1 00:00:00,000 --> 00:00:02,419 You know, usually when we talk about a diagnosis, 2 00:00:02,560 --> 00:00:06,160 whether it's a medical, mechanical, or even economic, 3 00:00:06,299 --> 00:00:09,560 there's this baseline expectation of precision. 4 00:00:09,660 --> 00:00:11,740 Right. Absolutely. It's almost like an engineering 5 00:00:11,740 --> 00:00:13,759 problem. Like, if you fall and break your arm, 6 00:00:13,880 --> 00:00:15,519 you go to the hospital, they take the x -ray, 7 00:00:15,599 --> 00:00:18,019 and it shows that jagged white line on the screen. 8 00:00:18,120 --> 00:00:19,940 And the doctor just points right at it. Exactly. 9 00:00:20,120 --> 00:00:21,579 They point at it and say, there it is. There's 10 00:00:21,579 --> 00:00:23,879 the break. It's visible. It's undeniable. And 11 00:00:23,879 --> 00:00:26,519 honestly, it's deeply comforting, you know? Oh, 12 00:00:26,539 --> 00:00:29,120 for sure. We humans are incredibly biased toward 13 00:00:29,120 --> 00:00:31,620 things that can be isolated, categorized, and, 14 00:00:31,620 --> 00:00:34,399 you know, just pointed at. We want the binary. 15 00:00:34,740 --> 00:00:37,200 Yeah, we really do. Broken or not broken. Functioning 16 00:00:37,200 --> 00:00:40,600 or failing. Because it gives us this illusion 17 00:00:40,600 --> 00:00:43,299 of total control over our reality. But then if 18 00:00:43,299 --> 00:00:45,920 you take a step back and try to apply that exact 19 00:00:45,920 --> 00:00:48,880 same diagnostic machinery to human identity... 20 00:00:48,880 --> 00:00:51,140 Oh, it falls apart. It completely shorts out. 21 00:00:51,200 --> 00:00:53,140 You're trying to figure out who we actually are 22 00:00:53,140 --> 00:00:55,219 at our core, and you can't just take a snapshot 23 00:00:55,219 --> 00:00:57,280 of the human condition and say, ah, look. Third 24 00:00:57,280 --> 00:00:59,479 rib down on the left, there's the self. No, it's 25 00:00:59,479 --> 00:01:01,899 an incredibly murky landscape. It really is. 26 00:01:02,320 --> 00:01:04,260 And for you listening to this right now, I know 27 00:01:04,260 --> 00:01:06,280 you aren't here for the easy binary answers. 28 00:01:06,739 --> 00:01:08,439 You're joining us on this deep dive because you 29 00:01:08,439 --> 00:01:11,019 want to grasp the profound complex stuff without 30 00:01:11,019 --> 00:01:13,959 getting tangled up in impenetrable academic jargon. 31 00:01:14,379 --> 00:01:16,180 Which is, well, it's a common trap in philosophy. 32 00:01:16,400 --> 00:01:19,409 Right. And that murkiness, that impossibility 33 00:01:19,409 --> 00:01:21,689 of pointing a finger at the soul and isolating 34 00:01:21,689 --> 00:01:24,730 it, that is exactly the wilderness we are trekking 35 00:01:24,730 --> 00:01:27,489 into today. It is arguably the ultimate diagnostic 36 00:01:27,489 --> 00:01:29,930 challenge. And to navigate it, we're taking a 37 00:01:29,930 --> 00:01:31,650 deep dive into what I consider to be one of the 38 00:01:31,650 --> 00:01:36,150 most vital, yet often misunderstood, philosophical 39 00:01:36,150 --> 00:01:38,370 masterworks of the 20th century. I am so ready 40 00:01:38,370 --> 00:01:41,109 for this. Yeah. It's Paul Recour's One Self as 41 00:01:41,109 --> 00:01:44,049 Another. And our mission today is to move through 42 00:01:44,049 --> 00:01:47,810 this dense, brilliant text. meticulously, concept 43 00:01:47,810 --> 00:01:51,370 by concept. Let's do it. We want to uncover Ricoeur's 44 00:01:51,370 --> 00:01:54,030 central radical argument, which is that human 45 00:01:54,030 --> 00:01:57,390 identity is not a locked safe. Right. His thesis 46 00:01:57,390 --> 00:01:59,590 is that you literally cannot understand yourself. 47 00:01:59,810 --> 00:02:02,930 You cannot even be a self without the fundamental 48 00:02:02,930 --> 00:02:06,060 integration of the other. See, I've been looking 49 00:02:06,060 --> 00:02:07,799 forward to this because it feels like a massive 50 00:02:07,799 --> 00:02:10,120 puzzle. Ricoeur is essentially trying to solve 51 00:02:10,120 --> 00:02:12,699 the problem of human isolation. Yes, exactly. 52 00:02:12,900 --> 00:02:14,719 And what fascinates me is that he doesn't just 53 00:02:14,719 --> 00:02:17,900 write like a psychology book or a purely metaphysical 54 00:02:17,900 --> 00:02:20,860 treatise. He builds this incredibly rigorous 55 00:02:20,860 --> 00:02:23,479 framework by pulling from linguistics, narrative 56 00:02:23,479 --> 00:02:26,580 theory, ethics, and ontology. Which is just the 57 00:02:26,580 --> 00:02:29,330 study of being itself. Right. Ontology. And he's 58 00:02:29,330 --> 00:02:31,669 building this bridge across all these disciplines 59 00:02:31,669 --> 00:02:34,509 just to prove that identity is a continuous dialogue, 60 00:02:35,050 --> 00:02:38,550 not a solitary fortress. And that interdisciplinary 61 00:02:38,550 --> 00:02:40,430 approach is exactly why we need to take our time 62 00:02:40,430 --> 00:02:42,930 with his foundational moves. Because if we want 63 00:02:42,930 --> 00:02:45,189 to understand how the self relates to the world, 64 00:02:45,830 --> 00:02:47,590 we first have to agree on the terms of engagement. 65 00:02:48,009 --> 00:02:52,319 Like what even is the self? Precisely. and record 66 00:02:52,319 --> 00:02:54,340 us something highly unconventional right out 67 00:02:54,340 --> 00:02:56,439 of the gate in his introduction. He doesn't start 68 00:02:56,439 --> 00:02:59,000 by making some grand sweeping claim about the 69 00:02:59,000 --> 00:03:02,360 cosmos or the human soul. Which is what you'd 70 00:03:02,360 --> 00:03:05,139 expect, right? Yeah, but instead, he starts by 71 00:03:05,139 --> 00:03:08,280 analyzing the grammar of natural languages. Which 72 00:03:08,280 --> 00:03:11,639 feels almost, I mean, counterintuitive when you 73 00:03:11,639 --> 00:03:14,340 think of deep existential philosophy. You don't 74 00:03:14,340 --> 00:03:15,939 usually think, all right, let's diagram some 75 00:03:15,939 --> 00:03:17,979 sentences. Right, and it sounds a bit dry at 76 00:03:17,979 --> 00:03:20,919 first. But he zeroes in on the way we speak, 77 00:03:21,300 --> 00:03:23,000 specifically focusing on the French language, 78 00:03:23,400 --> 00:03:26,240 to establish his first major philosophical intention. 79 00:03:26,620 --> 00:03:29,620 And that intention is key. Yeah, he wants to 80 00:03:29,620 --> 00:03:32,759 bypass the immediate, arrogant I, you know, the 81 00:03:32,759 --> 00:03:34,460 first -person singular that philosophers have 82 00:03:34,460 --> 00:03:37,479 been obsessed with for centuries. Instead of 83 00:03:37,479 --> 00:03:41,219 I, he focuses on the reflexive pronoun soi, meaning 84 00:03:41,219 --> 00:03:44,900 self, and the infinitive se, like in the phrase 85 00:03:44,900 --> 00:03:48,939 se désigne soit même. to designate oneself. It's 86 00:03:48,939 --> 00:03:51,479 a brilliant tactical maneuver. By focusing on 87 00:03:51,479 --> 00:03:54,460 the grammar of the reflexive swa, Ricoeur is actually 88 00:03:54,460 --> 00:03:57,560 proving a structural point about human reality. 89 00:03:57,919 --> 00:03:59,939 Okay, let's unpack this. Why does the grammar 90 00:03:59,939 --> 00:04:03,759 matter so much? Because the reflexive self is 91 00:04:03,759 --> 00:04:07,080 omnipersonal. It can apply to anyone. It belongs 92 00:04:07,080 --> 00:04:09,439 to all grammatical persons. You have a self, 93 00:04:09,460 --> 00:04:12,080 I have a self. They have a self. Oh, I see. But 94 00:04:12,080 --> 00:04:15,340 the word I, however, is entirely trapped in the 95 00:04:15,340 --> 00:04:18,579 first person. When I say I, I am isolating my 96 00:04:18,579 --> 00:04:21,439 perspective from the rest of the universe. So 97 00:04:21,439 --> 00:04:23,879 Ricoeur wants to show that our very language 98 00:04:23,879 --> 00:04:26,379 betrays the fact that identity isn't inherently 99 00:04:26,379 --> 00:04:29,699 locked inside a single solitary ego. Exactly. 100 00:04:30,300 --> 00:04:32,920 The grammar itself forces us to recognize that 101 00:04:32,920 --> 00:04:36,199 the self is a shared category. Because the moment 102 00:04:36,199 --> 00:04:38,600 you nominalize it, the moment you make it the 103 00:04:38,600 --> 00:04:41,860 self rather than just I, it becomes this shared 104 00:04:41,860 --> 00:04:44,519 concept. He brings up Michel Foucault here, right? 