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Dara Horn: Jewish Security, Education and Responsibility
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Felipe: Welcome to Marginalia. I'm Felipe, the creator of the show. I'm a philosopher, neuroscientist and computational linguist. Here we explore books and research, and connect ideas across philosophy, science, history and the arts, AI and technology. We make room for debate, disagreement and learning. I'm glad you're listening.
Essie: And I'm Essie, your co-host. I'm an artist and educator. I'm interested in how we teach these ideas, too: what someone needs to understand before we ask them to reconsider something they believe. That's going to come up quite a bit today.
Felipe: We're returning to Dara Horn, the novelist and essayist, and her book The Final Solution to the Jewish Question: A Love Story for the Living. Our earlier episode introduced the book and its account of antisemitism. Today we want to examine her argument more closely. Why does hostility toward Jews survive so much teaching about Jewish persecution? And what does she think we should do about it?
Essie: Before we get to her answer, can we spend a moment on her earlier book, People Love Dead Jews? Because the problem she's describing didn't begin with this one.
Felipe: Yes. In that earlier book, she asks why institutions can be so invested in remembering Jews who've died, and so uncomfortable with Jews who are alive. She describes a Jewish employee at the Anne Frank House in Amsterdam who wanted to wear his kippah, his Jewish head covering, at work. The museum initially required him to cover it with a baseball cap.
Essie: At the Anne Frank House. A museum dedicated to a Jewish girl who had to hide from the Nazis.
Felipe: Yes. The employee appealed, and the museum eventually allowed him to wear the kippah openly. That reversal matters. But he had to challenge the idea that an ordinary Jewish practice was something visitors shouldn't see.
Essie: Mm. I'd expect the history the museum teaches to help its staff recognize that problem. It makes me wonder what was missing from their understanding of living Jews.
Felipe: And what they thought a Jew should have to conceal. The kippah is a visible symbol of Jewish identity. For me, Jewish life includes practices, obligations, arguments and a shared history. Those don't disappear when a symbol is hidden. The person is being asked to make that part of their life less visible to be accepted.
Essie: So if we wanted to change that decision, would you start with education? Help the people making it understand what they're asking of the employee?
Felipe: I'd want them to understand. But the employee shouldn't need to make Judaism interesting to them before he can wear his kippah. He deserves to participate as a Jew. Asking him to hide a Jewish practice makes his acceptance conditional on concealing who he is.
Essie: I agree that he shouldn't have to earn permission by giving a lesson. I'm asking whether better understanding could stop the museum from imposing that condition in the first place. As an educator, I'd want to try.
Felipe: So would I. I'm doubtful that learning about Jews will stop the hostility, though. The employee needed the right to wear his kippah whether or not his employers came to appreciate Judaism. We need a way to insist on fair treatment when an explanation hasn't been enough.
Essie: That's a difference we can examine. In The Final Solution to the Jewish Question, Horn tries to explain why the hostility keeps returning. She also describes an educational project. I'd like us to understand what she expects teaching to change before deciding whether we share that expectation.
Felipe: We will. First, the concern about being able to insist on fair treatment brings me to Ruth Wisse. She's a scholar of Jewish literature who was Horn's thesis adviser. Horn has described Wisse's commitment to both literature and Jewish survival as important to her. That gives us a reason to read Wisse alongside her, without assuming Horn agrees with everything Wisse says.
Essie: What would you start with in Wisse? What argument helps us understand Horn's concern about security?
Felipe: Her book Jews and Power. She asks how Jews can act on our moral commitments when we lack the power to protect our own lives. That's relevant to the museum employee's need to challenge a restriction, as well as to much more dangerous situations.
Essie: Could you explain how she connects morality and protection? Then we can ask what choices she thinks Jews should make.
Felipe: Wisse uses the term moral solipsism. It's a difficult phrase for a familiar problem: becoming so absorbed in examining our own conduct that we stop examining what somebody else intends to do. If someone threatens Jews, we can spend all our time asking how we should improve ourselves and neglect the person making the threat.
Essie: Is she objecting to examining our conduct, or to expecting that examination to change somebody else's intentions?
