1 00:00:00,000 --> 00:00:01,879 Think about the last time you found yourself 2 00:00:01,879 --> 00:00:05,259 sitting on your couch, totally terrified, gripping 3 00:00:05,259 --> 00:00:07,219 the armrests because, I don't know, something 4 00:00:07,219 --> 00:00:09,400 on the screen was lurking in the shadows. Right. 5 00:00:09,619 --> 00:00:12,119 Your palms are sweating. Your heart is legitimately 6 00:00:12,119 --> 00:00:15,960 racing. Exactly. You were experiencing real physical 7 00:00:15,960 --> 00:00:19,579 stress. But if I walked into the room right then, 8 00:00:19,980 --> 00:00:22,940 paused the TV and asked, are you actually in 9 00:00:22,940 --> 00:00:26,280 danger? You'd immediately say no. You know you're 10 00:00:26,280 --> 00:00:29,850 completely safe. Yeah. You are fully aware that 11 00:00:29,850 --> 00:00:32,109 you're just sitting in a safe room looking at 12 00:00:32,109 --> 00:00:35,530 colored pixels So why on earth is your body reacting 13 00:00:35,530 --> 00:00:38,969 as if the threat is real? It really is the ultimate 14 00:00:38,969 --> 00:00:41,670 paradox of human engagement with art, isn't it? 15 00:00:41,829 --> 00:00:44,329 We willingly subject ourselves to these intense 16 00:00:44,329 --> 00:00:47,609 sometimes really agonizing emotional states And 17 00:00:47,609 --> 00:00:49,990 we do it all while knowing on a conscious level 18 00:00:49,990 --> 00:00:52,909 that it's a complete fabrication Exactly, we 19 00:00:52,909 --> 00:00:55,750 treat the fake as if it were real, but and this 20 00:00:55,750 --> 00:00:58,549 is key. We don't actually act Like it's real. 21 00:00:59,030 --> 00:01:00,909 Right. Because if there were an actual monster 22 00:01:00,909 --> 00:01:02,909 in your living room, you wouldn't just sweat 23 00:01:02,909 --> 00:01:05,469 and keep eating your popcorn. No, you would call 24 00:01:05,469 --> 00:01:09,030 the police or you'd run for your life. The physiological 25 00:01:09,030 --> 00:01:11,430 reaction is totally there, but the behavioral 26 00:01:11,430 --> 00:01:13,849 imperative like the need to run away is totally 27 00:01:13,849 --> 00:01:16,750 absent. It's a very weird cognitive loophole. 28 00:01:17,109 --> 00:01:20,409 It is. And usually when we talk about high art. 29 00:01:20,519 --> 00:01:23,299 whether it's, you know, a breathtaking oil painting 30 00:01:23,299 --> 00:01:26,739 or a classic novel, we treat it with this extreme 31 00:01:26,739 --> 00:01:29,239 reverence. Absolutely. We put these things on 32 00:01:29,239 --> 00:01:31,620 literal and metaphorical pedestals. We build 33 00:01:31,620 --> 00:01:34,900 these huge silent marble floor temples to house 34 00:01:34,900 --> 00:01:37,560 them. We quarter them off from ordinary life 35 00:01:37,560 --> 00:01:40,519 as if they exist on some higher spiritual plane 36 00:01:40,519 --> 00:01:43,439 or something. We treat aesthetics as sacred ground. 37 00:01:43,659 --> 00:01:45,780 Right, like a painting isn't just a painting, 38 00:01:46,200 --> 00:01:50,840 it's a masterpiece. A novel is this vessel of 39 00:01:50,840 --> 00:01:54,420 profound human truth. And they command this absolute 40 00:01:54,420 --> 00:01:57,260 hushed awe from us. We're essentially taught 41 00:01:57,260 --> 00:01:59,659 to look at them as mechanisms of higher truth. 42 00:02:00,439 --> 00:02:02,319 But then, you know, you step into the world of 43 00:02:02,319 --> 00:02:05,319 aesthetics and the philosophy of mind, and suddenly 44 00:02:05,319 --> 00:02:08,180 that pristine marble floor turns into mud. It 45 00:02:08,180 --> 00:02:10,469 really does. The conceptual landscape we are 46 00:02:10,469 --> 00:02:13,270 looking at today looks a lot less like a cathedral 47 00:02:13,270 --> 00:02:16,090 and, well, a lot more like a kindergarten playground. 48 00:02:16,629 --> 00:02:18,330 Which brings us to our mission for this deep 49 00:02:18,330 --> 00:02:21,430 dive. We are going to meticulously, chapter by 50 00:02:21,430 --> 00:02:24,930 chapter, unpack a genuinely seminal text. Right. 51 00:02:24,969 --> 00:02:28,370 Kendall L. Walton's 1990 book, Mimasis as Make 52 00:02:28,370 --> 00:02:30,729 -Believe, on the foundations of the representational 53 00:02:30,729 --> 00:02:34,550 arts. And our goal today is to basically dismantle 54 00:02:34,550 --> 00:02:37,349 the artificial wall between child's play and 55 00:02:37,349 --> 00:02:40,000 high culture entirely. Because Walton demands 56 00:02:40,000 --> 00:02:43,599 a total paradigm shift from us. He asks us to 57 00:02:43,599 --> 00:02:46,580 look at, say, Seurat's famous painting, Sunday 58 00:02:46,580 --> 00:02:49,039 on the Island of La Grangeotte. Or even a sweeping 59 00:02:49,039 --> 00:02:51,699 historical novel. Exactly. And he wants us to 60 00:02:51,699 --> 00:02:54,159 recognize that the underlying cognitive mechanics 61 00:02:54,159 --> 00:02:56,979 of how we interact with them are completely identical 62 00:02:56,979 --> 00:02:58,900 to how a five -year -old interacts with a doll. 63 00:02:59,560 --> 00:03:02,120 Or a toy truck, or a stick they pretend is a 64 00:03:02,120 --> 00:03:04,930 sword. Okay. Let's unpack this, because before 65 00:03:04,930 --> 00:03:07,389 we can even begin to dissect a masterpiece hanging 66 00:03:07,389 --> 00:03:09,669 in the Louvre, we have to start at the root. 67 00:03:10,110 --> 00:03:12,389 We have to look at how human imagination operates 68 00:03:12,389 --> 00:03:16,509 at its most raw, fundamental level. Right. What 69 00:03:16,509 --> 00:03:19,650 does it actually mean to imagine something? And 70 00:03:19,650 --> 00:03:22,210 Walden draws this very sharp, I think fascinating 71 00:03:22,210 --> 00:03:25,330 distinction between spontaneous imagining and 72 00:03:25,330 --> 00:03:28,039 deliberate imagining. That distinction really 73 00:03:28,039 --> 00:03:30,800 forms the bedrock of his entire thesis in chapter 74 00:03:30,800 --> 00:03:33,639 one. Because if we want to understand representational 75 00:03:33,639 --> 00:03:35,960 art, we have to understand the raw material of 76 00:03:35,960 --> 00:03:38,400 the human mind first. So let's talk about deliberate 77 00:03:38,400 --> 00:03:40,800 imagination. Yeah. Walton uses a hypothetical 78 00:03:40,800 --> 00:03:43,900 guy named Fred for this. So imagine Fred is sitting 79 00:03:43,900 --> 00:03:46,780 at work, utterly bored at his job selling shoes. 80 00:03:46,919 --> 00:03:49,520 We've all been Fred. Right. And to pass the time, 81 00:03:49,680 --> 00:03:52,180 Fred intentionally embarks on a daydream. He 82 00:03:52,180 --> 00:03:55,099 decides step by step to imagine winning the lottery. 83 00:03:55,180 --> 00:03:57,800 He imagines telling off his boss, moving to a 84 00:03:57,800 --> 00:04:00,439 villa in the south of France. Fred is basically 85 00:04:00,439 --> 00:04:03,439 the auteur of his own daydream. He really is. 86 00:04:03,699 --> 00:04:06,460 He is calling every single shot. He decides the 87 00:04:06,460 --> 00:04:08,960 color of the sports car, the temperature of the 88 00:04:08,960 --> 00:04:12,159 air in France. But because Fred is the one pulling 89 00:04:12,159 --> 00:04:15,080 all those cognitive strings, Walton says there 90 00:04:15,080 --> 00:04:18,949 is a hard limit on how vivid or how real. that 91 00:04:18,949 --> 00:04:21,670 daydream can ever feel. Exactly. The entire time 92 00:04:21,670 --> 00:04:24,649 he's constructing this fantasy, he remains hyper 93 00:04:24,649 --> 00:04:27,089 -aware of his own authorship. Glaring evidence 94 00:04:27,089 --> 00:04:29,149 of his actual reality, like the smell of the 95 00:04:29,149 --> 00:04:31,509 shoe store, the uncomfortable chair he's sitting 96 00:04:31,509 --> 00:04:34,310 in, it's constantly fighting against his daydream. 97 00:04:34,689 --> 00:04:37,350 He knows he is manufacturing the illusion, and 98 00:04:37,350 --> 00:04:39,930 because of that, he can't ever be truly surprised 99 00:04:39,930 --> 00:04:43,009 by it. But then, compare that to spontaneous 100 00:04:43,009 --> 00:04:45,269 imagining. Let's say you're walking through a 101 00:04:45,269 --> 00:04:47,370 dense forest at dusk. The shadows are getting 102 00:04:47,370 --> 00:04:50,339 long. You're already a little on edge. And suddenly, 103 00:04:50,959 --> 00:04:53,699 you see this massive, dark, lumpy shape just 104 00:04:53,699 --> 00:04:56,829 off the trail. Before you even have time to form 105 00:04:56,829 --> 00:04:59,250 a conscious thought, your brain screams, bear! 106 00:04:59,529 --> 00:05:01,870 Your stomach drops. Your adrenaline spikes. Right. 