105 00:04:44,699 --> 00:04:47,540 Yes, he does. Foucault's famous idea of the souci 106 00:04:47,540 --> 00:04:50,060 de soi, the care of the self? Yeah. When Foucault 107 00:04:50,060 --> 00:04:52,639 talks about the care of the self, he isn't talking 108 00:04:52,639 --> 00:04:56,040 about care of me. He's talking about a universal 109 00:04:56,040 --> 00:04:59,699 human project. The omnipersonal value of the 110 00:04:59,699 --> 00:05:02,939 self is preserved even when it functions as an 111 00:05:02,939 --> 00:05:05,379 object in a sentence. So this grammatical shift 112 00:05:05,379 --> 00:05:08,040 is really Ricoeur's way of prying the door open. 113 00:05:08,379 --> 00:05:10,500 It is. He's setting the stage for a self that 114 00:05:10,500 --> 00:05:12,699 is natively connected to the rest of the world, 115 00:05:13,279 --> 00:05:14,920 rather than just, you know, sitting in a dark 116 00:05:14,920 --> 00:05:17,839 room, solely contemplating its own existence. 117 00:05:18,420 --> 00:05:20,699 And once he pries that door open, he drops what 118 00:05:20,699 --> 00:05:22,939 I think is the most mind -bending distinction 119 00:05:22,939 --> 00:05:26,000 in the whole book. This is his second major intention. 120 00:05:26,300 --> 00:05:29,670 The Edam and Ipsy distinction. Yes. He looks 121 00:05:29,670 --> 00:05:32,730 at the word identical, or identity, and points 122 00:05:32,730 --> 00:05:34,990 out that we are fundamentally conflating two 123 00:05:34,990 --> 00:05:37,730 entirely different concepts when we use that 124 00:05:37,730 --> 00:05:40,170 word in English or French. If you take away only 125 00:05:40,170 --> 00:05:42,850 one conceptual tool from a court today, it should 126 00:05:42,850 --> 00:05:45,949 absolutely be this one. The Latin term edem refers 127 00:05:45,949 --> 00:05:49,629 to sameness. Sameness. Yeah. It is the concept 128 00:05:49,629 --> 00:05:53,089 of permanence in time, an uninterrupted continuity, 129 00:05:53,670 --> 00:05:56,399 its numerical and qualitative identity. Right, 130 00:05:56,459 --> 00:05:58,819 so to put it in everyday terms, Edom identity 131 00:05:58,819 --> 00:06:01,560 is like a stone wall. Let's say you build a stone 132 00:06:01,560 --> 00:06:03,920 wall in your backyard. Okay, I'm with you. You 133 00:06:03,920 --> 00:06:06,120 go away for 20 years, you come back, and it is 134 00:06:06,120 --> 00:06:08,420 the exact same wall. I mean, its atoms might 135 00:06:08,420 --> 00:06:10,420 have weathered slightly, but it maintains its 136 00:06:10,420 --> 00:06:13,560 numerical and qualitative permanence. It is identical 137 00:06:13,560 --> 00:06:16,980 to what it was. It's static. Exactly. It's the 138 00:06:16,980 --> 00:06:20,189 what of a thing. But ipsae, on the other hand, 139 00:06:20,670 --> 00:06:23,879 is selfhood. And how is that different? Ipsy 140 00:06:23,879 --> 00:06:26,819 identity implies absolutely no assertion concerning 141 00:06:26,819 --> 00:06:31,000 some unchanging static core of the personality. 142 00:06:32,209 --> 00:06:34,730 It is the identity of a self that can change, 143 00:06:35,089 --> 00:06:38,649 grow, age, suffer, and adapt. And yet somehow 144 00:06:38,649 --> 00:06:42,069 still remain itself. Yes. See, this is the part 145 00:06:42,069 --> 00:06:44,420 that really hooked me. Because human beings are 146 00:06:44,420 --> 00:06:46,779 terrible at Edom identity. We don't stay the 147 00:06:46,779 --> 00:06:49,000 same at all. We really don't. Biologically, my 148 00:06:49,000 --> 00:06:51,279 cells are completely turning over every few years. 149 00:06:51,860 --> 00:06:53,600 Psychologically, the things I believed at age 150 00:06:53,600 --> 00:06:55,759 15 are completely different from what I believe 151 00:06:55,759 --> 00:06:57,660 now. Right, you're practically a different person. 152 00:06:57,980 --> 00:07:00,740 Exactly. If human identity were based on Edom, 153 00:07:00,920 --> 00:07:03,500 on strict sameness, then I am literally not the 154 00:07:03,500 --> 00:07:06,040 same person I was a decade ago. I'm an imposter 155 00:07:06,040 --> 00:07:08,879 in my own life. Which is an existential crisis 156 00:07:08,879 --> 00:07:11,500 that a lot of philosophers run into. If you change, 157 00:07:11,519 --> 00:07:14,639 do you disappear? But Ricoeur solves this by showing 158 00:07:14,639 --> 00:07:17,379 that human identity is held together by ipsy. 159 00:07:17,779 --> 00:07:20,740 And the ultimate proof he offers for ipsy identity, 160 00:07:21,060 --> 00:07:23,019 the phenomenon that demonstrates it perfectly, 161 00:07:23,699 --> 00:07:27,100 is the act of keeping a promise. Let's explore 162 00:07:27,100 --> 00:07:29,779 that because the promise analogy is so powerful. 163 00:07:30,319 --> 00:07:33,100 Go for it. Let's say I promise my partner that 164 00:07:33,100 --> 00:07:34,980 I will be with them through sickness and health. 165 00:07:35,339 --> 00:07:38,779 I make that vow at age 25. I am full of energy, 166 00:07:39,000 --> 00:07:42,060 naive, wildly optimistic. The classic 25 year 167 00:07:42,060 --> 00:07:45,100 old. Right. Now cut to 30 years later, I'm 55. 168 00:07:45,720 --> 00:07:48,139 My health has changed. My brain chemistry is 169 00:07:48,139 --> 00:07:51,079 different. The romantic naivete has been completely 170 00:07:51,079 --> 00:07:53,319 replaced by the grind of daily life. You are 171 00:07:53,319 --> 00:07:56,160 physically and mentally altered. In the idom 172 00:07:56,160 --> 00:07:59,120 sense, I am absolutely not the same entity who 173 00:07:59,120 --> 00:08:02,680 made that promise. My sameness is gone. Yet when 174 00:08:02,680 --> 00:08:05,860 things get hard, I stay. I honor the vow. And 175 00:08:05,860 --> 00:08:08,879 why do you stay? Because of self -constancy. 176 00:08:09,459 --> 00:08:13,110 I am the same self. because I maintained my word 177 00:08:13,110 --> 00:08:15,730 across the gap of time, despite all the internal 178 00:08:15,730 --> 00:08:18,670 and external changes. My identity isn't a frozen 179 00:08:18,670 --> 00:08:20,629 rock in the garden, it's an act of maintenance 180 00:08:20,629 --> 00:08:23,449 of the commitment. That act of maintenance, that 181 00:08:23,449 --> 00:08:26,949 is ipsay. Promising proves that selfhood can 182 00:08:26,949 --> 00:08:30,149 completely free itself from mere sameness. You 183 00:08:30,149 --> 00:08:32,429 don't have to be the exact same person to remain 184 00:08:32,429 --> 00:08:35,789 the same self. That's just beautiful. It is. 185 00:08:36,450 --> 00:08:38,690 And this directly feeds into his third intention, 186 00:08:39,389 --> 00:08:42,179 which is the very title of the book. the dialectic 187 00:08:42,179 --> 00:08:45,779 of the self and the other. One self as another. 188 00:08:46,620 --> 00:08:49,419 Right, the core thesis. Ricoeur is arguing that 189 00:08:49,419 --> 00:08:51,860 otherness isn't just a comparative tool. He isn't 190 00:08:51,860 --> 00:08:54,879 saying I am a self and you are another self and 191 00:08:54,879 --> 00:08:57,620 we are similar. No, it's deeper than that. Much 192 00:08:57,620 --> 00:09:00,940 deeper. He is arguing that otherness is actually 193 00:09:00,940 --> 00:09:04,970 constitutive of the self. The self implies the 194 00:09:04,970 --> 00:09:07,529 other to such an intimate foundational degree 195 00:09:07,529 --> 00:09:10,370 that you cannot even conceive of the self. without 196 00:09:10,370 --> 00:09:12,309 the other already being present in the equation. 197 00:09:12,789 --> 00:09:16,070 So the word as in the title is carrying a massive 198 00:09:16,070 --> 00:09:17,690 amount of weight. Oh, absolutely. It doesn't 199 00:09:17,690 --> 00:09:20,529 mean one self is like another. It means one self 200 00:09:20,529 --> 00:09:24,250 in as much as being other. It is an implication, 201 00:09:25,070 --> 00:09:28,490 a deep entanglement. Now, to truly appreciate 202 00:09:28,490 --> 00:09:31,049 why Ricoeur has to build this three part foundation, 203 00:09:31,769 --> 00:09:35,330 the grammar of the self, the Edem and Ipse distinction 204 00:09:35,330 --> 00:09:38,350 and the constitutive other. We really have to 205 00:09:38,350 --> 00:09:40,309 look at the historical wreckage he is trying 206 00:09:40,309 --> 00:09:42,649 to clean up. The wreckage of past philosophers? 