Felipe: The expectation. She retains a commitment to moral idealism. But we have to assess what other people want, what power they have and what might constrain them. Being morally faultless wouldn't necessarily purchase our safety. Her argument is that staying alive makes it possible to act on our moral commitments at all.
Essie: Mm-hm. So we still judge our own choices, but we can't make someone else's decision to threaten us a problem that better Jewish behavior will solve.
Felipe: That's what I take from her. And it matters to how I read Horn. We can ask what Jews need to do to live freely without beginning from the assumption that we somehow caused the hostility. The people denying us that freedom have choices and responsibilities of their own.
Essie: What political conclusion does Wisse draw? I can accept the need for protection and still want to know who she thinks will provide it.
Felipe: In a 2015 interview with Moment magazine, she argues for a turn toward conservatism. She criticizes Obama's liberalism and calls for greater emphasis on family, collective responsibility, national commitment and Israel's future. So she does make a recommendation beyond saying Jews should survive.
Essie: Does she mean a broader conservative outlook, or a practical choice about which political allies will help Jews? Those could ask very different things of someone who considers themselves liberal.
Felipe: In her case, there is a broader conservative commitment. What doesn't follow is that every Jew who shares her concern for security has adopted it. A liberal Jew might support a particular foreign policy because they believe it offers protection, while disagreeing with that party about other things.
Essie: And you'd describe that as a tradeoff?
Felipe: Yes. We deal with overwhelmingly non-Jewish parties, whose priorities aren't ours to set. We may choose the option that offers a more immediate benefit, even at a cost. That doesn't mean we've found an ideology that represents everything we believe. Calling the choice conservative can hide the predicament that produced it.
Essie: I'd still want to examine the cost. If a party offers protection and asks for support for something we oppose, the need for safety doesn't settle whether that bargain is acceptable.
Felipe: It doesn't. But we should also ask why a Jew is being put in that position. If full acceptance requires giving up other convictions, how secure is the acceptance? That's a connection I see with both of Horn's books. In People Love Dead Jews, remembering suffering can coexist with discomfort toward living Jews. The newer book asks what it takes for Jews to act as people with choices of our own.
Essie: So the question about the bargain includes what the surrounding society is willing to accept from Jews. It isn't enough to ask which party a Jew chooses.
Felipe: Right. I think about this as an immigrant, too. Being welcomed on condition that you leave part of yourself out is a restricted welcome. Here, the part you're asked to leave out could be your liberal commitments, or your commitment to Jewish collective life. Why should we have to surrender either one to make ourselves politically legible?
Essie: This is where I want to ask about neoconservatism. Wisse has written for Commentary, a magazine closely associated with that intellectual tradition. My concern is whether an argument about security is also asking us to adopt a broader program about national power and political authority.
Felipe: Mm. Then we need to identify the program she's asking us to adopt. The label can't do that work. And with Horn, I'd reserve it for a political commitment she actually accepts. Studying with Wisse, or taking Jewish security seriously, doesn't establish that commitment.
Essie: Agreed about the adviser. What I want to examine is whether concern for Jews leads Horn to trust a use of power she might otherwise question. We'd need her own argument for that. Wisse's affiliation can't supply it.
Felipe: We would. And I want us to notice the reverse problem: treating a Jew's Zionism as proof that they can no longer be liberal. That erases political commitments rather than examining them. We're not going to settle the larger argument about anti-Zionism here; that deserves a separate episode. For today, let's look at an actual judgment Horn makes.
Essie: Her chapter on universities gives us one. In the newer book, she's discussing the federal government's pressure on Harvard in 2025, after failures she describes in its response to Jewish students' complaints. She objects to the government controlling what universities teach, cutting cancer research and deporting foreign students for noncriminal activity.
Felipe: Those objections matter. Where do you think she stops short?
Essie: She ends the paragraph by saying Harvard had “brought this upon itself.” I understand why she's angry with the university. But I want to know what responsibility that leaves with the government choosing the measures.