107 00:05:02,310 --> 00:05:04,250 You didn't deliberately choose to imagine a bear. 108 00:05:04,730 --> 00:05:07,230 The thought just hijacked your brain completely 109 00:05:07,230 --> 00:05:10,370 unbidden. And that spontaneous imagination is 110 00:05:10,370 --> 00:05:13,029 infinitely more vivid than Fred's daydream. It 111 00:05:13,029 --> 00:05:15,370 physically grips you, because you didn't consciously 112 00:05:15,370 --> 00:05:18,029 author the thought. It feels as though the idea 113 00:05:18,029 --> 00:05:20,370 exists entirely independently of your own will. 114 00:05:21,360 --> 00:05:24,480 You are essentially acting as a spectator to 115 00:05:24,480 --> 00:05:26,540 your own imagination. That's a great way to put 116 00:05:26,540 --> 00:05:29,259 it. Walton points out that when the evidence 117 00:05:29,259 --> 00:05:32,120 of your own fabrication is forcefully imposed 118 00:05:32,120 --> 00:05:34,579 on you, like Fred actively choosing the sports 119 00:05:34,579 --> 00:05:38,139 car, it severely dilutes the vividness. But in 120 00:05:38,139 --> 00:05:41,220 the woods, that lumpy stump bypasses all of that. 121 00:05:41,699 --> 00:05:44,350 Walton calls the stump a prompter, right? Yes, 122 00:05:44,470 --> 00:05:46,810 exactly. It bypasses your conscious mechanics 123 00:05:46,810 --> 00:05:49,069 entirely. You aren't focusing on the fact that 124 00:05:49,069 --> 00:05:51,370 your brain is generating an image. You're entirely 125 00:05:51,370 --> 00:05:54,110 focused on the bear. The stump is a prompter. 126 00:05:54,389 --> 00:05:56,610 Nature provides this highly suggestive visual 127 00:05:56,610 --> 00:05:58,850 cue, and the brain just takes off running without 128 00:05:58,850 --> 00:06:01,949 even asking for permission. But humanity realized 129 00:06:01,949 --> 00:06:04,410 thousands of years ago that relying on random 130 00:06:04,410 --> 00:06:06,350 stumps in the woods to prompt our imaginations 131 00:06:06,350 --> 00:06:09,470 is highly inefficient. Yeah, we can't just wait 132 00:06:09,470 --> 00:06:11,649 around for a spooky shadow if we want to feel 133 00:06:11,649 --> 00:06:14,410 something. Right. If we want to consistently 134 00:06:14,410 --> 00:06:17,509 access that vivid, spontaneous, imaginative state, 135 00:06:17,870 --> 00:06:20,470 we have to manufacture our own prompters. So 136 00:06:20,470 --> 00:06:23,490 we sculpt clay, we carve wooden figures, we paint 137 00:06:23,490 --> 00:06:26,790 on cave walls. Which introduces the core mechanism 138 00:06:26,790 --> 00:06:29,709 of the entire book. The concept of the prop. 139 00:06:30,089 --> 00:06:33,209 A prop. It's a very specific, culturally loaded 140 00:06:33,209 --> 00:06:36,069 type of prompter. A prop in Walton's framework 141 00:06:36,069 --> 00:06:38,730 is an object that is given a specific social 142 00:06:38,730 --> 00:06:41,720 function. And that function is generating fictional 143 00:06:41,720 --> 00:06:44,639 truths based on conditional rules. OK, let's 144 00:06:44,639 --> 00:06:46,259 ground that in the playground. Imagine a group 145 00:06:46,259 --> 00:06:48,339 of kids playing in the mud. They decide to play 146 00:06:48,339 --> 00:06:50,259 a game of make believe where mud pies are real 147 00:06:50,259 --> 00:06:53,199 pies. So the conditional rule of their specific 148 00:06:53,199 --> 00:06:56,459 game is that whenever someone forms a clump of 149 00:06:56,459 --> 00:06:59,120 mud into a circle, it counts as a pie. Right. 150 00:06:59,759 --> 00:07:01,819 So when a kid hands over a circle of mud, it 151 00:07:01,819 --> 00:07:04,019 becomes a fictional truth within their game that 152 00:07:04,019 --> 00:07:06,839 they just handed over a baked good. The mud is 153 00:07:06,839 --> 00:07:09,120 the prop that makes that proposition true in 154 00:07:09,120 --> 00:07:11,779 the universe of their game. It prescribes specific 155 00:07:11,779 --> 00:07:14,420 imaginings. It dictates exactly what the players 156 00:07:14,420 --> 00:07:16,879 are mandated to imagine if they want to participate 157 00:07:16,879 --> 00:07:19,079 correctly. Like if someone drops the mud pie 158 00:07:19,079 --> 00:07:21,399 on the ground, what happens? It automatically 159 00:07:21,399 --> 00:07:23,259 becomes a fictional truth that the pie is ruined. 160 00:07:23,699 --> 00:07:26,000 The players don't have to call a timeout and 161 00:07:26,000 --> 00:07:28,500 deliberately agree, OK, let's all imagine the 162 00:07:28,500 --> 00:07:31,220 pie fell. Exactly. The prop does the heavy lifting 163 00:07:31,220 --> 00:07:33,560 for them. It coordinates their shared imagination 164 00:07:33,560 --> 00:07:35,860 automatically, which allows the game to flow 165 00:07:35,860 --> 00:07:38,430 effortlessly. So Walton is demanding that we 166 00:07:38,430 --> 00:07:41,790 take that exact same mechanism, the mud generating 167 00:07:41,790 --> 00:07:44,730 fictional truths on a playground, and apply it 168 00:07:44,730 --> 00:07:48,029 to high art. He is. He's saying that Seurat's 169 00:07:48,029 --> 00:07:50,589 Le Grand Chat, that massive, pointless canvas 170 00:07:50,589 --> 00:07:53,589 in the museum, is essentially just a highly complex 171 00:07:53,589 --> 00:07:56,569 mud pie. It's just a sophisticated prop. The 172 00:07:56,569 --> 00:07:59,170 pattern of oil paint on the canvas acts in strict 173 00:07:59,170 --> 00:08:01,310 accordance with the conditional rules of our 174 00:08:01,310 --> 00:08:03,970 specific cultural games of visual make -believe. 175 00:08:04,060 --> 00:08:06,699 Those rules dictate that when we observe those 176 00:08:06,699 --> 00:08:09,899 specific arrangements of pigment we are prescribed 177 00:08:09,899 --> 00:08:13,600 to imagine a couple strolling or a woman holding 178 00:08:13,600 --> 00:08:16,500 a monkey on a leash. The painting makes it a 179 00:08:16,500 --> 00:08:18,600 fictional truth that those things are happening 180 00:08:18,600 --> 00:08:21,040 in the world of the artwork. The canvas itself 181 00:08:21,040 --> 00:08:23,339 is just a machine for generating those truths. 182 00:08:24,079 --> 00:08:26,699 Think of reading a dense Victorian novel. We 183 00:08:26,699 --> 00:08:29,000 often treat reading as, you know, receiving this 184 00:08:29,000 --> 00:08:31,829 profound message from a brilliant author. But 185 00:08:31,829 --> 00:08:33,750 Walton is saying you should think of it more 186 00:08:33,750 --> 00:08:36,250 like buying an incredibly detailed action figure. 187 00:08:36,649 --> 00:08:38,870 Charles Dickens is just manufacturing a very 188 00:08:38,870 --> 00:08:42,580 intricate toy. He is providing the prop. The 189 00:08:42,580 --> 00:08:45,440 book itself is inert. It's just dried ink on 190 00:08:45,440 --> 00:08:47,960 mashed trees. It doesn't actually do anything 191 00:08:47,960 --> 00:08:50,279 until you, the reader, take it out of the box 192 00:08:50,279 --> 00:08:52,759 and actively play the game of make -believe with 193 00:08:52,759 --> 00:08:55,559 it. That act of participation is what makes art 194 00:08:55,559 --> 00:08:58,620 functional. We really shouldn't view make -believe 195 00:08:58,620 --> 00:09:01,600 as merely frivolous play or childish escapism. 196 00:09:01,750 --> 00:09:05,889 Not at all. It is a fundamental, deeply ingrained 197 00:09:05,889 --> 00:09:09,440 psychological survival mechanism. Children across 198 00:09:09,440 --> 00:09:12,320 all cultures devote an astonishing amount of 199 00:09:12,320 --> 00:09:14,039 their cognitive development to make -believe. 200 00:09:14,320 --> 00:09:17,019 It's how we map out social roles, how we process 201 00:09:17,019 --> 00:09:19,960 overwhelming feelings, and how we test scenarios. 202 00:09:20,720 --> 00:09:23,879 Walton actually cites a profoundly dark but very 203 00:09:23,879 --> 00:09:26,720 illuminating example regarding this. Right, the 204 00:09:26,720 --> 00:09:28,620 example of children imprisoned in the Auschwitz 205 00:09:28,620 --> 00:09:31,240 concentration camp. Yeah. They were observed 206 00:09:31,240 --> 00:09:33,600 playing a game they called Going to the Gas Chamber. 207 00:09:34,240 --> 00:09:36,700 It is entirely chilling to even think about. 