207 00:09:43,009 --> 00:09:44,889 Yeah. We have to look at the philosophies of 208 00:09:44,889 --> 00:09:48,289 the subject. Right. We all know the Cartesian 209 00:09:48,289 --> 00:09:52,009 trap. Descartes wants absolute, undeniable certainty. 210 00:09:52,370 --> 00:09:54,669 The quest for a foundation. So he locks himself 211 00:09:54,669 --> 00:09:57,830 in a room, applies his hyperbolic doubt, imagines 212 00:09:57,830 --> 00:10:00,370 an evil genius tricking his senses, and just 213 00:10:00,370 --> 00:10:02,470 strips away the physical world until all he has 214 00:10:02,470 --> 00:10:05,490 left is the famous cogito. I think therefore 215 00:10:05,490 --> 00:10:09,500 I am. The exalted I. He builds this exalted eye, 216 00:10:09,620 --> 00:10:11,879 this master of the universe who is completely 217 00:10:11,879 --> 00:10:14,360 isolated from everything else. And anyone who 218 00:10:14,360 --> 00:10:17,159 has taken a Philosophy 101 class knows that exact 219 00:10:17,159 --> 00:10:20,220 sequence. But what Rekor zeroes in on is the 220 00:10:20,220 --> 00:10:22,740 architectural failure of that exalted eye. How 221 00:10:22,740 --> 00:10:25,720 does it fail? Well, Descartes reaches his point 222 00:10:25,720 --> 00:10:28,340 of absolute certainty, but it's a Pyrrhic victory. 223 00:10:29,019 --> 00:10:31,879 Left entirely to itself, this isolated eye is 224 00:10:31,879 --> 00:10:34,500 trapped in the instantaneous moment of its own 225 00:10:34,500 --> 00:10:37,659 thinking. Record actually compares it to a condemned 226 00:10:37,659 --> 00:10:40,580 Sisyphus. Oh, wow. Pushing the rock of certainty 227 00:10:40,580 --> 00:10:42,879 up the hill only for it to roll back down the 228 00:10:42,879 --> 00:10:45,200 moment he stops actively thinking about it. Exactly. 229 00:10:45,840 --> 00:10:49,320 The Cartesian ego has no duration. It has no 230 00:10:49,320 --> 00:10:51,580 way to guarantee its own existence from one second 231 00:10:51,580 --> 00:10:54,279 to the next without constantly reasserting itself. 232 00:10:54,299 --> 00:10:57,700 It is exhausting. So to escape this temporal 233 00:10:57,700 --> 00:11:00,460 trap, Descartes has to introduce a lifeline. 234 00:11:00,799 --> 00:11:02,919 He has to prove the existence of a perfectly 235 00:11:02,919 --> 00:11:06,019 truthful God who won't deceive him. Right. To 236 00:11:06,019 --> 00:11:07,820 guarantee you that his clear and distinct ideas 237 00:11:07,820 --> 00:11:11,159 hold true over time. And this creates a devastating 238 00:11:11,159 --> 00:11:14,019 theoretical loop. The famous vicious circle. 239 00:11:14,539 --> 00:11:16,860 Let's break down the ratio ascendi and ratio 240 00:11:16,860 --> 00:11:19,759 cognisendi here because that distinction exposes 241 00:11:19,759 --> 00:11:22,379 exactly why the isolated self is a total myth. 242 00:11:22,840 --> 00:11:25,820 It's a fascinating logical collapse. Descartes 243 00:11:25,820 --> 00:11:28,659 argues that God is the ratio ascendi, the reason 244 00:11:28,659 --> 00:11:32,019 for being of the self. God is the creator, therefore 245 00:11:32,019 --> 00:11:34,419 the self exists. Okay, that tracks with standard 246 00:11:34,419 --> 00:11:37,519 theology. But mathematically, chronologically 247 00:11:37,519 --> 00:11:40,259 in his own meditations, Descartes only discovers 248 00:11:40,259 --> 00:11:43,379 that God exists through his own internal clear 249 00:11:43,379 --> 00:11:47,720 and distinct idea of perfection. Therefore, the 250 00:11:47,720 --> 00:11:50,700 isolated self becomes the ratio cognisendi, the 251 00:11:50,700 --> 00:11:54,559 reason for knowing of God. So the exalted eye 252 00:11:54,559 --> 00:11:57,149 sets itself up as the ultimate. foundational 253 00:11:57,149 --> 00:11:59,629 truth of the universe. But the moment it actually 254 00:11:59,629 --> 00:12:02,330 has to function across time, it immediately relies 255 00:12:02,330 --> 00:12:04,990 on an outside guarantee. It subordinates itself 256 00:12:04,990 --> 00:12:07,970 to an idea it supposedly generated. It's a paradox. 257 00:12:08,350 --> 00:12:10,110 It completely collapses under its own weight. 258 00:12:10,570 --> 00:12:12,250 And the subsequent generations of philosophers 259 00:12:12,250 --> 00:12:15,669 saw that collapse and reacted to it, which leads 260 00:12:15,669 --> 00:12:18,450 to what Recuer calls the demotion of the cogito. 261 00:12:19,110 --> 00:12:22,950 Enter Spinoza. Yes. Spinoza looks at Descartes' 262 00:12:23,129 --> 00:12:25,809 flailing, isolated subject and says, this is 263 00:12:25,809 --> 00:12:28,840 absurd. For Spinoza, the only thing with true 264 00:12:28,840 --> 00:12:31,519 foundational infinite value is substance, which 265 00:12:31,519 --> 00:12:34,820 equates with nature or God. So the human cogito 266 00:12:34,820 --> 00:12:38,000 gets violently demoted from its pedestal. In 267 00:12:38,000 --> 00:12:40,759 Spinoza's ethics, the exalted I think therefore 268 00:12:40,759 --> 00:12:43,460 I am is reduced to a stark, almost biological 269 00:12:43,460 --> 00:12:48,399 axiom. Man thinks. Man thinks. That is so dismissive 270 00:12:48,399 --> 00:12:50,820 compared to Dick Hart. He really is. It's like 271 00:12:50,820 --> 00:12:54,629 saying dog's bark, fish swim. Man thinks. It's 272 00:12:54,629 --> 00:12:56,970 just a trait of a much larger substance, not 273 00:12:56,970 --> 00:13:00,590 the center of reality at all. Right. But if Spinoza 274 00:13:00,590 --> 00:13:03,649 demotes the eye, Nietzsche comes along a couple 275 00:13:03,649 --> 00:13:05,549 of centuries later and completely obliterates 276 00:13:05,549 --> 00:13:08,669 it. We go from the exalted eye to the shattered 277 00:13:08,669 --> 00:13:12,250 eye. Shattered into dust. Nietzsche's attack 278 00:13:12,250 --> 00:13:14,090 isn't just on Descartes' logic. It's an attack 279 00:13:14,090 --> 00:13:16,309 on the very language that makes the eye possible. 280 00:13:16,490 --> 00:13:19,769 How so? He views the Cartesian subject as a rhetorical 281 00:13:19,769 --> 00:13:22,919 illusion. In his early writings on truth and 282 00:13:22,919 --> 00:13:25,279 lies, Nietzsche argues that the concepts we use 283 00:13:25,279 --> 00:13:27,419 to anchor ourselves aren't fundamental truths. 284 00:13:27,940 --> 00:13:30,980 They are just faded metaphors, coins that have 285 00:13:30,980 --> 00:13:32,720 lost their embossing and are now just considered 286 00:13:32,720 --> 00:13:35,639 scrap metal. He uses the term Verstelling, right? 287 00:13:35,919 --> 00:13:38,720 Dissimulation. Yes. For Nietzsche, the eye is 288 00:13:38,720 --> 00:13:41,899 a Verstelling, an illusion that serves as an 289 00:13:41,899 --> 00:13:44,539 expedient for preserving life. It's biologically 290 00:13:44,539 --> 00:13:46,419 useful to believe you have a cohesive self, but 291 00:13:46,419 --> 00:13:49,070 it is ultimately a total fiction. So he just 292 00:13:49,070 --> 00:13:51,210 flips Descartes entirely. He takes Descartes' 293 00:13:51,350 --> 00:13:55,389 evil genius, the great deceiver, and says, the 294 00:13:55,389 --> 00:13:58,340 deceiver isn't an external demon. The deceiver 295 00:13:58,340 --> 00:14:01,360 is your own instinct for truth. Wow. The instinct 296 00:14:01,360 --> 00:14:04,799 for truth is a hidden sophism. The subject is 297 00:14:04,799 --> 00:14:07,240 shattered because it realizes it was the one 298 00:14:07,240 --> 00:14:09,759 lying to itself the entire time. So if you're 299 00:14:09,759 --> 00:14:11,919 a student of philosophy in the late 20th century, 300 00:14:12,460 --> 00:14:14,659 you're basically dealing with a massive case 301 00:14:14,659 --> 00:14:17,139 of historical whiplash. Whiplash is the perfect 302 00:14:17,139 --> 00:14:19,220 word for it. On one end of the pendulum, you 303 00:14:19,220 --> 00:14:22,720 have this arrogant, isolated, Cartesian eye that 304 00:14:22,720 --> 00:14:24,559 claims to be the foundation of reality, but ends 305 00:14:24,559 --> 00:14:26,919 up trapping itself in a loop. Right. And on the 306 00:14:26,919 --> 00:14:29,159 other end, you have Nietzsche telling you that 307 00:14:29,159 --> 00:14:31,840 your entire identity is a pathetic, linguistic 308 00:14:31,840 --> 00:14:34,000 illusion designed to keep you from going insane. 