Felipe: I read her as saying Harvard created the conditions for intervention by failing to enforce its own rules. When I read that judgment, I keep her objections to the government's methods—
Essie: I hear those objections. It's her conclusion about Harvard I'm questioning.
Felipe: Okay. How does that conclusion change what she has just said?
Essie: It makes the university's failure the last explanation we hear for the government's actions. Take the cancer research cuts. If they don't protect the students, Harvard's earlier failures don't make them a better measure. I'd want Horn to keep the government's responsibility for that choice in view when she says Harvard brought the crisis on itself.
Felipe: Mm. I see the concern. I still read her explicit objections as doing that work. She can blame Harvard for failing its students and reject the government's response. I don't think the conclusion that Harvard bears responsibility cancels what she has just said about those measures.
Essie: It doesn't cancel it. For me, it leaves the relationship unfinished. If she wanted outside intervention, I'd need to know which intervention she would support and how it would address the complaints. Otherwise I understand her anger better than I understand the remedy she wants.
Felipe: That's a fair question to ask of the passage. Can we make our own answer more specific? The students have reported harassment, and in Horn's account the university has failed to respond. What would you require the university to do?
Essie: Investigate those complaints and apply its conduct rules. Tell the affected students who is responsible for following up and what action is being taken to protect their participation. If the university refuses, I could support outside pressure directed at those failures. I'd want to judge the pressure by whether it makes those actions happen.
Felipe: I would too. And if unrelated research is cut while the complaints remain unanswered, calling that protection doesn't make it protection. Those are criteria we're proposing; we haven't found a complete policy in Horn's paragraph.
Essie: No. My remaining concern is about what her paragraph encourages us to examine. She identifies serious limits on government action, but her conclusion directs the reader back toward Harvard's culpability. I would want her to say more about how the two responsibilities are kept distinct.
Felipe: And I think her stated limits give us reason not to read the ending as excusing the government. I also don't want the government's overreach to become a reason to let Harvard's own failures disappear from the discussion. Both actors have to answer for what they choose.
Essie: We can keep that difference. It tells us more about our readings of Horn than assigning her an agenda from her connection to Wisse. It also leaves me with a question about our own suggestions: if a university changes its conduct, what would convince you that the change can last?
Felipe: I'd want to know whether the surrounding society's values were changing too. A university can prohibit a practice while people still regard Jewish claims to fair treatment as suspicious or excessive. If those assumptions remain normal, I expect them to undermine the rule. That's why I don't think changing institutional rules by itself can end antisemitism.
Essie: Which assumptions do you mean? Could you explain how people learn to see a Jewish claim as suspicious before they've considered it?
Felipe: This is where David Nirenberg helps me. He's a historian, and his book Anti-Judaism: The Western Tradition examines how societies have used ideas about Judaism to define what they oppose. Horn explicitly draws on him near the beginning of The Final Solution to the Jewish Question.
Essie: What does it mean to use Judaism to define something you oppose? Are we talking about an argument with actual Jews?
Felipe: Not necessarily. Nirenberg distinguishes ideas about Judaism from the lives and beliefs of actual Jews. Imagine Christians disputing how to read scripture. One accuses the other of being trapped in the literal law, and describes that as Jewish. The accusation tells people which kind of thinking to reject, even if no Jew is part of the disagreement.
Essie: Would the people hearing that need to know anything about Jewish interpretation for the accusation to work?
Felipe: No. They need to have learned that “Jewish” names the error. That can make actual Jewish thought almost irrelevant to the charge. In Horn's use of Nirenberg, the accusations also shift with what a society values. Jews can be condemned for being too religious in one setting and for undermining religion in another. The same people are made to represent opposite dangers.
Essie: So correcting the factual description of Jews wouldn't necessarily remove the use people are making of the accusation. Where does Nirenberg say that habit comes from?
Felipe: He traces it through religious and political thought. Christianity and Islam define their own claims partly through their relationship to Jewish scripture and their rejection of Jewish interpretations that do not accept those claims. He also examines how ideas about Judaism are reused outside religion. The problem isn't confined to an individual's dislike of a Jewish neighbor.