208 00:09:37,419 --> 00:09:39,700 But from a psychological standpoint, it reveals 209 00:09:39,700 --> 00:09:42,500 something massive about human nature. It demonstrates 210 00:09:42,500 --> 00:09:44,700 that make -believe is a vital tool for cognitive 211 00:09:44,700 --> 00:09:47,200 mapping. Those children were not playing for 212 00:09:47,200 --> 00:09:49,980 amusement. No, of course not. They were utilizing 213 00:09:49,980 --> 00:09:52,460 the innate mechanics of make -believe to earnestly 214 00:09:52,460 --> 00:09:55,120 confront and try to mentally structure this utterly 215 00:09:55,120 --> 00:09:57,139 incomprehensible reality they were subjected 216 00:09:57,139 --> 00:10:00,240 to. Make -believe allows the human mind to toy 217 00:10:00,240 --> 00:10:03,279 with reality, to explore the darkest unknowns, 218 00:10:03,960 --> 00:10:06,600 and to experience the crushing emotional weight 219 00:10:06,600 --> 00:10:09,399 of different scenarios within a protected psychological 220 00:10:09,399 --> 00:10:11,519 sandbox. You see, it's just the real -world cost 221 00:10:11,519 --> 00:10:14,360 of catastrophe. You can sit in a theater and 222 00:10:14,360 --> 00:10:16,659 experience the total devastation of Romeo and 223 00:10:16,659 --> 00:10:19,840 Juliet. You get to process the grief, the loss, 224 00:10:20,299 --> 00:10:22,580 the existential unfairness of the universe. And 225 00:10:22,580 --> 00:10:24,720 then the curtain drops and you walk out your 226 00:10:24,720 --> 00:10:27,559 car completely physically unharmed. We get all 227 00:10:27,559 --> 00:10:29,940 the profound cognitive and empathetic benefits 228 00:10:29,940 --> 00:10:33,000 of hard emotional experience for free. It really 229 00:10:33,000 --> 00:10:35,720 is a psychological evolutionary hack, which is 230 00:10:35,720 --> 00:10:38,620 why it's so incredibly strange that for decades 231 00:10:38,620 --> 00:10:41,200 philosophers of language and art theorists completely 232 00:10:41,200 --> 00:10:44,539 ignored this playful psychological reality. They 233 00:10:44,539 --> 00:10:47,480 try to jam art into a completely different framework, 234 00:10:47,860 --> 00:10:50,320 and this is exactly what Walton is reacting against 235 00:10:50,320 --> 00:10:53,440 in chapter two. Right, the pretend assertion 236 00:10:53,440 --> 00:10:56,080 theory. If art is fundamentally just a prop for 237 00:10:56,080 --> 00:10:58,679 a game of make -believe, why did the smartest 238 00:10:58,679 --> 00:11:01,120 philosophers of the 20th century treat fiction 239 00:11:01,120 --> 00:11:03,960 as a form of elaborate lying? Or what they called 240 00:11:03,960 --> 00:11:06,840 pretend truth -telling. To understand why they 241 00:11:06,840 --> 00:11:09,519 did that, we have to look at the obsession of 242 00:11:09,519 --> 00:11:12,419 20th century philosophy. The philosophy of language. 243 00:11:13,019 --> 00:11:15,730 Exactly. Philosophers like John Searle were heavily 244 00:11:15,730 --> 00:11:18,850 invested in turning all human communication into 245 00:11:18,850 --> 00:11:21,970 neat, logical prepositions that could be evaluated 246 00:11:21,970 --> 00:11:25,490 as strictly true or strictly false. They categorized 247 00:11:25,490 --> 00:11:29,590 communication into speech acts or elocutionary 248 00:11:29,590 --> 00:11:32,350 acts, like making a promise, giving an order, 249 00:11:32,570 --> 00:11:35,450 or most importantly, making an assertion about 250 00:11:35,450 --> 00:11:38,700 reality. Right. If I say to you, the sky is blue, 251 00:11:39,059 --> 00:11:41,620 I am making an assertion about the real world, 252 00:11:41,639 --> 00:11:43,879 and you can test it to see if I'm telling the 253 00:11:43,879 --> 00:11:47,019 truth. But fiction broke their neat logical system 254 00:11:47,019 --> 00:11:49,960 completely. Because how do you evaluate the truth 255 00:11:49,960 --> 00:11:52,879 of a sentence like, Sherlock Holmes lived at 256 00:11:52,879 --> 00:11:56,220 221B Baker Street? It's not a true assertion, 257 00:11:56,320 --> 00:11:58,240 obviously, because Sherlock Holmes never existed. 258 00:11:58,679 --> 00:12:00,679 But it also doesn't feel like a malicious lie, 259 00:12:00,899 --> 00:12:03,000 right? Because the author isn't trying to trick 260 00:12:03,000 --> 00:12:05,889 us into believing Holmes is real. So Searle and 261 00:12:05,889 --> 00:12:08,350 others developed this pretend assertion theory 262 00:12:08,350 --> 00:12:11,169 to solve the problem. They argued that when Arthur 263 00:12:11,169 --> 00:12:13,470 Conan Doyle wrote those words, he was simply 264 00:12:13,470 --> 00:12:16,470 pretending to make an assertion. He was mimicking 265 00:12:16,470 --> 00:12:18,850 the act of telling the truth, engaging in this 266 00:12:18,850 --> 00:12:22,250 socially acceptable form of deceit. Yeah, where 267 00:12:22,250 --> 00:12:25,129 the author pretends to be a historian or a journalist, 268 00:12:25,230 --> 00:12:27,070 and the reader just plays along with the joke. 269 00:12:27,789 --> 00:12:29,970 It reduces all of literature to an elaborate 270 00:12:29,970 --> 00:12:32,529 parlor trick. It's essentially saying art is 271 00:12:32,529 --> 00:12:35,710 just failed nonfiction. And Walton aggressively 272 00:12:35,710 --> 00:12:38,710 dismantles this by pointing out a glaring fatal 273 00:12:38,710 --> 00:12:41,649 flaw. He says the linguistic model completely 274 00:12:41,649 --> 00:12:44,029 collapses the second you leave the library and 275 00:12:44,029 --> 00:12:46,610 walk into a sculpture garden. This is such a 276 00:12:46,610 --> 00:12:49,549 good point. Look at Jacques Lipschitz's famous 277 00:12:49,549 --> 00:12:52,860 bronze sculpture guitar player. Under Searle's 278 00:12:52,860 --> 00:12:55,000 theory, we would have to say that Lipschitz is 279 00:12:55,000 --> 00:12:57,419 pretending to make an assertion with a hunk of 280 00:12:57,419 --> 00:13:00,440 bronze. Which is ridiculous. You don't make truth 281 00:13:00,440 --> 00:13:02,580 claims with a welding torch and molten metal. 282 00:13:02,600 --> 00:13:04,720 That makes zero sense. Painting and sculpting 283 00:13:04,720 --> 00:13:08,860 are not standard mediums for performing illocutionary 284 00:13:08,860 --> 00:13:11,460 speech acts. To claim a painter is mimicking 285 00:13:11,460 --> 00:13:14,139 a tradition of making truth claims with a brushstroke 286 00:13:14,139 --> 00:13:16,840 is incredibly forced. It's deeply unnatural. 287 00:13:17,360 --> 00:13:19,240 A sculptor is not pretending that a piece of 288 00:13:19,240 --> 00:13:21,559 bronze is a real person any more than a company 289 00:13:21,559 --> 00:13:24,080 that manufactures a plastic baby doll is trying 290 00:13:24,080 --> 00:13:26,379 to trick children into thinking they've created 291 00:13:26,379 --> 00:13:29,220 biological life. They are manufacturing a prop. 292 00:13:29,539 --> 00:13:31,799 And Walden argues that literary fictions are 293 00:13:31,799 --> 00:13:34,299 doing the exact same thing. The author of a novel 294 00:13:34,299 --> 00:13:36,980 isn't pretending to make assertions about reality. 295 00:13:37,220 --> 00:13:39,980 They are systematically building a textual prop 296 00:13:39,980 --> 00:13:42,779 designed specifically to guide the reader's imagination. 297 00:13:43,259 --> 00:13:45,840 I find that incredibly liberating. It frees art 298 00:13:45,840 --> 00:13:48,259 from the burden of being judged constantly against 299 00:13:48,259 --> 00:13:50,960 reality. I agree, but I do want to push back 300 00:13:50,960 --> 00:13:54,200 on this a little bit. What happens when the lines 301 00:13:54,200 --> 00:13:57,659 blur? What do you mean? Like, what about a massive, 302 00:13:57,980 --> 00:14:00,700 heavily researched historical novel like Hilary 303 00:14:00,700 --> 00:14:04,330 Mantel's Wolf Hall? or a meticulous novel about 304 00:14:04,330 --> 00:14:06,570 Abraham Lincoln. Okay, I see where you're going. 305 00:14:06,929 --> 00:14:08,990 The author is using actual historical facts, 306 00:14:09,110 --> 00:14:11,970 real dates, real people. If the author is utilizing 307 00:14:11,970 --> 00:14:14,649 objective reality, where does Walton draw the 308 00:14:14,649 --> 00:14:17,389 line between work of nonfiction, like a Lincoln 309 00:14:17,389 --> 00:14:20,669 biography, and a historical novel? That's a great 310 00:14:20,669 --> 00:14:24,649 question. For Walton, the dividing line has absolutely 311 00:14:24,649 --> 00:14:26,870 nothing to do with whether the statements inside 312 00:14:26,870 --> 00:14:29,149 the book are objectively true or false in the 313 00:14:29,149 --> 00:14:33,009 real world. Really? What is the distinction based 314 00:14:33,009 --> 00:14:35,750 on? It relies entirely on the social function 315 00:14:35,750 --> 00:14:38,309 of the work. A biography of Abraham Lincoln has 316 00:14:38,309 --> 00:14:40,409 the established social function of communicating 317 00:14:40,409 --> 00:14:43,129 facts. Its primary utility is to be believed 318 00:14:43,129 --> 00:14:46,330 by the reader. Okay, but a historical novel about 319 00:14:46,330 --> 00:14:49,710 Lincoln? Even if the novel happens to be 99 % 320 00:14:49,710 --> 00:14:51,490 factually accurate to the historical record, 321 00:14:51,850 --> 00:14:54,730 its primary social function is serving as a prop 322 00:14:54,730 --> 00:14:57,649 in a game of make -believe. Its structural purpose 323 00:14:57,649 --> 00:15:00,980 is to prescribe imaginings. So... If a historical 324 00:15:00,980 --> 00:15:03,480 novel contains the sentence, Lincoln was the 325 00:15:03,480 --> 00:15:06,360 16th president, that statement is factually true 326 00:15:06,360 --> 00:15:08,940 in the real world. Yes. But within the context 327 00:15:08,940 --> 00:15:11,500 of the novel, its job isn't to educate you on 328 00:15:11,500 --> 00:15:14,899 presidential history. Its job is to say, within 329 00:15:14,899 --> 00:15:17,179 the boundaries of this game we are playing, it 330 00:15:17,179 --> 00:15:19,399 is a fictional truth that Lincoln is the president. 