309 00:14:34,200 --> 00:14:36,960 It's a choice between absolute hubris and absolute 310 00:14:36,960 --> 00:14:40,230 despair. And Ricoeur plants his flag right in 311 00:14:40,230 --> 00:14:42,669 the middle. He refuses both. He says both of 312 00:14:42,669 --> 00:14:45,210 these extremes are dead ends. The demand for 313 00:14:45,210 --> 00:14:47,809 an ultimate unshakable foundation is what caused 314 00:14:47,809 --> 00:14:50,009 the pendulum to swing so violently in the first 315 00:14:50,009 --> 00:14:52,710 place. So what's his alternative? He proposes 316 00:14:52,710 --> 00:14:55,730 a hermeneutics of the self, a way of interpreting 317 00:14:55,730 --> 00:14:58,129 identity that sits at an equal distance from 318 00:14:58,129 --> 00:15:00,730 the apology of the cogito and its overthrow. 319 00:15:01,409 --> 00:15:03,330 And the core mechanism of this middle path is 320 00:15:03,330 --> 00:15:06,529 a concept he calls attestation. Let's pause on 321 00:15:06,529 --> 00:15:08,669 that for a second because attestation feels like 322 00:15:08,669 --> 00:15:10,669 the linchpin of the whole first half of this 323 00:15:10,669 --> 00:15:13,519 deep dive. It absolutely is. If we reject the 324 00:15:13,519 --> 00:15:16,220 empirical scientific certainty of Descartes, 325 00:15:16,379 --> 00:15:19,399 what the Greeks called episteme, and we refuse 326 00:15:19,399 --> 00:15:21,840 to surrender to Nietzsche's nihilistic despair, 327 00:15:22,179 --> 00:15:25,799 what exactly is attestation? Think of attestation 328 00:15:25,799 --> 00:15:29,159 as an I believe in, rather than an empirical 329 00:15:29,159 --> 00:15:32,440 I believe that. Okay. It is a fundamental lived 330 00:15:32,440 --> 00:15:35,580 assurance. It shares grammatical space with testimony 331 00:15:35,580 --> 00:15:38,419 and credence. It is the deep trust that each 332 00:15:38,419 --> 00:15:41,399 person has of existing as a self, capable of 333 00:15:41,399 --> 00:15:43,429 acting, and suffering in the world. Oh, wait, 334 00:15:43,509 --> 00:15:47,330 hold on. If all we have is attestation, just 335 00:15:47,330 --> 00:15:49,690 my own internal testimony that I exist and have 336 00:15:49,690 --> 00:15:52,389 agency, how does that actually hold up against 337 00:15:52,389 --> 00:15:55,110 intense skepticism? Because if we take this to 338 00:15:55,110 --> 00:15:57,789 a literal courtroom, testimony is notoriously 339 00:15:57,789 --> 00:16:01,029 the weakest form of evidence. An eyewitness saying, 340 00:16:01,389 --> 00:16:03,929 I believe in what I saw, gets dismantled by hard 341 00:16:03,929 --> 00:16:06,190 forensic data every time. That's a fair point. 342 00:16:06,470 --> 00:16:09,750 So isn't Ricoeur just settling for a really flimsy, 343 00:16:09,830 --> 00:16:13,309 subjective foundation here? Is this just a philosophical 344 00:16:13,309 --> 00:16:16,070 downgrade from certainty to blind faith? That 345 00:16:16,070 --> 00:16:18,549 is exactly the critique a die -hard Cartesian 346 00:16:18,549 --> 00:16:21,570 would hurl at Ricoeur. They would call it a surrender. 347 00:16:22,269 --> 00:16:25,230 But Ricoeur argues that attestation is actually 348 00:16:25,230 --> 00:16:27,809 vastly more resilient than the impossible demand 349 00:16:27,809 --> 00:16:30,889 for absolute certainty. How is it more resilient? 350 00:16:31,529 --> 00:16:34,139 Certainty is brittle. The moment you find a single 351 00:16:34,139 --> 00:16:36,419 crack in Cartesian certainty, the whole edifice 352 00:16:36,419 --> 00:16:39,340 shatters, which is exactly what Nietzsche proved. 353 00:16:40,019 --> 00:16:42,299 Attestation isn't a weak guess, like saying, 354 00:16:42,620 --> 00:16:45,240 I attest that it might rain tomorrow. So what 355 00:16:45,240 --> 00:16:48,620 is it anchored to? It is deeply tethered to that 356 00:16:48,620 --> 00:16:51,700 ipsay identity we talked about, the self -constancy 357 00:16:51,700 --> 00:16:54,580 of keeping a promise. Ah, so it's an active trust. 358 00:16:55,039 --> 00:16:57,519 Precisely. It is a trust in our own existence 359 00:16:57,519 --> 00:17:00,779 that is constantly tested, challenged, and reaffirmed 360 00:17:00,779 --> 00:17:03,559 through our friction with the world. When you 361 00:17:03,559 --> 00:17:06,380 make a promise and keep it, you are a testing 362 00:17:06,380 --> 00:17:08,779 to your selfhood. You're doing it in reality, 363 00:17:08,940 --> 00:17:11,400 not just in your head. You are proving your agency 364 00:17:11,400 --> 00:17:14,559 in real time, not just thinking about it in a 365 00:17:14,559 --> 00:17:17,400 vacuum. It is a broken certainty for a broken 366 00:17:17,400 --> 00:17:19,559 cogito, but it is the only kind of certainty 367 00:17:19,559 --> 00:17:22,500 that actually allows us to live, act, and be 368 00:17:22,500 --> 00:17:26,130 ethical beings. That reframes it entirely. It's 369 00:17:26,130 --> 00:17:28,450 not about being bulletproof. It's about being 370 00:17:28,450 --> 00:17:31,329 anti -fragile. It's resilience in the face of 371 00:17:31,329 --> 00:17:34,170 doubt. Exactly. But that brings up the next massive 372 00:17:34,170 --> 00:17:37,049 hurdle. If we can't just stare inwardly like 373 00:17:37,049 --> 00:17:40,180 Descartes tried to do to find this self, how 374 00:17:40,180 --> 00:17:43,089 do we actually locate it? We have to take what 375 00:17:43,089 --> 00:17:46,450 Ricoeur calls the detour of reflection by way of 376 00:17:46,450 --> 00:17:51,349 analysis. A detour. Yeah. If the direct inward 377 00:17:51,349 --> 00:17:53,980 gaze is blinding, we have to look outward. We 378 00:17:53,980 --> 00:17:56,519 have to look at what the self actually does in 379 00:17:56,519 --> 00:17:59,359 the world. And fundamentally, a self does two 380 00:17:59,359 --> 00:18:03,599 things. It speaks and it acts. Which pulls us 381 00:18:03,599 --> 00:18:05,599 out of the realm of pure abstract thought and 382 00:18:05,599 --> 00:18:08,660 drops us right into linguistics and pragmatics. 383 00:18:08,839 --> 00:18:11,920 It grounds us. This is where he engages with 384 00:18:11,920 --> 00:18:14,480 analytic philosophy, and specifically the philosopher 385 00:18:14,480 --> 00:18:17,500 P .F. Strassen. And Recruer locks onto Strassen's 386 00:18:17,500 --> 00:18:20,559 concept of the person as a basic particular. 387 00:18:20,900 --> 00:18:24,329 Yes. In his book, Individuals. Strossen argues 388 00:18:24,329 --> 00:18:26,369 against the long -standing tradition of separating 389 00:18:26,369 --> 00:18:29,329 the mind and the body into two distinct substances. 390 00:18:29,710 --> 00:18:33,000 The old dualism. Right. He says that before you 391 00:18:33,000 --> 00:18:35,839 can even conceptualize a mind floating around, 392 00:18:36,200 --> 00:18:39,319 or a body acting like a machine, you have to 393 00:18:39,319 --> 00:18:43,039 start with the unified concept of a person. A 394 00:18:43,039 --> 00:18:46,980 person is a basic particular, a single indivisible 395 00:18:46,980 --> 00:18:49,259 entity to which we ascribe both physical and 396 00:18:49,259 --> 00:18:52,039 mental predicates. So practically speaking, you 397 00:18:52,039 --> 00:18:55,119 don't say my body weighs 150 pounds and my mind 398 00:18:55,119 --> 00:18:59,359 is contemplating Rekur. You say I weigh 150 pounds 399 00:18:59,359 --> 00:19:02,819 and I am confused. The same subject anchors both 400 00:19:02,819 --> 00:19:06,650 realities. Exactly. There is no pure ethereal 401 00:19:06,650 --> 00:19:08,930 consciousness at the starting line. You are a 402 00:19:08,930 --> 00:19:12,250 person embedded in a physical world. And this 403 00:19:12,250 --> 00:19:14,750 leads to a profound constraint that Strassen 404 00:19:14,750 --> 00:19:18,589 identifies, which Rekur eagerly adopts. The rule 405 00:19:18,589 --> 00:19:21,250 of double ascription. Yes. the rule of double 406 00:19:21,250 --> 00:19:24,410 ascription. This rule completely flipped my understanding 407 00:19:24,410 --> 00:19:27,210 of how we process our own thoughts. It's a total 408 00:19:27,210 --> 00:19:29,970 paradigm, Fifter. The rule of double ascription 409 00:19:29,970 --> 00:19:32,430 states that you can only meaningfully ascribe 410 00:19:32,430 --> 00:19:35,190 a state of consciousness to yourself if you can 411 00:19:35,190 --> 00:19:37,529 simultaneously potentially ascribe it to someone 412 00:19:37,529 --> 00:19:39,710 else. Let's really dig into the mechanics of 413 00:19:39,710 --> 00:19:42,430 that because the implications are huge. You're 414 00:19:42,430 --> 00:19:44,690 saying that I cannot even form the thought I 415 00:19:44,690 --> 00:19:46,769 am feeling grief unless I have a pre -existing 416 00:19:46,769 --> 00:19:49,799 recognition that you or anyone else are also 417 00:19:49,799 --> 00:19:52,440 capable of feeling grief? Yes, that is exactly 418 00:19:52,440 --> 00:19:56,559 it. The concept of grief or joy or anger is a 419 00:19:56,559 --> 00:19:59,160 shared category. But what if I just invent my 420 00:19:59,160 --> 00:20:02,259 own word for it? If you invent a completely private 421 00:20:02,259 --> 00:20:04,980 language with predicates that can strictly only 422 00:20:04,980 --> 00:20:07,480 apply to you and no one else in the universe, 423 00:20:08,099 --> 00:20:11,220 it ceases to be language. It loses all meaning. 