual game where you imagine one shape floating in front of another in a spatial plane. It prescribes a spatial imagining. Therefore, it functions as a prop. So a painting forces you to play a perceptual game with depth and light. But what about words? A novel doesn't give me colors or shapes to scan with my eyes. It's just black ink. Words don't depict, right? They describe.

00:31:43And because they describe, they necessitate a narrator. The narrator acts as a crucial mediator for our game of make -believe. In a painting, you usually imagine yourself directly observing the scene. In a novel, you imagine yourself listening to someone or reading an account written by someone who is describing the scene to you. And when you introduce a narrator, you introduce the glorious mess of human fallibility. A narrator can be reliable or they can be lying, self -deceived or simply stupid. If you read a book with an unreliable narrator, the mechanics of the game shift entirely. You aren't just imagining the events they describe. You are playing a complex game of psychological deduction. You have to imagine the events while simultaneously interrogating the psychological state of the person telling you about them. You're trying to parse the actual fictional truth from their fictional bias. It requires a dual layer of imagining. You're constructing the world, and you're constructing the psychology of the voice mediating that world. A painting forces you to play a game with your eyes. You have to search the shadows for the truth. But a novel forces you to play a game with your trust.

00:32:54You have to interrogate the narrator's agenda to find the truth. The medium completely dictates the mechanics of the game. That is fascinating. Okay, we are entering the final stretch of the book, chapters 10 and 11, which deal with the metaphysics of make -believe. The ontology problem. Right. We have established that art is a game, a structured hallucination we voluntarily agree to play, guided by props. But what happens when we leave the museum, put down the book, and go to a dinner party in the real world, and start talking about these characters? This brings us to one of the most agonizing traditional philosophical problems. Ontology. Ontology is the study of what exists, what has reality. Because philosophers like Bertrand Russell and Gottlieb Freig spent years agonizing over how to parse sentences about things that don't exist, right? They did. The famous example is, the present King of France is bald. If there is no King of France, is that sentence false? Is it just meaningless noise?

00:33:57Do fictional characters like Tom Sawyer or King Lear or Sherlock Holmes actually exist in some abstract metaphysical realm just because we can make true statements about them? Because we do it all the time. We say Sherlock Holmes is a brilliant detective. Grammatically, that sounds exactly like a factual assertion about a biological human being. And some philosophers known as realists argue that because we make true statements about these characters, they must possess some form of existence. Perhaps as eternal abstract concepts or non -actualized entities floating in a metaphysical ether. But Walton completely rejects this. He argues we do not need to clutter our universe with ghosts, abstract entities, and metaphysical baggage to explain our everyday language. So how does Walton explain a sentence like, Tom Sawyer attended his own funeral? Because anyone who has read the book knows that is a true statement about the narrative. Right. Walton argues that when you say Tom Sawyer attended his own funeral, you are not stating a real -world fact about an abstract ghost entity. You are actually just continuing to play the game of make -believe.

00:35:02You are speaking within the pretense. It's a linguistic shortcut. It's as if you were saying, in the game of make -believe, authorized by the prop known as Mark Twain's novel, it is a fictional truth that Tom Sawyer attended his own funeral. But instead of stating that clunky preamble every time, we just speak from inside the game. It is an act of verbal participation. When I say Tom Sawyer is tricky, I am pretending to assert a fact about a real boy, because that is simply how the game is played. I'm participating in the pretense. But what about when we explicitly deny a character exists? What about the statement, Gregor Samsa does not exist? When I say that, I am definitely not speaking inside the pretense.

00:35:46Because inside the pretense of Kafka's story, Gregor Samsa absolutely exists. He just happens to be a giant insect. You've hit the exact crux of the metaphysical issue. You cannot say Gregor Samsa does not exist from inside the game because it directly contradicts the rules generated by the prop. So what is it? Walton categorizes this specific type of existence claim as a betrayal of the pretense. A betrayal of the pretense. It means you are intentionally stepping outside the magic circle of the game to point out the cold, hard, literal mechanics of the real world.