Essie: And what do you take from that history that goes beyond Nirenberg's account?
Felipe: I think the institutions built within these societies keep carrying those values forward. Secular institutions can still expect Jews to give up something particular to become acceptable. My conclusion is that antisemitism has no way to disappear while society continues to define its ideals through opposition to what it calls Jewish. I don't see that as a problem a better explanation of Jews can resolve.
Essie: In his Holocaust Museum interview, Nirenberg says recognizing these habits can help people question them. That's the possibility I want to pursue. If an institution recognizes a discriminatory rule and changes it, why do you doubt that the underlying assumption has changed too?
Felipe: Because changing a rule doesn't necessarily remove the assumption underneath it. Think back to the museum. The employee eventually won the right to wear his kippah. That's a necessary change. But the initial expectation was that he should conceal an ordinary Jewish practice, in an institution devoted to remembering persecution. I don't see that as a small gap in its knowledge of Jews.
Essie: Neither do I. But the employee challenged the restriction and the museum reversed it. Do we have to prove that every hostile assumption has vanished before we count the change as an improvement in his life?
Felipe: No, but we have to distinguish that improvement from a change in society's values. I'm glad he won. What worries me is that the assumption which made the restriction seem reasonable remains available to the next institution. If society keeps reproducing it, I expect institutional gains to be temporary unless we keep defending them.
Essie: Mm. If recurrence is near-certain, as you expect, I still want to ask whether learning can help make a gain last. People can recognize an assumption they've inherited and stop treating it as normal. That could change the support a rule has outside the institution as well as inside it.
Felipe: I would welcome that. I just don't think a successful intervention establishes that those wider values have changed. An institution may comply because it has been challenged, while the society around it remains hostile. We need to judge what happened and retain the power to defend the result. We can't make our safety depend on optimism about the next response.
Essie: I wouldn't make safety wait for that optimism. My difference with you is about how much those values can change through learning, and how much effort we should put into that possibility. Horn offers a story about Jewish life that she thinks could change what people recognize. Before we get to the teaching, can we examine the explanation she wants people to understand?
Felipe: Yes. Which part of her explanation do you want to test?
Essie: In the later chapters of The Final Solution to the Jewish Question, she connects hostility toward Jews to Jewish commitments to human equality and limits on rulers. In her account, a tradition that refuses unlimited human authority threatens people who want obedience. That is a more specific explanation than saying societies keep using anti-Jewish ideas.
Felipe: Because it identifies something about Judaism that the attacker opposes. We can ask whether the evidence shows that motive. Does Horn give us an example where someone actually attacks the idea of equality?
Essie: She does. She discusses Johann von Leers, a Nazi propagandist. In her account, he accused Jews of persuading the world to accept human equality as a lie. That is why I find her connection persuasive in that case: the hostility she describes is explicitly directed at the idea she says is threatening.
Felipe: Mm. That example supports the connection. My question is how far it reaches. A case in which an attacker opposes equality doesn't establish that opposition to equality explains every attack on Jews. Can we explain other cases without that motive?
Essie: We could test that against Horn's own account of Trent. She describes a bishop using a false accusation to build influence. Could you walk us through that case? I'd like to ask whether her account requires us to believe he feared Jewish ideas about equality.
Felipe: Yes. In 1475, a child died in Trent, and Jews were falsely accused of murdering him for a religious ritual. Horn describes the bishop, Johannes Hinderbach, promoting that accusation, with confessions extracted through torture. He was using an existing lie about Jews and Christian children; he didn't need people to understand Jewish beliefs to turn them against Jews.
Essie: What did promoting the accusation do for him, in her account?
Felipe: Horn suggests that he combined a conviction that Jews obstructed his ideals with a desire to strengthen his own influence. He promoted records and images that made his account seem authoritative. So we have a way to explain the persecution through his interests and through beliefs already available to his audience. We haven't had to establish that he was responding to Jewish teaching about equality.
Essie: I see that. It limits how much the equality explanation can establish from this example. Horn also describes other authorities trying to stop what was happening. What can we learn from their resistance within that same society?