424 00:20:11,900 --> 00:20:14,380 To identify your own internal state, you must 425 00:20:14,380 --> 00:20:17,359 use a shared conceptual framework. Which means 426 00:20:17,359 --> 00:20:20,579 the solitary, isolated ego is dead on arrival. 427 00:20:21,059 --> 00:20:23,460 We are fundamentally, linguistically tethered 428 00:20:23,460 --> 00:20:26,299 to anyone else from the very moment we try to 429 00:20:26,299 --> 00:20:28,920 articulate our own internal reality. You can't 430 00:20:28,920 --> 00:20:31,779 escape the Other. If I am in solitary confinement, 431 00:20:32,319 --> 00:20:34,299 trying to make sense of my own mind, I am still 432 00:20:34,299 --> 00:20:37,019 heavily relying on the phantom presence of the 433 00:20:37,019 --> 00:20:40,180 Other just to use the words that define my isolation. 434 00:20:40,549 --> 00:20:43,609 And what makes this even more complex is the 435 00:20:43,609 --> 00:20:45,990 radical asymmetry of this double description. 436 00:20:46,490 --> 00:20:49,710 What's fascinating here is the mechanism of how 437 00:20:49,710 --> 00:20:52,250 we apply these predicates. Right, because I can't 438 00:20:52,250 --> 00:20:55,609 feel your feelings. Exactly. When you ascribe 439 00:20:55,609 --> 00:20:58,009 a feeling to yourself, let's say anxiety, it 440 00:20:58,009 --> 00:21:01,369 is felt. You experience it from the inside viscerally. 441 00:21:02,029 --> 00:21:04,130 But when you ascribe that exact same feeling 442 00:21:04,130 --> 00:21:08,349 of anxiety to me, it is observed. I see you sweating 443 00:21:08,349 --> 00:21:11,220 or shaking. You see me pacing. You hear my voice 444 00:21:11,220 --> 00:21:14,339 shaking. The criteria for assigning the label 445 00:21:14,339 --> 00:21:18,119 are entirely different. Internal intuition versus 446 00:21:18,119 --> 00:21:21,140 external observation. Yet we use the exact same 447 00:21:21,140 --> 00:21:23,740 word. I say I am anxious and you are anxious, 448 00:21:23,799 --> 00:21:25,680 treating it as the exact same phenomenon, even 449 00:21:25,680 --> 00:21:29,240 though my access to those two phenomena are worlds 450 00:21:29,240 --> 00:21:34,000 apart. That asymmetry is the crucible of otherness. 451 00:21:34,700 --> 00:21:36,940 It forces our brains to simultaneously acquire 452 00:21:36,940 --> 00:21:40,960 the idea of reflexivity. My internal experience 453 00:21:40,960 --> 00:21:45,160 and the idea of otherness, your external reality. 454 00:21:45,940 --> 00:21:48,859 So we learn what it means to be a self by mapping 455 00:21:48,859 --> 00:21:51,759 our felt experiences onto the observed experiences 456 00:21:51,759 --> 00:21:55,519 of others and vice versa. Absolutely. So even 457 00:21:55,519 --> 00:21:58,059 at the level of basic semantics, just defining 458 00:21:58,059 --> 00:22:00,599 what an action or a feeling is, we are forced 459 00:22:00,599 --> 00:22:04,160 to shift into pragmatics. Who is the agent doing 460 00:22:04,160 --> 00:22:07,240 the acting? And that agent only materializes 461 00:22:07,240 --> 00:22:10,980 in a network of other acting agents. We are Interagents. 462 00:22:11,359 --> 00:22:14,900 We are interagents. But actions in speech acts 463 00:22:14,900 --> 00:22:17,720 don't just happen in isolated, disconnected bubbles. 464 00:22:18,420 --> 00:22:20,440 They aren't random points on a graph. No, they 465 00:22:20,440 --> 00:22:23,680 string together. They span across decades, which 466 00:22:23,680 --> 00:22:26,180 leads us out of the linguistic detour and into 467 00:22:26,180 --> 00:22:28,319 what I found to be the most beautiful part of 468 00:22:28,319 --> 00:22:31,680 Recour's framework, narrative identity. It is 469 00:22:31,680 --> 00:22:34,000 stunning. Because this is how we actually maintain 470 00:22:34,000 --> 00:22:36,759 that ipsy identity, that self -constancy across 471 00:22:36,759 --> 00:22:39,470 the chaos of a lifetime. Narrative identity is 472 00:22:39,470 --> 00:22:42,849 Ricoeur's masterstroke. It acts as the ultimate 473 00:22:42,849 --> 00:22:45,390 mediator between those two poles we established 474 00:22:45,390 --> 00:22:48,670 earlier, the rigid static edem of our character 475 00:22:48,670 --> 00:22:52,390 and the flexible dynamic ipsay of our self -constancy. 476 00:22:53,150 --> 00:22:54,950 Let's unpack the character side of that first. 477 00:22:55,269 --> 00:22:58,509 Ricoeur describes character as the set of distinctive 478 00:22:58,509 --> 00:23:01,230 marks that allow re -identification. But he doesn't 479 00:23:01,230 --> 00:23:03,509 just treat it like a personality test. No, he 480 00:23:03,509 --> 00:23:05,730 ties it to the ancient Greek concept of fate. 481 00:23:06,000 --> 00:23:08,299 Right. He links it back to a famous fragment 482 00:23:08,299 --> 00:23:13,180 from Heraclitus. Ethos Anthropos Daimon. Man's 483 00:23:13,180 --> 00:23:17,180 character is his fate. Your character is the 484 00:23:17,180 --> 00:23:19,420 sedimentation of your habits, your deep -seated 485 00:23:19,420 --> 00:23:22,519 dispositions, the physiological and psychological 486 00:23:22,519 --> 00:23:25,500 baselines you inherited. It's the what of the 487 00:23:25,500 --> 00:23:28,079 who. Yes. It's a layer of your existence that 488 00:23:28,079 --> 00:23:30,940 you cannot easily overwrite by pure willpower. 489 00:23:31,339 --> 00:23:34,220 You ultimately have to consent to it. So if you 490 00:23:34,220 --> 00:23:37,099 are inherently risk averse, or if you have a 491 00:23:37,099 --> 00:23:40,480 quick temper, that is your Edam character. It's 492 00:23:40,480 --> 00:23:43,019 almost painted onto you from the outside. Yes. 493 00:23:43,339 --> 00:23:46,059 But if we were just our character, we would be 494 00:23:46,059 --> 00:23:48,819 entirely predictable machines. Narrative identity 495 00:23:48,819 --> 00:23:50,900 prevents that static portrait from defining us 496 00:23:50,900 --> 00:23:53,279 completely. Because we aren't just a list of 497 00:23:53,279 --> 00:23:56,779 traits. We are telling a story. We are constantly 498 00:23:56,779 --> 00:24:00,400 synthesizing heterogeneous elements. Think about 499 00:24:00,400 --> 00:24:02,779 your life. You have intentional actions you chose 500 00:24:02,779 --> 00:24:05,500 to take. You have passive experiences that were 501 00:24:05,500 --> 00:24:08,920 inflicted upon you. Unexpected strokes of brilliant 502 00:24:08,920 --> 00:24:11,579 luck and devastating misfortunes. None of which 503 00:24:11,579 --> 00:24:14,720 fit perfectly together. Right. Narrative identity 504 00:24:14,720 --> 00:24:18,619 is the cognitive process of weaving all of those 505 00:24:18,619 --> 00:24:21,460 wildly disparate elements into a cohesive plot. 506 00:24:22,240 --> 00:24:23,759 Here's where it gets really interesting because 507 00:24:23,759 --> 00:24:26,960 this makes me think of an analogy. Imagine your 508 00:24:26,960 --> 00:24:30,339 life is a novel. Okay. I love a good book analogy. 