331 00:15:20,000 --> 00:15:22,840 Please imagine that. That is the exact crucial 332 00:15:22,840 --> 00:15:25,279 distinction. And this function applies heavily 333 00:15:25,279 --> 00:15:27,799 to cultural myths and religious texts as well. 334 00:15:27,909 --> 00:15:29,970 Oh, right, because many societies have origin 335 00:15:29,970 --> 00:15:32,629 myths. And whether the individuals reciting those 336 00:15:32,629 --> 00:15:35,009 myths believe them to be historically, scientifically 337 00:15:35,009 --> 00:15:38,269 true is actually secondary to the text's social 338 00:15:38,269 --> 00:15:41,049 function. The myth operates as an incredibly 339 00:15:41,049 --> 00:15:43,330 powerful prop to guide the collective imagination 340 00:15:43,330 --> 00:15:45,889 of a culture. It establishes a web of shared 341 00:15:45,889 --> 00:15:48,429 fictional truths that bind a community together 342 00:15:48,429 --> 00:15:51,649 and dictate cultural values. The objective truth 343 00:15:51,649 --> 00:15:54,789 value is far less important than the shared imaginative 344 00:15:54,789 --> 00:15:58,210 engagement the text demands. Okay, so if we accept 345 00:15:58,210 --> 00:16:00,570 that artworks are props, that there are tools 346 00:16:00,570 --> 00:16:04,070 we use to play a structured game, how do we actually 347 00:16:04,070 --> 00:16:06,070 know the rules of the game? This takes us into 348 00:16:06,070 --> 00:16:08,950 chapters three and four, the mechanics of fictional 349 00:16:08,950 --> 00:16:12,129 worlds. Because no prop gives you all the information, 350 00:16:12,269 --> 00:16:15,470 right? A painting of a house only shows you the 351 00:16:15,470 --> 00:16:17,210 front facade. It doesn't paint the backyard. 352 00:16:17,330 --> 00:16:20,789 Right. Or a 900 -page fantasy novel doesn't stop 353 00:16:20,789 --> 00:16:23,269 to tell you how many times the character blinks 354 00:16:23,269 --> 00:16:26,110 or whether they have a circulatory system. The 355 00:16:26,110 --> 00:16:29,809 art is always incomplete. So how do we, as players, 356 00:16:30,110 --> 00:16:32,389 know how to fill in the massive blank spaces 357 00:16:32,389 --> 00:16:35,190 the artist leaves behind? Exactly. How do props 358 00:16:35,190 --> 00:16:37,830 generate truths that aren't explicitly stated? 359 00:16:38,509 --> 00:16:40,750 Before we look at how we extrapolate, Walton 360 00:16:40,750 --> 00:16:42,809 asks us to look at what the props are fundamentally 361 00:16:42,809 --> 00:16:44,970 anchoring themselves to, which he calls objects 362 00:16:44,970 --> 00:16:47,990 of representation. Okay, because sometimes props 363 00:16:47,990 --> 00:16:50,649 point at real -world things, like a painting 364 00:16:50,649 --> 00:16:53,309 of Julius Caesar points at the historical Caesar. 365 00:16:53,690 --> 00:16:56,190 Yes. The painting doesn't just mandate that you 366 00:16:56,190 --> 00:16:59,129 imagine a generic man in a toga. It mandates 367 00:16:59,129 --> 00:17:02,049 that you imagine of the actual Julius Caesar 368 00:17:02,049 --> 00:17:05,470 that he is standing there. But then Walton introduces 369 00:17:05,470 --> 00:17:09,170 this mind -bending category called reflexive 370 00:17:09,170 --> 00:17:12,130 representations, right? Yes. These are works 371 00:17:12,130 --> 00:17:14,970 of art that represent themselves. They are props 372 00:17:14,970 --> 00:17:18,089 that prescribe imaginings about their own physical 373 00:17:18,089 --> 00:17:21,470 existence. Give me an example of a reflexive 374 00:17:21,470 --> 00:17:23,750 prop because that sounds like an absolute paradox. 375 00:17:24,289 --> 00:17:27,009 Walton points to John Barth's story, Frametale. 376 00:17:27,150 --> 00:17:29,529 Have you seen this? I don't think so. So the 377 00:17:29,529 --> 00:17:32,049 physical story is literally just a few words 378 00:17:32,049 --> 00:17:34,509 printed on a strip of paper. On one side, it 379 00:17:34,509 --> 00:17:37,809 says, once upon a time there. And on the reverse 380 00:17:37,809 --> 00:17:41,769 side, it says, was a story that began. OK. The 381 00:17:41,769 --> 00:17:44,509 reader is explicitly instructed to cut the strip 382 00:17:44,509 --> 00:17:47,710 out, give it a half twist, and tape the ends 383 00:17:47,710 --> 00:17:50,970 together to form a Mobius strip. Oh, wow. So 384 00:17:50,970 --> 00:17:52,849 when you trace it with your finger, it just endlessly 385 00:17:52,849 --> 00:17:55,049 reads, once upon a time, there was a story that 386 00:17:55,049 --> 00:17:56,710 began, once upon a time, there was a story that 387 00:17:56,710 --> 00:17:59,890 began in a continuous infinite loop? Exactly. 388 00:18:00,230 --> 00:18:04,250 OK. The text represents itself as a story, representing 389 00:18:04,250 --> 00:18:06,630 itself as a story. It generates fictional truths 390 00:18:06,630 --> 00:18:09,630 about its own physical looping existence as a 391 00:18:09,630 --> 00:18:12,529 piece of paper. That is so weird. Are there movies 392 00:18:12,529 --> 00:18:15,109 that do this? Definitely. Consider the Millbrooks 393 00:18:15,109 --> 00:18:17,289 film Blazing Saddles. Oh, I love that movie. 394 00:18:17,710 --> 00:18:20,789 In the climax of the movie, The characters physically 395 00:18:20,789 --> 00:18:23,349 break out of the fictional Western town. They 396 00:18:23,349 --> 00:18:25,569 spill over onto the Warner Brothers studio lot, 397 00:18:26,089 --> 00:18:28,250 fight through a cafeteria, and eventually run 398 00:18:28,250 --> 00:18:30,150 down a street to a movie theater. Right, and 399 00:18:30,150 --> 00:18:32,109 they sit down and watch the end of Blazing Saddles 400 00:18:32,109 --> 00:18:34,849 on the silver screen. The movie appears inside 401 00:18:34,849 --> 00:18:37,509 itself. It is a prop that mandates you to imagine 402 00:18:37,509 --> 00:18:39,609 that the prop itself exists within the fictional 403 00:18:39,609 --> 00:18:41,950 universe you are watching. It completely shatters 404 00:18:41,950 --> 00:18:44,250 the boundaries of the game by making the game 405 00:18:44,250 --> 00:18:46,509 piece part of the game itself. That is brilliant. 406 00:18:46,750 --> 00:18:49,190 It's very meta. But let's get back to filling 407 00:18:49,190 --> 00:18:51,890 in the blanks for more traditional art. Walton 408 00:18:51,890 --> 00:18:54,809 outlines two primary engines that power our ability 409 00:18:54,809 --> 00:18:57,490 to extrapolate fictional truths. The reality 410 00:18:57,490 --> 00:18:59,789 principle and the mutual belief principle. Right. 411 00:19:00,230 --> 00:19:02,670 Let's tackle the reality principle first. OK, 412 00:19:02,670 --> 00:19:05,630 let me see if I can map this one out. See, I'm 413 00:19:05,630 --> 00:19:08,549 reading a thriller. And the author writes, the 414 00:19:08,549 --> 00:19:11,650 detective walked into the room. OK. The text 415 00:19:11,650 --> 00:19:14,890 doesn't explicitly say, the detective breathed 416 00:19:14,890 --> 00:19:18,009 oxygen. or gravity kept the detective's feet 417 00:19:18,009 --> 00:19:20,369 on the floor. But I inherently know those things 418 00:19:20,369 --> 00:19:23,289 are true within the story. Exactly. The Reality 419 00:19:23,289 --> 00:19:26,750 Principle, or RP, means you use the actual laws 420 00:19:26,750 --> 00:19:29,230 of physics and reality as the default operating 421 00:19:29,230 --> 00:19:31,970 system for the fictional world, unless the author 422 00:19:31,970 --> 00:19:34,990 explicitly tells you otherwise. You're utilizing 423 00:19:34,990 --> 00:19:37,809 reality as the baseline blueprint. If the text 424 00:19:37,809 --> 00:19:40,640 generates a primary fictional truth, like he 425 00:19:40,640 --> 00:19:43,720 walked into a room, we ask, what else would logically 426 00:19:43,720 --> 00:19:45,960 follow if that event occurred in the real world? 427 00:19:46,200 --> 00:19:48,920 We automatically generate a massive web of implied 428 00:19:48,920 --> 00:19:51,019 truths without the author having to waste ink 429 00:19:51,019 --> 00:19:54,299 explaining basic biology or physics. That seems 430 00:19:54,299 --> 00:19:57,039 pretty intuitive, right? But the mutual belief 431 00:19:57,039 --> 00:19:59,500 principle is where it gets incredibly culturally 432 00:19:59,500 --> 00:20:02,160 specific. OK, so think about watching an action 433 00:20:02,160 --> 00:20:05,079 movie from the 1980s. The hero shoots the bumper 434 00:20:05,079 --> 00:20:07,720 of a parked car with just a standard handgun, 435 00:20:07,940 --> 00:20:10,289 and the car instantly detonates into a massive 436 00:20:10,289 --> 00:20:13,049 three -story fireball. A classic trope. Right. 437 00:20:13,430 --> 00:20:16,230 Now, if we strictly applied the reality principle, 438 00:20:16,430 --> 00:20:18,650 we would say, well, the bullet lodged in the 439 00:20:18,650 --> 00:20:20,289 fiberglass bumper and absolutely nothing else 440 00:20:20,289 --> 00:20:22,450 happened. Because that's how physics works. But 441 00:20:22,450 --> 00:20:24,950 we don't do that. We instinctively accept that 442 00:20:24,950 --> 00:20:27,710 in this specific genre, cars are essentially 443 00:20:27,710 --> 00:20:30,009 constructed entirely out of volatile explosives. 