Felipe: There were people who could be appealed to. The local duke and papal authorities sought to interrupt the proceedings. A papal investigator was sent. Horn also describes Jewish communities appealing to authorities for help. Those were attempts to protect people who were being persecuted, and the bishop worked to obstruct them.
Essie: What does the obstruction tell us? If some authorities rejected the accusation, why was the bishop able to keep promoting it?
Felipe: In Horn's account, he kept the investigator away from the accused and from people who could contradict his version. He also portrayed Jewish appeals for help as improper influence. An effort to challenge the lie could itself be made to look suspicious because Jews were involved.
Essie: Then the resistance matters, but we can't treat its existence as proof that the prejudice had disappeared. The people trying to stop the persecution still had to contend with that use of Jewish suspicion.
Felipe: Which matters for our disagreement. Those interventions were real. I don't want to erase them. But the bishop was able to use religious assumptions about Jews to make his accusation persuasive and to undermine people who challenged it. Having some authorities resist didn't make those assumptions disappear.
Essie: For me, those attempts to intervene are a reason to ask what could have made protection effective. We know the investigator was kept from people who could contradict the bishop. I'd want to understand how that access could have been secured. There are choices about authority to examine alongside the inherited prejudice.
Felipe: We do. That's why I want to examine the accuser and the people able to constrain him. Horn's account of Jewish equality can tell us something important about Jewish values. The Trent case still needs an explanation of the bishop's campaign and how it gained authority. An admirable account of Judaism can't supply all of that.
Essie: Are you also worried that explaining hostility through Jewish virtues makes respect conditional on those virtues? I ask because Horn herself rejects that condition. She criticizes the expectation that Jews must prove their worth through their contributions.
Felipe: I agree with her rejection. My objection here is about the explanation of persecution, not a claim that she thinks only admirable Jews deserve protection. Jews deserve safety regardless of whether someone appreciates Jewish ethics. And we shouldn't need to demonstrate what is admirable about us before examining what an accuser is doing.
Essie: Then there's a question we can carry into education: can we teach Jewish life in depth without making the lesson a defense of why Jews deserve to be here? That's something I want from teaching, and it's something Horn is trying to address.
Essie: In chapter eight of The Final Solution to the Jewish Question, Horn describes founding The Tell Institute. Its audience includes Jews and non-Jews, in middle schools, high schools and Jewish community settings. She wants to teach a story of Jewish choices, law and disagreement that helps people recognize the accusations we've been discussing. She presents its effect as a hypothesis to test.
Felipe: What would that give a student who has learned about Jewish persecution but little about Jewish life?
Essie: A way to recognize Jews as participants in a living tradition, with arguments and choices of our own. For instance, a student could learn how Jewish texts place obligations on rulers rather than treating the ruler's wishes as the law. Horn connects that to refusal of domination. My hope would be that the student becomes less willing to accept a description of Jews as people who simply seek power over everyone else.
Felipe: That explains the hoped-for change in understanding. Does Horn claim that a student would then reject a new accusation when people around them accept it?
Essie: She wants to test whether the teaching helps people recognize and resist those lies. She isn't presenting demonstrated results. And in the introduction to this same book, she says it isn't fair or realistic to ask Jews to solve antisemitism. Her decision to offer teaching isn't a demand that every Jew become an instructor.
Felipe: I agree. I wouldn't criticize her for imposing an obligation she rejects. I do want to ask about the scale of the educational claim. Early in the book she says education can't inoculate societies built on these lies. When she introduces The Tell, she hopes her teaching can alert and inoculate people against them. What changes between those two claims?
Essie: Mm. The scale might change. A program could help particular people recognize an accusation without undoing the society's whole inheritance. Since she calls it a hypothesis, I would give that possibility a serious test. I wouldn't treat the fact that she hasn't demonstrated a cure as a reason not to teach.
Felipe: Nor would I. But I don't want us to narrow the promise on her behalf without saying we're doing it. Helping some students recognize a lie is a worthwhile result. It would still leave the question of how the institution acts when other people believe the lie, or when defending Jews becomes unpopular.