509 00:24:30,640 --> 00:24:34,539 Your character, your Edam identity, determines 510 00:24:34,539 --> 00:24:37,400 the genre of the book and the predictable habits 511 00:24:37,400 --> 00:24:40,099 of the protagonist. If you're a highly cautious, 512 00:24:40,380 --> 00:24:43,000 introverted person, the reader expects you to 513 00:24:43,000 --> 00:24:46,299 act cautiously. The rules of the genre. Right. 514 00:24:46,779 --> 00:24:50,119 But your self -constancy, your ipsay identity, 515 00:24:50,859 --> 00:24:53,420 is the plot driving the story forward. That's 516 00:24:53,420 --> 00:24:55,859 a fantastic way to visualize it. Yeah. And the 517 00:24:55,859 --> 00:24:58,180 true test of identity happens when the plot forces 518 00:24:58,180 --> 00:25:01,339 the protagonist into a crisis. Let's say that 519 00:25:01,339 --> 00:25:03,980 cautious introvert suddenly has to take a massive, 520 00:25:04,279 --> 00:25:06,180 life -threatening risk to save someone they love. 521 00:25:06,359 --> 00:25:08,180 Which goes against their character. Exactly. 522 00:25:08,740 --> 00:25:11,519 In terms of strict idum character, taking a massive 523 00:25:11,519 --> 00:25:15,119 risk makes no sense. It's out of character. But 524 00:25:15,119 --> 00:25:17,880 the narrative synthesizes it. The plot explains 525 00:25:17,880 --> 00:25:20,359 why the vow to save their loved one overrode 526 00:25:20,359 --> 00:25:23,019 their natural caution. The identity doesn't shatter 527 00:25:23,019 --> 00:25:25,779 because of the contradiction. It expands to absorb 528 00:25:25,779 --> 00:25:28,650 it. We remain the same self because the story 529 00:25:28,650 --> 00:25:31,089 holds the contradictions together. And we are 530 00:25:31,089 --> 00:25:33,650 not just the solitary authors of this novel either. 531 00:25:34,170 --> 00:25:37,029 This is where the other floods back in. How so? 532 00:25:37,690 --> 00:25:40,670 Ricoeur heavily emphasizes that we are entangled 533 00:25:40,670 --> 00:25:43,170 in the stories of others. We are co -authors 534 00:25:43,170 --> 00:25:45,490 and sometimes we are just minor characters in 535 00:25:45,490 --> 00:25:48,789 someone else's plot. Furthermore, he cites H 536 00:25:48,789 --> 00:25:52,599 .R. Yowes' aesthetics of reception. noting how 537 00:25:52,599 --> 00:25:55,480 our very sense of self is shaped by the fictional 538 00:25:55,480 --> 00:25:58,400 stories we consume. Wait, really? Fictional stories? 539 00:25:58,779 --> 00:26:02,220 Yeah. When we read a tragedy and experience catharsis, 540 00:26:02,519 --> 00:26:05,119 we are borrowing the lives of fictional others 541 00:26:05,119 --> 00:26:08,700 to test out our own emotional capacities. Our 542 00:26:08,700 --> 00:26:11,039 identity requires the affection of the reading 543 00:26:11,039 --> 00:26:14,440 subject. We literally borrow the other to figure 544 00:26:14,440 --> 00:26:18,539 out who the self is. That's wild. But this brings 545 00:26:18,539 --> 00:26:21,720 up a heavy realization. If our lives are these 546 00:26:21,720 --> 00:26:24,839 deeply intertwined narratives and we are agents 547 00:26:24,839 --> 00:26:28,319 acting within them, then our actions have profound 548 00:26:28,319 --> 00:26:32,579 consequences on the other characters. Yes. We 549 00:26:32,579 --> 00:26:35,759 can't just act in a vacuum. We have to evaluate 550 00:26:35,759 --> 00:26:38,480 what we do. Which means we must transition from 551 00:26:38,480 --> 00:26:42,279 asking, who is the agent acting, to asking, who 552 00:26:42,279 --> 00:26:45,960 is the moral subject of imputation? Who is responsible? 553 00:26:46,480 --> 00:26:49,160 This brings us to the ethical and moral aim. 554 00:26:49,259 --> 00:26:51,680 of Ricoeur's work, which spans studies seven 555 00:26:51,680 --> 00:26:55,220 through nine. And here, he makes a very strict, 556 00:26:55,779 --> 00:26:58,460 deliberate distinction between the terms ethical 557 00:26:58,460 --> 00:27:02,339 and moral. Which most people use totally interchangeably 558 00:27:02,339 --> 00:27:05,000 in casual conversation. They do, but Ricoeur 559 00:27:05,000 --> 00:27:07,920 separates them along historical lines. For Ricoeur, 560 00:27:08,559 --> 00:27:11,819 the ethical is defined by the aim of an accomplished 561 00:27:11,819 --> 00:27:15,240 life. It is the pursuit of the good. The Greek 562 00:27:15,240 --> 00:27:18,180 approach. Exactly. This is rooted in Aristotle's 563 00:27:18,180 --> 00:27:20,619 teleological approach, aiming for a flourishing 564 00:27:20,619 --> 00:27:24,240 life. The moral, conversely, is the articulation 565 00:27:24,240 --> 00:27:26,880 of this aim into strict norms, characterized 566 00:27:26,880 --> 00:27:30,299 by a claim to universality and an effect of constraint. 567 00:27:30,960 --> 00:27:34,480 So the moral is more about rules. It's about 568 00:27:34,480 --> 00:27:37,799 obligation and duty, which is deeply rooted in 569 00:27:37,799 --> 00:27:41,119 Kant. OK. So ethics is the grand vision of the 570 00:27:41,119 --> 00:27:43,859 good life. And morality is the strict rule book 571 00:27:43,859 --> 00:27:45,920 we use to prevent ourselves from destroying that 572 00:27:45,920 --> 00:27:48,799 vision. Let's start with the ethical aim in Aristotle. 573 00:27:49,700 --> 00:27:51,960 Ricard leans heavily on Aristotle's concept of 574 00:27:51,960 --> 00:27:55,859 philia, friendship. Yes. Aristotle famously posits 575 00:27:55,859 --> 00:27:59,180 that the good man is a lover of self. But Ricard 576 00:27:59,180 --> 00:28:01,380 quickly points out that this isn't narcissism. 577 00:28:01,700 --> 00:28:03,819 It sounds like narcissism. It does, but it's 578 00:28:03,819 --> 00:28:06,880 not. For authentic self -esteem to even exist, 579 00:28:07,140 --> 00:28:09,980 it inherently requires the mediation of the other. 580 00:28:10,140 --> 00:28:12,759 You cannot truly evaluate your own actions as 581 00:28:12,759 --> 00:28:15,859 good without simultaneously recognizing the capacity 582 00:28:15,859 --> 00:28:18,839 for good in others. Okay. Aristotle calls the 583 00:28:18,839 --> 00:28:22,720 friend, another myself. Ricoeur highlights a specific 584 00:28:22,720 --> 00:28:26,900 Greek term Aristotle uses, sunias thesthai, which 585 00:28:26,900 --> 00:28:30,259 translates to perceiving together. Perceiving 586 00:28:30,259 --> 00:28:33,480 together. That almost sounds like the primordial 587 00:28:33,480 --> 00:28:37,200 root of a conscience. It is exactly that. It 588 00:28:37,200 --> 00:28:39,529 prefigures conscience. It is the shared baseline 589 00:28:39,529 --> 00:28:42,289 of human valuation. But let me challenge this 590 00:28:42,289 --> 00:28:44,769 Aristotelian setup, because it always feels a 591 00:28:44,769 --> 00:28:47,089 bit like a sleight of hand. How so? Well, if 592 00:28:47,089 --> 00:28:49,329 Aristotle says the foundation of this is being 593 00:28:49,329 --> 00:28:52,349 a lover of self, and we seek out friends because 594 00:28:52,349 --> 00:28:56,009 they are another myself, isn't this entire ethical 595 00:28:56,009 --> 00:28:58,670 framework secretly just an extension of self 596 00:28:58,670 --> 00:29:02,170 -interest? No. Isn't it just an elaborate, civilized 597 00:29:02,170 --> 00:29:05,279 form of selfishness? love the other because they 598 00:29:05,279 --> 00:29:07,539 reflect our own goodness back to us. It's a very 599 00:29:07,539 --> 00:29:09,640 common, very cynical critique of virtue ethics. 600 00:29:10,440 --> 00:29:12,819 But Ricoeur untangles this by showing that it 601 00:29:12,819 --> 00:29:15,660 is not a zero -sum game between selfishness and 602 00:29:15,660 --> 00:29:18,299 altruism. Okay, defend it for me. For Ricoeur's 603 00:29:18,299 --> 00:29:21,259 reading of Aristotle, loving the self structurally 604 00:29:21,259 --> 00:29:24,059 requires loving the other. They are mutually 605 00:29:24,059 --> 00:29:26,559 dependent variables. It's not that you love the 606 00:29:26,559 --> 00:29:29,259 other because they benefit you in some... transactional 607 00:29:29,259 --> 00:29:32,440 way right it's that your very capacity to value 608 00:29:32,440 --> 00:29:35,559 yourself your self -esteem is built out of the 609 00:29:35,559 --> 00:29:38,619 shared recognition of human worth the other is 610 00:29:38,619 --> 00:29:41,740 a self just like you without the other the category 611 00:29:41,740 --> 00:29:44,240 of worth doesn't even exist to apply to yourself 612 00:29:44,240 --> 00:29:46,980 so it's less like a mirror feeding my ego and 613 00:29:46,980 --> 00:29:49,500 more like a shared atmosphere I can't breathe 614 00:29:49,500 --> 00:29:52,440 without the air that we are both sharing that's 615 00:29:52,440 --> 00:29:54,660 a beautiful way to phrase it okay that makes 616 00:29:54,660 --> 00:29:57,519 sense for the ethical aim but What happens when 617 00:29:57,519 --> 00:29:59,900 the pursuit of the good life runs into conflict? 