00:36:20You're pointing directly at the prop, the physical Kafka book, and declaring, this prop does not correspond to an actual biological entity. You are invoking the game of make -believe specifically to declare its boundaries, to remind everyone involved that it is, in fact, merely a game. You are stating that any attempt to refer to a real person using the rules of this specific game will ultimately fail. So think about internet culture for a second. When people argue passionately online about whether a fictional character like Goku would win a physical fight against Superman.

00:36:54Oh man, those debates get intense. They do. But they aren't arguing about fake biology. They aren't debating the physics of abstract metaphysical entities. They're just fiercely aggressively negotiating the rules of their overlapping games of make -believe. That is precisely what is happening. They are taking the principles of generation from the Dragon Ball universe, and the principles of generation from the DC Comics universe, attempting to smash them together into a unified framework. And then debating which implied fictional truths would supersede the others. It is a highly complex, collaborative, and often intensely combative game of adult make -believe. It makes so much of our cultural behavior make sense. Let's look at the immense journey we've taken today through Walton's framework. We started with the raw psychology of a child in a muddy playground, turning a clump of dirt into a pie and a stump into a pear. We saw how 20th century philosophers awkwardly tried to explain art as a form of failed truth -telling.

00:37:56And how Walton obliterated that by showing that art is just the manufacturing of highly sophisticated props. We learned the engines of the game, the reality principle and the mutual belief principle. We realize that we aren't passive observers safely behind a fourth wall. We are active, unseen players experiencing real, physical quasi -emotions in a fictional sandbox. We saw how a canvas forces us to play a perceptual game with depth, while a novel forces us to play a psychological game with trust. And finally, we realized we don't need to believe in metaphysical ghosts to talk about literature. The art is the prop and we are the eager players. It is a profoundly unifying deeply elegant theory. It takes the loftiest, most intimidating heights of human creativity and grounds them firmly in our most basic, innate psychological need to play, to simulate and to imagine. But, you know, if we pull back and look at the broader implications of this framework, it leaves us with a rather provocative question about the modern hyper -connected world we live in today. Lay it on me. If our engagement with art is fundamentally a rule -bound game of make -believe where props guide us into experiencing physiological quasi -emotions. Yeah. How much of our engagement with the real world has inadvertently become its own massive, unacknowledged game of make -believe? Oh, wow. Think about the digital landscape we inhabit daily. We consume endlessly curated social media feeds. We interact with highly constructed, polished political personas.

00:39:30We watch 24 -hour news cycles that are heavily edited. narrative driven and scored with dramatic tension music. They are functioning as props. Are we experiencing real anger, real fear, real joy when we scroll through these feeds? Or have these digital platforms evolved into massive societal level props? Are they prescribing imaginings? When we get utterly outraged at a political tweet or devastated by a curated 15 second news clip, are we experiencing genuine actionable emotion or Are we experiencing a quasi -emotion, guided by digital props and a sprawling game we don't even realize we are playing? If it operates like a game of make -believe, the physiological reaction is real, our blood pressure spikes, but the behavioral imperative, the actual need to go out and fix the real world, might be bypassed entirely. Just like Charles watching the slime monster. We feel the terror, we feel the outrage, but we don't actually move from our seats. because deep down, our nervous system is processing the feed as a fiction. We are safely experiencing the emotion without the risk of action. We are trapped in a digital playground of our own making. The line between the prop and reality is blurring. We may be playing a game with real -world consequences, treating actual events as if they were just another prescribed imagining. Well, on that slightly existential note, that wraps up our deep dive into Mimesis as Make -Believe. The next time you walk into a museum or open a novel or even just open a feed on your phone, take a second to look past the polished marble floors. Look at the mud. Look closely at the props operating in your own life and ask yourself, what game are you being asked to play? Thanks for joining us.