Essie: That's where the institution's own responsibilities become important. How are you worried it might use the teaching?
Felipe: My worry is what an institution expects the course to do for it. It could fund some teaching and treat that as its response to a complaint, without changing the conduct that led to the complaint.
Essie: Or it could teach alongside a real response. Let's try a school example so we can distinguish them. Suppose a Jewish child is being harassed. The school asks a Jewish parent to give an assembly about antisemitism. The parent wants the other children to understand more about Jews—
Felipe: Has it—has the school stopped the harassment?
Essie: In this first version, no. The assembly is the response it's offered.
Felipe: Then the child is still going back into the same corridor tomorrow. The parent is being asked to help, while the school hasn't intervened. That responsibility belongs to the school.
Essie: It does. Let me change that fact. The staff intervene when the harassment happens, apply the conduct rules to the pupils responsible, and make sure the Jewish child can take part in school activities safely. Those actions have happened before anyone asks the parent to teach.
Felipe: What happens after that first intervention? The family needs to know who will follow up if the harassment resumes.
Essie: The principal assigns a staff member to stay in contact with the family and check whether the harassment has stopped. So now we've described both immediate protection and follow-up. If the school then invites the parent to contribute to teaching, is the invitation still a problem?
Felipe: It can be. The parent may hear it as: we've dealt with today's incident, but now you need to make sure our staff and pupils understand enough to prevent the next one. A parent can want to say no and still worry that their child's safety will depend on accepting.
Essie: Even when the school has taken the protective steps we've just described?
Felipe: Yes. Those steps matter, but they don't tell the parent who is responsible for the learning that comes next. If the invitation is the school's only educational plan, refusing it leaves the parent wondering whether anything further will happen. I'm not saying refusal is wrong. I'm saying the school shouldn't put that responsibility on them.
Essie: Suppose, um, the school can find a teacher—actually, suppose it's already booked a qualified educator and is paying for the work—
Felipe: Already booked, regardless of the parent's answer?
Essie: Yes. The course will happen either way. The parent can contribute if they want to, but the school has taken responsibility for arranging the teaching. Alongside the protection and follow-up we already specified.
Felipe: Mm. That changes the parent's position. They aren't being asked to supply a class that otherwise won't exist. I'd be more comfortable with an invitation on those terms. It doesn't establish that the school's assumptions have changed, though. We shouldn't make the paid booking prove more than it does.
Essie: I wouldn't. I'd still want the parent to have a real choice to participate. They may enjoy teaching about Jewish life or have something they want the children to understand. We shouldn't make that choice suspect simply because institutions sometimes demand it unfairly.
Felipe: Of course. The question is whether the school will do its work if the parent declines. And its work has to continue after the visiting teacher leaves. What led staff to offer an assembly instead of stopping the harassment? What assumptions made the family responsible for supplying an answer?
Essie: So you'd want the staff to examine their own response, not only arrange a lesson for pupils.
Felipe: Yes, and to learn before the next complaint. They can study Jewish history and life, seek expertise and examine ordinary practices that make Jews less able to participate. If they discover that a routine expectation excludes Jewish pupils, they should address it without waiting for another family to exhaust itself explaining why.
Essie: I'd call that education too. Staff learning to recognize a problem they had treated as normal could change what they do. It reaches further than the single assembly, and it could make protection more reliable.
Felipe: It could. I still distinguish that institutional work from a change in the values of the wider society. We need the work, and we need to ask whether the expectations outside the school will keep recreating the problem. The school's responsibility doesn't end with correcting one incident or paying someone to speak.
Essie: No. But if staff carry what they learn into their other relationships, that could affect the wider culture as well. That's where I remain more hopeful than you. I don't think a course guarantees it; I think learning can be part of how it happens.
Felipe: That's a possibility I'd want people to pursue. And the responsibility for pursuing it belongs to the society reproducing the hostility. There's a useful comparison with arguments about racism here. The histories differ, but we can ask a shared question: do the people being harmed have to provide every explanation, or must the people and institutions perpetuating the harm learn and act themselves? We're applying that question to antisemitism; the writers I'm about to mention aren't responding to Horn.