444 00:20:30,430 --> 00:20:32,490 That is the mutual belief principle at work, 445 00:20:32,609 --> 00:20:36,470 right? It is. The perfect modern example. The 446 00:20:36,470 --> 00:20:39,450 mutual belief principle or MBP dictates that 447 00:20:39,450 --> 00:20:41,950 we should not assume the fictional world operates 448 00:20:41,950 --> 00:20:45,450 like the actual real world. We assume it operates 449 00:20:45,450 --> 00:20:49,329 how the artist's society or genre mutually believed 450 00:20:49,329 --> 00:20:53,210 or conventionally agreed the world worked. Walton 451 00:20:53,210 --> 00:20:55,650 uses a really great historical example of a silent 452 00:20:55,650 --> 00:20:58,670 film from 1910. The movie shows a family eating 453 00:20:58,670 --> 00:21:01,450 dinner and the table is covered with a checkered 454 00:21:01,450 --> 00:21:03,930 tablecloth. Okay, just a standard tablecloth? 455 00:21:04,130 --> 00:21:06,589 Well, if you strictly apply the reality principle, 456 00:21:07,250 --> 00:21:09,769 a checkered tablecloth implies absolutely nothing 457 00:21:09,769 --> 00:21:12,809 about a family's socioeconomic status. Rich people 458 00:21:12,809 --> 00:21:15,529 and poor people both own checkered fabric. Right, 459 00:21:15,769 --> 00:21:18,869 it's just a textile pattern in reality. But if 460 00:21:18,869 --> 00:21:20,789 we apply the mutual belief principle, we have 461 00:21:20,789 --> 00:21:24,049 to look at what a 1910 cinema audience mutually 462 00:21:24,049 --> 00:21:26,529 understood about that specific visual symbol. 463 00:21:26,750 --> 00:21:29,180 What did they understand? In the cultural context 464 00:21:29,180 --> 00:21:32,220 of early 20th century theater and film, a checkered 465 00:21:32,220 --> 00:21:35,259 tablecloth was a universally understood, incredibly 466 00:21:35,259 --> 00:21:38,660 efficient shorthand for a poor but honest family. 467 00:21:38,859 --> 00:21:42,059 Oh, wow. So the MVP dictates that it is a fictional 468 00:21:42,059 --> 00:21:44,240 truth in the world of that movie that the family 469 00:21:44,240 --> 00:21:47,480 is poor but honest. Yes. The actual reality of 470 00:21:47,480 --> 00:21:49,960 tablecloths doesn't matter. The mutual belief 471 00:21:49,960 --> 00:21:52,099 of the audience dictates the rules of the game. 472 00:21:52,500 --> 00:21:55,259 We are constantly. seamlessly code -switching 473 00:21:55,259 --> 00:21:58,019 when we consume art. We are negotiating this 474 00:21:58,019 --> 00:22:00,539 really complex treaty between the laws of reality 475 00:22:00,539 --> 00:22:03,259 and the laws of genre or culture. The artist 476 00:22:03,259 --> 00:22:05,259 knows we will read the checker tablecloth a certain 477 00:22:05,259 --> 00:22:08,640 way, so they use it to save time. The MVP gives 478 00:22:08,640 --> 00:22:11,799 the artist massive narrative leverage. But the 479 00:22:11,799 --> 00:22:14,119 reality principle allows the audience to immerse 480 00:22:14,119 --> 00:22:16,539 themselves, to investigate the fictional world 481 00:22:16,539 --> 00:22:19,140 deeply, as if it had real weight and consequence. 482 00:22:19,420 --> 00:22:23,349 Exactly. It's a balance. Okay, so we've constructed 483 00:22:23,349 --> 00:22:27,329 the world. We understand the props. We know how 484 00:22:27,329 --> 00:22:30,130 to generate the implied truths. We know the rules 485 00:22:30,130 --> 00:22:32,990 of gravity and genre. But this raises a massive 486 00:22:32,990 --> 00:22:35,450 logistical problem for me. What's the problem? 487 00:22:36,190 --> 00:22:39,559 Where are we? Where does the audience physically 488 00:22:39,559 --> 00:22:41,319 and psychologically fit into this landscape? 489 00:22:41,519 --> 00:22:43,720 Because usually we talk about the fourth wall. 490 00:22:44,279 --> 00:22:46,779 Right. The idea that there is the fictional world 491 00:22:46,779 --> 00:22:49,200 happening on stage and we are sitting in the 492 00:22:49,200 --> 00:22:51,740 dark, safe and separate, looking through an invisible 493 00:22:51,740 --> 00:22:53,880 window. Yeah, that's how we're taught to think 494 00:22:53,880 --> 00:22:57,500 about it. Well, in chapters 5, 6, and 7, Walton 495 00:22:57,500 --> 00:22:59,579 basically takes a sledgehammer to the concept 496 00:22:59,579 --> 00:23:03,259 of the fourth wall. Really? How so? He argues 497 00:23:03,259 --> 00:23:05,519 that we are not outside the fiction looking in. 498 00:23:05,680 --> 00:23:08,839 We are active players situated inside our own 499 00:23:08,839 --> 00:23:11,980 game of make -believe. Wait, he argues that our 500 00:23:11,980 --> 00:23:14,599 act of observing is part of the fiction itself? 501 00:23:15,059 --> 00:23:17,400 Yes. When you stand in a museum and look at a 502 00:23:17,400 --> 00:23:20,160 painting, the artwork is a prop in your personal 503 00:23:20,160 --> 00:23:22,450 game. It becomes a fictional truth within your 504 00:23:22,450 --> 00:23:24,710 game that you are observing the events depicted. 505 00:23:25,150 --> 00:23:27,970 So, like, take Michelangelo's creation of Adam 506 00:23:27,970 --> 00:23:29,930 painted on the ceiling of the Sistine Chapel. 507 00:23:30,509 --> 00:23:33,690 It depicts God reaching out to spark life into 508 00:23:33,690 --> 00:23:36,009 the first human being. A very famous moment. 509 00:23:36,170 --> 00:23:39,529 Right. But logically and biblically, there were 510 00:23:39,529 --> 00:23:41,650 absolutely no other humans present to witness 511 00:23:41,650 --> 00:23:44,710 this moment. So how can we be looking at it? 512 00:23:45,049 --> 00:23:48,319 Where's the camera positioned? We have to play 513 00:23:48,319 --> 00:23:51,759 a game where we are invisible, omnipresent witnesses. 514 00:23:52,200 --> 00:23:55,299 Walton calls this seeing the unseen. Seeing the 515 00:23:55,299 --> 00:23:57,960 unseen. The artwork actively prescribes that 516 00:23:57,960 --> 00:24:00,660 you imagine yourself seeing it. It is a fictional 517 00:24:00,660 --> 00:24:02,759 truth in your game of make believe that you are 518 00:24:02,759 --> 00:24:06,599 present, witnessing a fundamentally unwitnessable 519 00:24:06,599 --> 00:24:09,599 event. You are not just a passive receptacle 520 00:24:09,599 --> 00:24:13,059 for an image. You are a participant. Your physical 521 00:24:13,059 --> 00:24:15,359 act of looking is incorporated directly into 522 00:24:15,359 --> 00:24:17,809 the fiction. It makes the act of walking through 523 00:24:17,809 --> 00:24:21,529 an art gallery an incredibly active, almost athletic 524 00:24:21,529 --> 00:24:23,670 endeavor. You are constantly stepping into new 525 00:24:23,670 --> 00:24:26,609 roles. But participation isn't just about where 526 00:24:26,609 --> 00:24:28,390 we are standing in the fictional space, right? 527 00:24:28,509 --> 00:24:30,849 It's about what is happening in our nervous system. 528 00:24:31,589 --> 00:24:34,450 Yes. Which circles back to the paradox we started 529 00:24:34,450 --> 00:24:37,470 the show with. The paradox of fictional emotions. 530 00:24:37,910 --> 00:24:39,789 Let's talk about Charles in the slime. This is 531 00:24:39,789 --> 00:24:41,589 my favorite part of the theory. It is perhaps 532 00:24:41,589 --> 00:24:44,190 Walton's most famous contribution to aesthetics. 533 00:24:44,529 --> 00:24:46,869 Imagine a man named Charles sitting in a movie 534 00:24:46,869 --> 00:24:49,410 theater watching a horror film. Okay, Charles 535 00:24:49,410 --> 00:24:52,230 is in the theater. On the screen, a giant radioactive 536 00:24:52,230 --> 00:24:54,890 green slime is oozing its way toward the camera. 537 00:24:55,700 --> 00:24:58,779 Charles screams, he clutches the armrests, his 538 00:24:58,779 --> 00:25:01,079 heart rate spikes, he starts sweating. He is 539 00:25:01,079 --> 00:25:04,019 exhibiting every physiological symptom of sheer 540 00:25:04,019 --> 00:25:06,960 terror. But if you tap Charles on the shoulder 541 00:25:06,960 --> 00:25:10,019 and ask, are you in physical danger? He will 542 00:25:10,019 --> 00:25:13,410 say no. Because if he genuinely, cognitively 543 00:25:13,410 --> 00:25:15,750 believed a radioactive slime was about to consume 544 00:25:15,750 --> 00:25:18,210 him, he would spread out the emergency exit. 545 00:25:18,750 --> 00:25:22,210 Exactly. Charles has the physiological symptoms 546 00:25:22,210 --> 00:25:25,309 of fear, but he lacks the behavioral imperatives, 547 00:25:25,869 --> 00:25:29,289 the need to run, fight, or hide, that define 548 00:25:29,289 --> 00:25:32,109 genuine real -world fear. So how does Walton 549 00:25:32,109 --> 00:25:34,809 solve this? He solves this paradox by introducing 550 00:25:34,809 --> 00:25:39,150 the concept of quasi -emotions. Charles is experiencing 551 00:25:39,150 --> 00:25:42,210 a very real, undeniable physiological reaction. 