618 00:30:00,420 --> 00:30:02,920 That's where Kant's morality comes in. Kant brings 619 00:30:02,920 --> 00:30:05,500 the hammer down. Kant wants a system that relies 620 00:30:05,500 --> 00:30:08,519 on categorical imperatives, built on strict rules 621 00:30:08,519 --> 00:30:12,160 of universalization and non -contradiction. The 622 00:30:12,160 --> 00:30:14,980 categorical imperative. Yes. He champions the 623 00:30:14,980 --> 00:30:17,799 concept of autonomy, the self, giving the moral 624 00:30:17,799 --> 00:30:21,980 law to itself. free from external biases. But 625 00:30:21,980 --> 00:30:24,160 Record looks at Kant's system and says, this 626 00:30:24,160 --> 00:30:26,299 is too cold. It's too restrictive. Because it 627 00:30:26,299 --> 00:30:28,319 ignores the messiness of real life. Exactly. 628 00:30:28,680 --> 00:30:31,160 If you strip away all context, all culture, all 629 00:30:31,160 --> 00:30:34,099 human friction in the name of pure universal 630 00:30:34,099 --> 00:30:37,819 logic, morality becomes an incredibly poor abstract 631 00:30:37,819 --> 00:30:40,660 algorithm. It becomes rigid. Like the famous 632 00:30:40,660 --> 00:30:44,079 example, if the rule is never lie and a murderer 633 00:30:44,079 --> 00:30:47,029 is at the door asking where your friend is, Kantian 634 00:30:47,029 --> 00:30:50,789 universalization dictates you can't lie. Right, 635 00:30:50,789 --> 00:30:53,589 which completely violates the ethoglame of a 636 00:30:53,589 --> 00:30:57,190 good life with your friend. Exactly. Ricoeur argues 637 00:30:57,190 --> 00:31:00,210 that pure autonomy is a fantasy. To have a functional 638 00:31:00,210 --> 00:31:03,890 morality, we must integrate heteronomy into our 639 00:31:03,890 --> 00:31:07,029 autonomy. Heteronomy meaning being governed by 640 00:31:07,029 --> 00:31:10,089 an outside law or an external force. In Ricoeur's 641 00:31:10,089 --> 00:31:13,190 nuanced usage, it means recognizing that the 642 00:31:13,190 --> 00:31:16,049 moral injunction very often comes from the outside. 643 00:31:16,230 --> 00:31:19,349 It comes from the face of the other. The face 644 00:31:19,349 --> 00:31:23,150 of the other. Ricoeur uses the dynamic of the master 645 00:31:23,150 --> 00:31:25,970 and the disciple. Not a master who dominates 646 00:31:25,970 --> 00:31:28,509 and enslaves, but a master of justice who calls 647 00:31:28,509 --> 00:31:31,690 you to a higher standard. True autonomy isn't 648 00:31:31,690 --> 00:31:34,490 about being an isolated king making up rules. 649 00:31:34,930 --> 00:31:37,910 No, true autonomy is completely bound up with 650 00:31:37,910 --> 00:31:40,210 recognizing the urgent demands of justice for 651 00:31:40,210 --> 00:31:43,500 every individual around you. Which... naturally 652 00:31:43,500 --> 00:31:46,279 bridges us into Hegel. Because if we are talking 653 00:31:46,279 --> 00:31:48,880 about recognizing the demands of the other, Hegel 654 00:31:48,880 --> 00:31:52,460 is the philosopher of recognition. Hegel's concept 655 00:31:52,460 --> 00:31:55,420 of recognition is the glue that binds the ethical 656 00:31:55,420 --> 00:31:58,519 aim to the moral norm, right? Yes. In Hegel's 657 00:31:58,519 --> 00:32:00,740 famous master -slave dialectic, he proves that 658 00:32:00,740 --> 00:32:04,140 a self -consciousness can only truly become aware 659 00:32:04,140 --> 00:32:07,119 of its own freedom when it is recognized by another 660 00:32:07,119 --> 00:32:09,849 equally free self -consciousness. Because if 661 00:32:09,849 --> 00:32:12,150 you just dominate the other person, their recognition 662 00:32:12,150 --> 00:32:15,009 is worthless. You have to recognize them as an 663 00:32:15,009 --> 00:32:18,049 equal to validate your own standing. So recognition 664 00:32:18,049 --> 00:32:20,849 introduces an inescapable plurality into the 665 00:32:20,849 --> 00:32:23,390 very constitution of the self. We move from self 666 00:32:23,390 --> 00:32:26,170 -esteem in Aristotle to solicitude and care for 667 00:32:26,170 --> 00:32:28,690 the neighbor, and finally to justice, which is 668 00:32:28,690 --> 00:32:31,029 care for the anonymous others, the institutions 669 00:32:31,029 --> 00:32:34,250 of society. You are a moral subject precisely 670 00:32:34,250 --> 00:32:37,329 because you are recognized as one, and you distribute 671 00:32:37,329 --> 00:32:39,880 that recognition in return. You've tracked the 672 00:32:39,880 --> 00:32:42,440 entire massive detour perfectly. We found the 673 00:32:42,440 --> 00:32:44,740 self's ominous presence in grammar. We rescued 674 00:32:44,740 --> 00:32:47,299 it from Cartesian hubris and Nietzschean despair 675 00:32:47,299 --> 00:32:50,140 through the resilient trust of attestation. We 676 00:32:50,140 --> 00:32:52,160 discovered it relies on double ascription just 677 00:32:52,160 --> 00:32:54,960 to speak. We watched it weave its scattered actions 678 00:32:54,960 --> 00:32:57,920 into narrative identity. And we saw its moral 679 00:32:57,920 --> 00:33:00,539 weight forged entirely in the crucible of mutual 680 00:33:00,539 --> 00:33:03,079 recognition. Which means we are finally ready 681 00:33:03,079 --> 00:33:05,980 for the summit. Study 10. The final chapter. 682 00:33:06,299 --> 00:33:08,920 Ricoeur has proven that the self is entangled 683 00:33:08,920 --> 00:33:11,380 with the other in language, story, and ethics. 684 00:33:11,980 --> 00:33:14,339 But now he asks the foundational question. What 685 00:33:14,339 --> 00:33:17,759 is the actual mode of being of this self? This 686 00:33:17,759 --> 00:33:20,180 is his ontology. Having traced all the detours, 687 00:33:20,279 --> 00:33:23,099 he wants to ground this in the bedrock of reality. 688 00:33:23,980 --> 00:33:26,079 He reaches all the way back to Plato's dialogues 689 00:33:26,079 --> 00:33:29,779 like the sophist, borrowing the great kinds of 690 00:33:29,779 --> 00:33:32,819 the same and the other. And he brings in Heidegger, 691 00:33:33,039 --> 00:33:35,400 too. He pulls heavily from Martin Heidegger's 692 00:33:35,400 --> 00:33:39,500 concept of Dasein, or being in the world. Heidegger's 693 00:33:39,500 --> 00:33:42,660 idea of throne -ness is so visceral here. It 694 00:33:42,660 --> 00:33:45,690 is. Throne -ness is the realization that you 695 00:33:45,690 --> 00:33:47,910 did not create the conditions of your own existence. 696 00:33:48,450 --> 00:33:51,089 You were thrown into a specific historical era, 697 00:33:51,549 --> 00:33:54,490 a specific language, a specific body, without 698 00:33:54,490 --> 00:33:58,730 your consent. Your facticity. Yes. Your facticity. 699 00:33:58,990 --> 00:34:01,809 The concrete facts of your life. limits your 700 00:34:01,809 --> 00:34:04,529 freedom from the very first breath. You are never 701 00:34:04,529 --> 00:34:08,030 a pure, unblemished starting point. And Ricker 702 00:34:08,030 --> 00:34:10,329 takes that sense of being acted upon by the world 703 00:34:10,329 --> 00:34:12,690 and distills it into what he calls the Triad 704 00:34:12,690 --> 00:34:15,489 of Passivity. The Triad of Passivity is the beating 705 00:34:15,489 --> 00:34:19,460 heart of oneself as another. These are three 706 00:34:19,460 --> 00:34:21,900 fundamental, inescapable modes of experience 707 00:34:21,900 --> 00:34:26,059 where the self is acted upon by a profound otherness. 