Essie: Who are you drawing on?
Felipe: Ijeoma Oluo, a writer on race and racism, in So You Want to Talk About Race. She describes what happens when a person points out racism and is then expected to do more work for the person they've challenged. If you've hurt someone, they don't owe you more emotional labor to explain what you did. You can reflect, investigate, learn without requiring them to continue the conversation.
Essie: That would mean the school can't treat the parent's refusal as the end of its opportunity to learn. The staff can still seek information and examine what they did.
Felipe: Exactly. And Oluo's argument goes beyond having better conversations. Learning should inform action in the institutions and relationships where people have influence. Applied to our example, the school has to change its own practices. Listening sympathetically to a parent or hiring a speaker doesn't finish that work.
Essie: I'd add Reni Eddo-Lodge's Why I'm No Longer Talking to White People About Race. She's a British writer examining racism, and the book's title comes from her exhaustion with people who repeatedly deny the structural problem she's describing. The refusal is a boundary on those conversations. It isn't a claim that nobody can choose to teach.
Felipe: How does she connect that boundary to responsibility outside the person being asked to explain?
Essie: She says the surrounding society has work to do in its own institutions and social circles. People can't wait for a person experiencing racism to make every intervention or for everyone to agree first. That's the part I would carry into our discussion: a school, a workplace or a group of friends has responsibilities that aren't suspended when a Jewish person is tired of explaining.
Felipe: Yes. And that goes back to the Nirenberg argument. If society has learned to understand its problems through ideas about Jews, Jews didn't create that habit and can't be assigned the job of undoing it for everyone else. Non-Jewish people have to examine the way they think and act, including the claims they pass on when no Jew is there to object.
Essie: Which still leaves room for Horn's chosen work. She can offer teaching, and others can take responsibility for learning from it and questioning it. The existence of a Jewish educator doesn't transfer the responsibility back to Jews as a group.
Felipe: I agree. I want people to read her and other Jewish writers because Jewish life is worth understanding. I don't want our security to depend on whether they come away impressed. The school has to protect the child and examine its practices even if the parent never gives that assembly.
Essie: And I want to find out whether learning helps the staff recognize exclusions they previously missed and act before the next family has to complain. We still differ on how far that can change society. We don't have to settle that prediction to know the school has work to do now.
Felipe: There's another part of that responsibility I want to examine. If non-Jewish institutions have to learn, they can't also reserve the right to decide that Jewish knowledge doesn't count. We can make that problem concrete with a different case, about who gets to participate in a campus project.
Felipe: Suppose several student organizations are planning a campus campaign against discrimination. A Jewish student group asks to join. The organizers tell it to condemn an Israeli government policy first. They haven't asked the other groups to answer for a state because of their identity. The university supports the project, and a staff adviser is responsible for its participation rules.
Essie: The declaration is required because they're the Jewish group?
Felipe: Yes. It's an antisemitic loyalty test. The students are being assigned a political responsibility because they're Jewish, then asked to perform a disavowal before they can participate. Their Jewish identity is being treated as a reason to suspect their loyalties. The organizers' description of the demand as political doesn't change what they're doing to the Jewish group.
Essie: Could you explain the history behind that loyalty test?
Felipe: Jews have repeatedly been treated as people whose political loyalty is suspect because they're Jews. The Dreyfus Affair is a nineteenth-century example: Alfred Dreyfus, a Jewish officer in France, was wrongfully convicted of treason in 1894 in a case shaped by antisemitism. His actual conduct was not fairly judged; Jewishness helped make him a plausible traitor to his accusers.
Essie: You're drawing a connection to that presumption of suspect loyalty, rather than equating a student-group condition with a criminal prosecution?
Felipe: Yes. The situations and consequences are different. The connection is the demand that Jews answer a political suspicion attached to their identity. In our campus example, the group has to dissociate itself from a state before it's welcomed. That history is relevant knowledge the students bring when they explain why the demand is antisemitic.
Essie: Then the adviser responsible for participation has to examine the actual demand, including who was asked to make it. The organizers can't settle the complaint simply by saying that they intended political criticism.