552 00:25:42,589 --> 00:25:45,230 His adrenaline is pumping. Right. Walton calls 553 00:25:45,230 --> 00:25:48,910 this raw physiological state quasi -fear. But 554 00:25:48,910 --> 00:25:52,309 Charles is not experiencing actual directed fear. 555 00:25:52,930 --> 00:25:56,609 Instead, it is a fictional truth in Charles's 556 00:25:56,609 --> 00:25:59,150 game of make -believe that he is afraid of the 557 00:25:59,150 --> 00:26:02,049 slime. Yes. Let me make sure I'm capturing the 558 00:26:02,049 --> 00:26:04,190 nuance here though. The sweating, the elevated 559 00:26:04,190 --> 00:26:06,849 heart rate, the adrenaline, that is entirely 560 00:26:06,849 --> 00:26:10,660 real. But the emotion of fear, specifically directed 561 00:26:10,660 --> 00:26:14,440 at the fictional slime, is a pretense. Exactly. 562 00:26:14,960 --> 00:26:17,140 Charles is playing a psychological game where 563 00:26:17,140 --> 00:26:19,859 he imagines himself to be terrified. Think of 564 00:26:19,859 --> 00:26:21,839 a child playing cops and robbers. Oh, that's 565 00:26:21,839 --> 00:26:24,140 a perfect analogy. The child gets tagged, falls 566 00:26:24,140 --> 00:26:26,339 to the grass, and yells, you shot me, I'm dying. 567 00:26:26,839 --> 00:26:29,579 The child is genuinely experiencing a rush of 568 00:26:29,579 --> 00:26:31,900 adrenaline, excitement, and exertion. But they 569 00:26:31,900 --> 00:26:34,480 are fictionally experiencing the agony of a gunshot 570 00:26:34,480 --> 00:26:38,230 wound. Charles is genuinely feeling quasi -fear, 571 00:26:38,569 --> 00:26:41,130 but he is fictionally afraid of the slime. He 572 00:26:41,130 --> 00:26:43,190 is psychologically participating in the game 573 00:26:43,190 --> 00:26:46,069 using his own nervous system as part of the apparatus. 574 00:26:46,710 --> 00:26:49,369 This brilliantly explains why we intentionally 575 00:26:49,369 --> 00:26:52,069 seek out tragedy. When you put on a movie that 576 00:26:52,069 --> 00:26:54,329 you know will make you sob uncontrollably, you 577 00:26:54,329 --> 00:26:56,289 aren't doing it because you are a masochist who 578 00:26:56,289 --> 00:26:59,289 wants to be genuinely depressed. No, if a close 579 00:26:59,289 --> 00:27:02,130 friend died in real life, that would be actual 580 00:27:02,130 --> 00:27:04,309 grief, and it would be traumatizing, debilitating, 581 00:27:04,430 --> 00:27:07,430 and chaotic. But when you watch a tragic film, 582 00:27:07,890 --> 00:27:11,410 you experience quasi -grief. You get to fictionally 583 00:27:11,410 --> 00:27:14,190 experience the profundity, the catharsis, and 584 00:27:14,190 --> 00:27:17,069 the deep connecting empathy of human loss, but 585 00:27:17,069 --> 00:27:19,609 within a strictly bounded container. You get 586 00:27:19,609 --> 00:27:21,569 all the emotional weightlifting without the risk 587 00:27:21,569 --> 00:27:23,690 of dropping the barbell on your neck and crushing 588 00:27:23,690 --> 00:27:27,390 your windpipe. It is an incredibly adaptive psychological 589 00:27:27,390 --> 00:27:30,329 tool. We are safely rehearsing our emotional 590 00:27:30,329 --> 00:27:33,289 capacities, but this raises a practical problem 591 00:27:33,289 --> 00:27:37,009 for me. What's that? Experiencing the quasi -fear 592 00:27:37,009 --> 00:27:39,450 of a giant visual slime monster on a massive 593 00:27:39,450 --> 00:27:43,329 movie screen is a highly visceral sensory experience. 594 00:27:44,299 --> 00:27:46,819 How does this same game work when we transition 595 00:27:46,819 --> 00:27:48,940 from a movie to a book? That's a good distinction 596 00:27:48,940 --> 00:27:51,640 to make. Like, does a painting of a landscape 597 00:27:51,640 --> 00:27:55,440 trigger the exact same mechanics as reading a 598 00:27:55,440 --> 00:27:58,089 chapter of text? Walton actually acknowledges 599 00:27:58,089 --> 00:27:59,809 a profound difference in the mechanics here, 600 00:27:59,910 --> 00:28:02,930 dividing them into depicting representation and 601 00:28:02,930 --> 00:28:05,289 verbal representation in chapters eight and nine. 602 00:28:05,730 --> 00:28:08,049 Okay, let's start with depicting representation. 603 00:28:08,450 --> 00:28:10,630 That encompasses visual games like paintings 604 00:28:10,630 --> 00:28:13,190 and sculptures. Pictures provoke what he calls 605 00:28:13,190 --> 00:28:16,869 rich and vivid perceptual games. So when you 606 00:28:16,869 --> 00:28:19,369 look at a painting, you aren't just handed a 607 00:28:19,369 --> 00:28:22,029 piece of data to imagine. You are prescribed 608 00:28:22,029 --> 00:28:25,619 to visually explore it. He uses the example of 609 00:28:25,619 --> 00:28:28,900 a 17th century Dutch landscape by Hobbema, the 610 00:28:28,900 --> 00:28:30,720 water mill with the great red roof. Have you 611 00:28:30,720 --> 00:28:33,740 seen it? Yeah, it's very detailed, lots of trees 612 00:28:33,740 --> 00:28:35,960 and little figures. When you stand in front of 613 00:28:35,960 --> 00:28:38,319 that painting, it isn't just a fictional truth 614 00:28:38,319 --> 00:28:41,140 that a water mill exists. It is a fictional truth 615 00:28:41,140 --> 00:28:43,960 that you are looking at the mill and you can 616 00:28:43,960 --> 00:28:45,920 dart your eyes around the canvas to discover 617 00:28:45,920 --> 00:28:48,559 what else is there. You scan the painted trees 618 00:28:48,559 --> 00:28:51,220 to see if there are birds. You look at the doorway 619 00:28:51,220 --> 00:28:53,730 to see if someone is standing there. Your actual 620 00:28:53,730 --> 00:28:56,210 physical act of moving your eyes across the canvas 621 00:28:56,210 --> 00:28:58,990 corresponds directly to the fictional act of 622 00:28:58,990 --> 00:29:02,289 scanning a real landscape. That is a visual game 623 00:29:02,289 --> 00:29:04,609 of make -believe. And different artists force 624 00:29:04,609 --> 00:29:06,730 us to play different variations of this visual 625 00:29:06,730 --> 00:29:09,529 game, right? The way Vermeer makes you play is 626 00:29:09,529 --> 00:29:11,970 entirely different from the way Matisse makes 627 00:29:11,970 --> 00:29:15,549 you play. It's a spectacular comparison. Take 628 00:29:15,549 --> 00:29:18,029 a Vermeer painting, like girl reading a letter 629 00:29:18,029 --> 00:29:21,410 at an open window. Vermeer is famous for his 630 00:29:21,410 --> 00:29:25,339 light. Exactly. Vermeer uses incredibly explicit, 631 00:29:25,400 --> 00:29:28,019 highly detailed cues of light and shadow. The 632 00:29:28,019 --> 00:29:30,319 light falls across the drapery with photographic 633 00:29:30,319 --> 00:29:34,119 precision. So in our game of make -believe, the 634 00:29:34,119 --> 00:29:35,819 fictional truths about the three -dimensional 635 00:29:35,819 --> 00:29:39,019 space, the depth of the room, the distance between 636 00:29:39,019 --> 00:29:41,960 the girl and the window, are generated directly 637 00:29:41,960 --> 00:29:44,539 by our observation of those shadows. We see the 638 00:29:44,539 --> 00:29:46,819 rendered light, and the light dictates the shape 639 00:29:46,819 --> 00:29:49,180 of the room to our brains. But Matisse strips 640 00:29:49,180 --> 00:29:51,539 all of that away entirely. Oh, yeah. Look at 641 00:29:51,539 --> 00:29:54,599 Matisse's The Red Studio. It depicts a room, 642 00:29:54,720 --> 00:29:56,660 but the walls, the floor, the furniture are all 643 00:29:56,660 --> 00:30:00,000 painted in this flat, vibrant, uniform red. There 644 00:30:00,000 --> 00:30:02,759 are absolutely no shadows. The objects are just 645 00:30:02,759 --> 00:30:06,000 thin outlines. So in Vermeer, the light tells 646 00:30:06,000 --> 00:30:08,980 us about the objects. In Matisse, the objects, 647 00:30:09,319 --> 00:30:10,980 like the outlines of a chair or the angle of 648 00:30:10,980 --> 00:30:14,259 a table, force us to deduce the space. We have 649 00:30:14,259 --> 00:30:17,180 to reconstruct the 3D space indirectly because 650 00:30:17,180 --> 00:30:19,819 the explicit visual cues of light and depth are 651 00:30:19,819 --> 00:30:22,119 entirely missing. The game requires a different 652 00:30:22,119 --> 00:30:24,420 kind of perceptual heavy lifting from the viewer. 653 00:30:25,039 --> 00:30:26,839 We are forced to imagine a three -dimensional 654 00:30:26,839 --> 00:30:29,859 room, despite the canvas aggressively reminding 655 00:30:29,859 --> 00:30:32,380 us that it is a flat, two -dimensional surface. 656 00:30:32,799 --> 00:30:34,900 The cognitive dissonance is the point of the 657 00:30:34,900 --> 00:30:37,519 game, and this applies even to purely abstract 658 00:30:37,519 --> 00:30:41,099 art. Wait, really? Yes, Walton's take on Kazimir 659 00:30:41,099 --> 00:30:43,960 Malevich's Suprematist painting completely rewired 660 00:30:43,960 --> 00:30:46,059 how I look at modern art. Refresh my memory. 661 00:30:46,099 --> 00:30:49,000 What does that painting look like? The painting's 662 00:30:49,000 --> 00:30:52,119 literally just a yellow rectangle painted slightly 663 00:30:52,119 --> 00:30:55,700 over a green rectangle. Right. And many critics 664 00:30:55,700 --> 00:30:58,160 would argue that is non -representational art. 665 00:30:58,700 --> 00:31:01,039 It's just geometry on canvas. It doesn't represent 666 00:31:01,039 --> 00:31:04,839 anything outside itself. But Walton argues it 667 00:31:04,839 --> 00:31:08,059 is a representation. Because when you look at 668 00:31:08,059 --> 00:31:10,619 it, human visual processing inevitably sees the 669 00:31:10,619 --> 00:31:13,240 yellow rectangle as being in front of the green 670 00:31:13,240 --> 00:31:15,759 one. Even though you know the canvas is completely 671 00:31:15,759 --> 00:31:19,480 flat, there is zero actual depth. Exactly. But 672 00:31:19,480 --> 00:31:21,519 the painting forces your brain to play a visual 673 00:31:21,519 --> 00:31:23,680 game where you imagine one shape floating in 674 00:31:23,680 --> 00:31:26,420 front of another in a spatial plane. It prescribes 675 00:31:26,420 --> 00:31:29,099 a spatial imagining. Therefore, it functions 676 00:31:29,099 --> 00:31:32,339 as a prop. So a painting forces you to play a 677 00:31:32,339 --> 00:31:35,059 perceptual game with depth and light. But what 678 00:31:35,059 --> 00:31:38,009 about words? A novel doesn't give me colors or 679 00:31:38,009 --> 00:31:40,250 shapes to scan with my eyes. It's just black 680 00:31:40,250 --> 00:31:42,890 ink. Words don't depict, right? They describe. 681 00:31:43,269 --> 00:31:45,430 And because they describe, they necessitate a 682 00:31:45,430 --> 00:31:48,940 narrator. The narrator acts as a crucial mediator 683 00:31:48,940 --> 00:31:51,240 for our game of make -believe. In a painting, 684 00:31:51,539 --> 00:31:53,779 you usually imagine yourself directly observing 685 00:31:53,779 --> 00:31:57,359 the scene. In a novel, you imagine yourself listening 686 00:31:57,359 --> 00:32:00,400 to someone or reading an account written by someone 687 00:32:00,400 --> 00:32:02,859 who is describing the scene to you. And when 688 00:32:02,859 --> 00:32:05,509 you introduce a narrator, you introduce the glorious 689 00:32:05,509 --> 00:32:08,490 mess of human fallibility. A narrator can be 690 00:32:08,490 --> 00:32:11,690 reliable or they can be lying, self -deceived 691 00:32:11,690 --> 00:32:14,569 or simply stupid. If you read a book with an 692 00:32:14,569 --> 00:32:17,029 unreliable narrator, the mechanics of the game 693 00:32:17,029 --> 00:32:19,609 shift entirely. You aren't just imagining the 694 00:32:19,609 --> 00:32:22,329 events they describe. You are playing a complex 695 00:32:22,329 --> 00:32:25,190 game of psychological deduction. You have to 696 00:32:25,190 --> 00:32:28,690 imagine the events while simultaneously interrogating 697 00:32:28,690 --> 00:32:30,990 the psychological state of the person telling 698 00:32:30,990 --> 00:32:34,069 you about them. You're trying to parse the actual 699 00:32:34,069 --> 00:32:36,990 fictional truth from their fictional bias. It 700 00:32:36,990 --> 00:32:40,230 requires a dual layer of imagining. You're constructing 701 00:32:40,230 --> 00:32:43,250 the world, and you're constructing the psychology 702 00:32:43,250 --> 00:32:46,349 of the voice mediating that world. A painting 703 00:32:46,349 --> 00:32:48,589 forces you to play a game with your eyes. You 704 00:32:48,589 --> 00:32:51,490 have to search the shadows for the truth. But 705 00:32:51,490 --> 00:32:53,950 a novel forces you to play a game with your trust. 706 00:32:54,369 --> 00:32:56,450 You have to interrogate the narrator's agenda 707 00:32:56,450 --> 00:32:59,809 to find the truth. The medium completely dictates 708 00:32:59,809 --> 00:33:01,890 the mechanics of the game. That is fascinating. 709 00:33:02,109 --> 00:33:04,549 Okay, we are entering the final stretch of the 710 00:33:04,549 --> 00:33:07,549 book, chapters 10 and 11, which deal with the 711 00:33:07,549 --> 00:33:10,890 metaphysics of make -believe. The ontology problem. 712 00:33:11,089 --> 00:33:13,859 Right. We have established that art is a game, 713 00:33:14,259 --> 00:33:16,680 a structured hallucination we voluntarily agree 714 00:33:16,680 --> 00:33:19,740 to play, guided by props. But what happens when 715 00:33:19,740 --> 00:33:22,559 we leave the museum, put down the book, and go 716 00:33:22,559 --> 00:33:24,720 to a dinner party in the real world, and start 717 00:33:24,720 --> 00:33:27,579 talking about these characters? This brings us 718 00:33:27,579 --> 00:33:30,759 to one of the most agonizing traditional philosophical 719 00:33:30,759 --> 00:33:34,710 problems. Ontology. Ontology is the study of 720 00:33:34,710 --> 00:33:38,809 what exists, what has reality. Because philosophers 721 00:33:38,809 --> 00:33:42,230 like Bertrand Russell and Gottlieb Freig spent 722 00:33:42,230 --> 00:33:45,130 years agonizing over how to parse sentences about 723 00:33:45,130 --> 00:33:47,890 things that don't exist, right? They did. The 724 00:33:47,890 --> 00:33:50,410 famous example is, the present King of France 725 00:33:50,410 --> 00:33:53,609 is bald. If there is no King of France, is that 726 00:33:53,609 --> 00:33:56,329 sentence false? Is it just meaningless noise? 727 00:33:57,089 --> 00:34:00,369 Do fictional characters like Tom Sawyer or King 728 00:34:00,369 --> 00:34:04,210 Lear or Sherlock Holmes actually exist in some 729 00:34:04,210 --> 00:34:06,490 abstract metaphysical realm just because we can 730 00:34:06,490 --> 00:34:08,769 make true statements about them? Because we do 731 00:34:08,769 --> 00:34:10,849 it all the time. We say Sherlock Holmes is a 732 00:34:10,849 --> 00:34:12,989 brilliant detective. Grammatically, that sounds 733 00:34:12,989 --> 00:34:15,929 exactly like a factual assertion about a biological 734 00:34:15,929 --> 00:34:19,250 human being. And some philosophers known as realists 735 00:34:19,250 --> 00:34:21,489 argue that because we make true statements about 736 00:34:21,489 --> 00:34:23,869 these characters, they must possess some form 737 00:34:23,869 --> 00:34:28,280 of existence. Perhaps as eternal abstract concepts 738 00:34:28,280 --> 00:34:31,719 or non -actualized entities floating in a metaphysical 739 00:34:31,719 --> 00:34:35,280 ether. But Walton completely rejects this. He 740 00:34:35,280 --> 00:34:37,559 argues we do not need to clutter our universe 741 00:34:37,559 --> 00:34:40,360 with ghosts, abstract entities, and metaphysical 742 00:34:40,360 --> 00:34:42,940 baggage to explain our everyday language. So 743 00:34:42,940 --> 00:34:45,340 how does Walton explain a sentence like, Tom 744 00:34:45,340 --> 00:34:47,809 Sawyer attended his own funeral? Because anyone 745 00:34:47,809 --> 00:34:50,050 who has read the book knows that is a true statement 746 00:34:50,050 --> 00:34:52,789 about the narrative. Right. Walton argues that 747 00:34:52,789 --> 00:34:55,150 when you say Tom Sawyer attended his own funeral, 748 00:34:55,650 --> 00:34:57,889 you are not stating a real -world fact about 749 00:34:57,889 --> 00:35:00,929 an abstract ghost entity. You are actually just 750 00:35:00,929 --> 00:35:02,829 continuing to play the game of make -believe. 751 00:35:02,969 --> 00:35:05,670 You are speaking within the pretense. It's a 752 00:35:05,670 --> 00:35:08,210 linguistic shortcut. It's as if you were saying, 753 00:35:08,690 --> 00:35:10,849 in the game of make -believe, authorized by the 754 00:35:10,849 --> 00:35:13,409 prop known as Mark Twain's novel, it is a fictional 755 00:35:13,409 --> 00:35:15,909 truth that Tom Sawyer attended his own funeral. 756 00:35:16,159 --> 00:35:18,880 But instead of stating that clunky preamble every 757 00:35:18,880 --> 00:35:22,119 time, we just speak from inside the game. It 758 00:35:22,119 --> 00:35:25,199 is an act of verbal participation. When I say 759 00:35:25,199 --> 00:35:28,340 Tom Sawyer is tricky, I am pretending to assert 760 00:35:28,340 --> 00:35:31,059 a fact about a real boy, because that is simply 761 00:35:31,059 --> 00:35:33,920 how the game is played. I'm participating in 762 00:35:33,920 --> 00:35:36,739 the pretense. But what about when we explicitly 763 00:35:36,739 --> 00:35:39,639 deny a character exists? What about the statement, 764 00:35:40,000 --> 00:35:42,920 Gregor Samsa does not exist? When I say that, 765 00:35:43,199 --> 00:35:45,699 I am definitely not speaking inside the pretense. 