Felipe: Exactly. Nor does recognizing the loyalty test require ending political criticism. People can argue about Israeli policy. What needs scrutiny is rhetoric that turns that argument into an obligation imposed on Jews because they're Jews. The institution has to address that conduct, not make free speech and Jewish participation into opposing demands.
Essie: What would addressing it require in the case we've described?
Felipe: The organizers should withdraw the declaration as a condition on the Jewish group's participation, and the adviser should ensure they do. They should also examine how the campaign came to make that demand. Otherwise the students may be admitted while the suspicion that produced the condition remains untouched.
Essie: Mm. So there's an immediate correction and further work for the organizers. What if they find another Jewish student who thinks the condition is acceptable?
Felipe: That doesn't erase what happened to the group. Jews can disagree, but finding a Jewish person who approves isn't an answer to the complaint. The organizers still need to explain why Jewish identity triggered the demand. The adviser still has to enforce the participation rules they are responsible for.
Essie: And we'd have to hear the other student's reasons, too. We shouldn't assume a different judgment means they don't care about Jewish life. But their disagreement can't be used to tell the original group that its knowledge no longer counts.
Felipe: I agree. Non-Jewish society doesn't own antisemitism or get to decide its meaning without us. That doesn't require a single Jewish position on every incident. It requires taking Jewish experience and historical knowledge seriously, and answering the actual reasons given. An institution's unfamiliarity with a loyalty test isn't evidence that the test is harmless.
Essie: Nor is disagreement a reason to postpone a decision indefinitely. In this case, the condition is clear, and the adviser has a responsibility to act on it. The students shouldn't have to produce unanimous Jewish agreement before the university deals with the condition on their participation.
Felipe: That's the work I don't want handed back to Jews. We've asked institutions to examine conduct, learn the history and change the practices they control. We haven't asked them to wait until every Jew agrees or until someone has supplied an unlimited explanation. The people with authority can act on the case in front of them.
Essie: Coming back to Horn, the museum example is still the reason I want people to read her. An institution can be devoted to remembering Jewish persecution and fail to recognize its own exclusion of a living Jew. People Love Dead Jews makes that failure concrete. The newer book asks what understanding Jewish life might change, and I want to test that possibility seriously.
Felipe: What I take from both books is the insistence that we can live as Jews without first proving our usefulness or becoming more acceptable to somebody else. Wisse helps me explain why the power to protect that life matters. We need to make decisions in the circumstances we actually face, and an ideological label doesn't tell us whether those decisions are justified.
Essie: I'm more hopeful about what learning can change in those circumstances. The school example helped me specify what I mean: staff understanding a problem they had missed, changing their practices and carrying that understanding into other parts of their lives. I wouldn't count attendance at a class as proof that any of that happened.
Felipe: And I remain convinced that antisemitism will persist while society reproduces the values that make these accusations useful. Institutional gains matter; the museum employee's freedom to wear his kippah matters. But we have to be able to defend those gains when the hostility returns. I won't make Jewish security depend on a promise that other people have finally understood us.
Essie: I also want to keep our question about Horn's historical explanation. The von Leers example supports a connection between hostility and equality. The Trent case needs an account of the bishop's interests, the people who resisted him and the obstacles they faced. Teaching the value of Jewish ideas doesn't by itself establish why every persecutor acted.
Felipe: We agree on that distinction. And we still read her Harvard paragraph differently. I give more weight to her explicit rejection of government measures when I read her criticism of the university.
Essie: I want a clearer account of how her final judgment about Harvard keeps the government's responsibility in view. That's a disagreement listeners can examine in the passage itself. We'll include the source, along with the other books and our earlier episode introducing Horn's argument.
Felipe: We'll return to Zionism, political identity and Jewish belonging in a separate episode.
Essie: You'll find the sources in the episode notes. Thank you for spending this time with us.
Felipe: And if you enjoyed the conversation, please like the video and subscribe to Marginalia on YouTube. It helps other listeners find the show. I'm Felipe.
Essie: And I'm Essie. Thanks for listening.