766 00:35:46,190 --> 00:35:49,050 Because inside the pretense of Kafka's story, 767 00:35:49,349 --> 00:35:52,610 Gregor Samsa absolutely exists. He just happens 768 00:35:52,610 --> 00:35:55,949 to be a giant insect. You've hit the exact crux 769 00:35:55,949 --> 00:35:58,969 of the metaphysical issue. You cannot say Gregor 770 00:35:58,969 --> 00:36:01,730 Samsa does not exist from inside the game because 771 00:36:01,730 --> 00:36:04,110 it directly contradicts the rules generated by 772 00:36:04,110 --> 00:36:07,400 the prop. So what is it? Walton categorizes this 773 00:36:07,400 --> 00:36:10,519 specific type of existence claim as a betrayal 774 00:36:10,519 --> 00:36:13,300 of the pretense. A betrayal of the pretense. 775 00:36:13,519 --> 00:36:15,659 It means you are intentionally stepping outside 776 00:36:15,659 --> 00:36:17,780 the magic circle of the game to point out the 777 00:36:17,780 --> 00:36:20,179 cold, hard, literal mechanics of the real world. 778 00:36:20,480 --> 00:36:23,260 You're pointing directly at the prop, the physical 779 00:36:23,260 --> 00:36:25,780 Kafka book, and declaring, this prop does not 780 00:36:25,780 --> 00:36:29,119 correspond to an actual biological entity. You 781 00:36:29,119 --> 00:36:31,500 are invoking the game of make -believe specifically 782 00:36:31,500 --> 00:36:33,840 to declare its boundaries, to remind everyone 783 00:36:33,840 --> 00:36:36,340 involved that it is, in fact, merely a game. 784 00:36:36,719 --> 00:36:39,599 You are stating that any attempt to refer to 785 00:36:39,599 --> 00:36:42,949 a real person using the rules of this specific 786 00:36:42,949 --> 00:36:45,920 game will ultimately fail. So think about internet 787 00:36:45,920 --> 00:36:49,699 culture for a second. When people argue passionately 788 00:36:49,699 --> 00:36:52,059 online about whether a fictional character like 789 00:36:52,059 --> 00:36:54,539 Goku would win a physical fight against Superman. 790 00:36:54,800 --> 00:36:58,099 Oh man, those debates get intense. They do. But 791 00:36:58,099 --> 00:37:00,480 they aren't arguing about fake biology. They 792 00:37:00,480 --> 00:37:03,039 aren't debating the physics of abstract metaphysical 793 00:37:03,039 --> 00:37:06,380 entities. They're just fiercely aggressively 794 00:37:06,380 --> 00:37:08,539 negotiating the rules of their overlapping games 795 00:37:08,539 --> 00:37:11,519 of make -believe. That is precisely what is happening. 796 00:37:12,000 --> 00:37:13,960 They are taking the principles of generation 797 00:37:13,960 --> 00:37:16,480 from the Dragon Ball universe, and the principles 798 00:37:16,480 --> 00:37:19,579 of generation from the DC Comics universe, attempting 799 00:37:19,579 --> 00:37:22,360 to smash them together into a unified framework. 800 00:37:23,059 --> 00:37:25,280 And then debating which implied fictional truths 801 00:37:25,280 --> 00:37:28,800 would supersede the others. It is a highly complex, 802 00:37:29,400 --> 00:37:32,119 collaborative, and often intensely combative 803 00:37:32,119 --> 00:37:35,079 game of adult make -believe. It makes so much 804 00:37:35,079 --> 00:37:38,110 of our cultural behavior make sense. Let's look 805 00:37:38,110 --> 00:37:40,010 at the immense journey we've taken today through 806 00:37:40,010 --> 00:37:43,170 Walton's framework. We started with the raw psychology 807 00:37:43,170 --> 00:37:45,730 of a child in a muddy playground, turning a clump 808 00:37:45,730 --> 00:37:50,019 of dirt into a pie and a stump into a pear. We 809 00:37:50,019 --> 00:37:53,440 saw how 20th century philosophers awkwardly tried 810 00:37:53,440 --> 00:37:56,400 to explain art as a form of failed truth -telling. 811 00:37:56,760 --> 00:37:59,119 And how Walton obliterated that by showing that 812 00:37:59,119 --> 00:38:01,559 art is just the manufacturing of highly sophisticated 813 00:38:01,559 --> 00:38:05,219 props. We learned the engines of the game, the 814 00:38:05,219 --> 00:38:07,380 reality principle and the mutual belief principle. 815 00:38:07,460 --> 00:38:10,199 We realize that we aren't passive observers safely 816 00:38:10,199 --> 00:38:13,599 behind a fourth wall. We are active, unseen players 817 00:38:13,599 --> 00:38:16,679 experiencing real, physical quasi -emotions in 818 00:38:16,679 --> 00:38:19,820 a fictional sandbox. We saw how a canvas forces 819 00:38:19,820 --> 00:38:22,619 us to play a perceptual game with depth, while 820 00:38:22,619 --> 00:38:25,320 a novel forces us to play a psychological game 821 00:38:25,320 --> 00:38:28,039 with trust. And finally, we realized we don't 822 00:38:28,039 --> 00:38:30,599 need to believe in metaphysical ghosts to talk 823 00:38:30,599 --> 00:38:33,280 about literature. The art is the prop and we 824 00:38:33,280 --> 00:38:37,000 are the eager players. It is a profoundly unifying 825 00:38:37,260 --> 00:38:40,440 deeply elegant theory. It takes the loftiest, 826 00:38:40,659 --> 00:38:43,139 most intimidating heights of human creativity 827 00:38:43,139 --> 00:38:47,480 and grounds them firmly in our most basic, innate 828 00:38:47,480 --> 00:38:50,900 psychological need to play, to simulate and to 829 00:38:50,900 --> 00:38:53,000 imagine. But, you know, if we pull back and look 830 00:38:53,000 --> 00:38:55,039 at the broader implications of this framework, 831 00:38:55,739 --> 00:38:57,840 it leaves us with a rather provocative question 832 00:38:57,840 --> 00:39:00,500 about the modern hyper -connected world we live 833 00:39:00,500 --> 00:39:03,579 in today. Lay it on me. If our engagement with 834 00:39:03,579 --> 00:39:06,980 art is fundamentally a rule -bound game of make 835 00:39:06,980 --> 00:39:09,739 -believe where props guide us into experiencing 836 00:39:09,739 --> 00:39:13,969 physiological quasi -emotions. Yeah. How much 837 00:39:13,969 --> 00:39:16,349 of our engagement with the real world has inadvertently 838 00:39:16,349 --> 00:39:19,469 become its own massive, unacknowledged game of 839 00:39:19,469 --> 00:39:22,250 make -believe? Oh, wow. Think about the digital 840 00:39:22,250 --> 00:39:25,599 landscape we inhabit daily. We consume endlessly 841 00:39:25,599 --> 00:39:28,300 curated social media feeds. We interact with 842 00:39:28,300 --> 00:39:30,519 highly constructed, polished political personas. 843 00:39:30,860 --> 00:39:33,599 We watch 24 -hour news cycles that are heavily 844 00:39:33,599 --> 00:39:37,039 edited. narrative driven and scored with dramatic 845 00:39:37,039 --> 00:39:39,840 tension music. They are functioning as props. 846 00:39:40,480 --> 00:39:43,500 Are we experiencing real anger, real fear, real 847 00:39:43,500 --> 00:39:46,099 joy when we scroll through these feeds? Or have 848 00:39:46,099 --> 00:39:48,519 these digital platforms evolved into massive 849 00:39:48,519 --> 00:39:52,800 societal level props? Are they prescribing imaginings? 850 00:39:53,530 --> 00:39:56,170 When we get utterly outraged at a political tweet 851 00:39:56,170 --> 00:39:59,489 or devastated by a curated 15 second news clip, 852 00:39:59,750 --> 00:40:02,949 are we experiencing genuine actionable emotion 853 00:40:02,949 --> 00:40:07,380 or Are we experiencing a quasi -emotion, guided 854 00:40:07,380 --> 00:40:10,099 by digital props and a sprawling game we don't 855 00:40:10,099 --> 00:40:12,719 even realize we are playing? If it operates like 856 00:40:12,719 --> 00:40:15,539 a game of make -believe, the physiological reaction 857 00:40:15,539 --> 00:40:19,239 is real, our blood pressure spikes, but the behavioral 858 00:40:19,239 --> 00:40:21,519 imperative, the actual need to go out and fix 859 00:40:21,519 --> 00:40:24,500 the real world, might be bypassed entirely. Just 860 00:40:24,500 --> 00:40:26,840 like Charles watching the slime monster. We feel 861 00:40:26,840 --> 00:40:29,139 the terror, we feel the outrage, but we don't 862 00:40:29,139 --> 00:40:31,659 actually move from our seats. because deep down, 863 00:40:32,179 --> 00:40:34,860 our nervous system is processing the feed as 864 00:40:34,860 --> 00:40:38,420 a fiction. We are safely experiencing the emotion 865 00:40:38,420 --> 00:40:41,840 without the risk of action. We are trapped in 866 00:40:41,840 --> 00:40:44,639 a digital playground of our own making. The line 867 00:40:44,639 --> 00:40:48,000 between the prop and reality is blurring. We 868 00:40:48,000 --> 00:40:50,639 may be playing a game with real -world consequences, 869 00:40:51,139 --> 00:40:53,400 treating actual events as if they were just another 870 00:40:53,400 --> 00:40:55,920 prescribed imagining. Well, on that slightly 871 00:40:55,920 --> 00:40:58,480 existential note, that wraps up our deep dive 872 00:40:58,480 --> 00:41:01,539 into Mimesis as Make -Believe. The next time 873 00:41:01,539 --> 00:41:04,780 you walk into a museum or open a novel or even 874 00:41:04,780 --> 00:41:07,840 just open a feed on your phone, take a second 875 00:41:07,840 --> 00:41:10,579 to look past the polished marble floors. Look 876 00:41:10,579 --> 00:41:13,639 at the mud. Look closely at the props operating 877 00:41:13,639 --> 00:41:16,940 in your own life and ask yourself, what game 878 00:41:16,940 --> 00:41:19,239 are you being asked to play? Thanks for joining 879 00:41:19,239 --> 00:41:19,519 us.