708 00:34:26,440 --> 00:34:29,199 It is what keeps the self from ever reclaiming 709 00:34:29,199 --> 00:34:32,360 that arrogant Cartesian throne. Because the self 710 00:34:32,360 --> 00:34:35,960 is fundamentally passive to the other. Yes. Let's 711 00:34:35,960 --> 00:34:37,699 walk through the triad, because this is where 712 00:34:37,699 --> 00:34:40,619 the philosophy really hits bone. What is the 713 00:34:40,619 --> 00:34:43,780 first passivity? The first passivity is the flesh, 714 00:34:44,119 --> 00:34:47,559 your own physical body. OK, wait. My own body 715 00:34:47,559 --> 00:34:50,360 is the other. How can the thing that I am most 716 00:34:50,360 --> 00:34:52,179 intimately connected to, the thing that literally 717 00:34:52,179 --> 00:34:55,610 is me, be an other. Because it is an intimate 718 00:34:55,610 --> 00:34:58,789 passivity. Your flesh is the ultimate mediator 719 00:34:58,789 --> 00:35:01,250 between your internal self and the external world. 720 00:35:01,869 --> 00:35:03,530 Think about how your body actually operates. 721 00:35:03,570 --> 00:35:06,110 Okay. You do not consciously control its deepest 722 00:35:06,110 --> 00:35:08,750 workings. Your heart beats, your cells divide 723 00:35:08,750 --> 00:35:11,429 completely independent of your will, and more 724 00:35:11,429 --> 00:35:14,010 importantly your body frequently rebels against 725 00:35:14,010 --> 00:35:16,289 your sense of self. Man, I can relate to this 726 00:35:16,289 --> 00:35:19,119 on a painfully mundane level. Oh yeah. Yeah, 727 00:35:19,199 --> 00:35:21,599 a few months ago I sneezed while turning to grab 728 00:35:21,599 --> 00:35:24,320 a coffee mug and I completely threw my lower 729 00:35:24,320 --> 00:35:26,320 back out. The classic betrayal of the flesh. 730 00:35:26,420 --> 00:35:28,639 For three days I was completely immobilized. 731 00:35:28,760 --> 00:35:31,980 My mind, myself, wanted to work, wanted to go 732 00:35:31,980 --> 00:35:34,500 for a run, wanted to just stand up straight, 733 00:35:34,920 --> 00:35:38,579 but my body acted as an alien entity that vetoed 734 00:35:38,579 --> 00:35:41,079 my desires. It took over. It forced me to endure 735 00:35:41,079 --> 00:35:44,559 its pain. It belonged to me, but it operated 736 00:35:44,559 --> 00:35:47,659 entirely as an other that I was completely passive 737 00:35:47,659 --> 00:35:50,019 to. That is a perfect articulation of the first 738 00:35:50,019 --> 00:35:53,420 passivity. The flesh ages. It gets sick. It demands 739 00:35:53,420 --> 00:35:56,320 sustenance. It anchors you in the physical world, 740 00:35:56,519 --> 00:35:58,960 making you a body among other bodies, vulnerable 741 00:35:58,960 --> 00:36:02,099 to the laws of physics. It is an otherness built 742 00:36:02,099 --> 00:36:05,119 right into your core. So my own body is the first 743 00:36:05,119 --> 00:36:08,159 other. What is the second passivity in the triad? 744 00:36:08,460 --> 00:36:11,179 The second is the other person, the foreign human 745 00:36:11,179 --> 00:36:13,920 being standing in front of you. And here, Recour 746 00:36:13,920 --> 00:36:16,480 synthesizes a massive phenomenological debate 747 00:36:16,480 --> 00:36:19,239 between Edmund Husserl and Emmanuel Levinas. 748 00:36:19,639 --> 00:36:21,980 Let's break that down. How did Husserl view the 749 00:36:21,980 --> 00:36:25,179 other person? Husserl argued for a process called 750 00:36:25,179 --> 00:36:28,719 analogical transfer. Basically, I know intimately 751 00:36:28,719 --> 00:36:31,199 that I have a mind and a body that operate together. 752 00:36:31,420 --> 00:36:33,500 Right. So when I look out into the world and 753 00:36:33,500 --> 00:36:36,300 see you, a similar physical body moving and speaking, 754 00:36:36,820 --> 00:36:39,260 I transfer my understanding of myself onto you. 755 00:36:39,460 --> 00:36:42,349 I build you by analogy. you become an alter ego. 756 00:36:42,869 --> 00:36:45,030 That makes logical sense, but it feels a bit, 757 00:36:45,030 --> 00:36:47,949 I don't know, self -centered, like I am the original 758 00:36:47,949 --> 00:36:50,650 template and everyone else is just a mental projection 759 00:36:50,650 --> 00:36:53,429 I am painting onto the world. Levinas felt the 760 00:36:53,429 --> 00:36:56,889 exact same way. Levinas violently rejected Husserl's 761 00:36:56,889 --> 00:36:59,570 view. Levinas argued that if you build the other 762 00:36:59,570 --> 00:37:01,869 by analogy to yourself, you strip them of their 763 00:37:01,869 --> 00:37:05,190 true radical otherness. You reduce them to the 764 00:37:05,190 --> 00:37:08,750 same. So what was Levinas's alternative? For 765 00:37:08,750 --> 00:37:11,030 Levinas, there is a radical asymmetry in human 766 00:37:11,030 --> 00:37:13,949 interaction, and the responsibility comes entirely 767 00:37:13,949 --> 00:37:17,210 from the other. Levinas talks a lot about the 768 00:37:17,210 --> 00:37:20,670 face of the other, right? Yes. For Levinas, the 769 00:37:20,670 --> 00:37:22,570 face of the other isn't just physical features. 770 00:37:22,670 --> 00:37:25,889 It is an ethical authority. It is a master who 771 00:37:25,889 --> 00:37:27,989 summons you to responsibility before you even 772 00:37:27,989 --> 00:37:30,690 have the chance to consent. Wow. The very existence 773 00:37:30,690 --> 00:37:33,429 of the other issues a silent, absolute injunction. 774 00:37:33,849 --> 00:37:37,960 Thou shalt not kill. You do not build the other 775 00:37:37,960 --> 00:37:40,639 out of your own image. The other commands you 776 00:37:40,639 --> 00:37:44,139 from a place of radical Exteriority so whose 777 00:37:44,139 --> 00:37:46,219 rule says I build you from the ground up based 778 00:37:46,219 --> 00:37:48,800 on my own blueprint And let me know says you 779 00:37:48,800 --> 00:37:51,179 crash into my reality from above and demand my 780 00:37:51,179 --> 00:37:54,579 subservience to ethics How does record resolve 781 00:37:54,579 --> 00:37:58,099 that massive gap? He finds the dialectic if we 782 00:37:58,099 --> 00:38:00,300 connect this to the bigger picture He argues 783 00:38:00,300 --> 00:38:03,219 that you actually need both mechanisms for a 784 00:38:03,219 --> 00:38:05,820 functioning identity Why both if you only have 785 00:38:05,820 --> 00:38:08,610 Levin us? The self is completely crushed by the 786 00:38:08,610 --> 00:38:12,190 demands of the other. You have no agency. Ricoeur 787 00:38:12,190 --> 00:38:14,889 says you need the Husserlian self -esteem, the 788 00:38:14,889 --> 00:38:17,630 capacity to recognize your own agency, in order 789 00:38:17,630 --> 00:38:21,130 to be capable of responding to the Levinassian 790 00:38:21,130 --> 00:38:23,989 Convocation to Justice. So the other person acts 791 00:38:23,989 --> 00:38:26,949 upon us, demanding recognition, and we are passive 792 00:38:26,949 --> 00:38:30,590 to that demand, but we actively respond. Precisely. 793 00:38:30,699 --> 00:38:32,780 Well, we've got the flesh and the other person. 794 00:38:32,820 --> 00:38:35,659 What is the third and final passivity? The third 795 00:38:35,659 --> 00:38:38,340 is arguably the most deeply hidden mysterious 796 00:38:38,340 --> 00:38:42,309 passivity of all. Conscience. And Ricoeur specifically 797 00:38:42,309 --> 00:38:45,269 focuses on the German word Gewissen, which means 798 00:38:45,269 --> 00:38:48,269 conscience as a moral compass. And he differentiates 799 00:38:48,269 --> 00:38:50,650 that from other words for consciousness. Yes, 800 00:38:50,730 --> 00:38:53,070 differentiating it from Bewusstsein, which is 801 00:38:53,070 --> 00:38:55,789 just general cognitive awareness. But why is 802 00:38:55,789 --> 00:38:58,829 a moral compass considered an other? Isn't my 803 00:38:58,829 --> 00:39:01,230 conscious just my own thoughts? Think about how 804 00:39:01,230 --> 00:39:03,289 conscience actually feels when you experience 805 00:39:03,289 --> 00:39:07,760 it. It acts as an internal injunction. When you 806 00:39:07,760 --> 00:39:09,880 feel guilty or when you feel compelled to do 807 00:39:09,880 --> 00:39:11,739 the right thing against your own selfish interests, 808 00:39:12,179 --> 00:39:14,159 it does not feel like a choice you are actively 809 00:39:14,159 --> 00:39:16,559 making. No, it really doesn't. It feels like 810 00:39:16,559 --> 00:39:18,900 a voice that calls to you, a debt you suddenly 811 00:39:18,900 --> 00:39:22,539 owe. It is a voice inside you, yet it feels entirely 812 00:39:22,539 --> 00:39:25,860 like it comes from outside you. It judges you. 813 00:39:26,099 --> 00:39:28,579 It demands things of you. It tells you that you 814 00:39:28,579 --> 00:39:30,969 are falling short. It's the voice you can't turn 815 00:39:30,969 --> 00:39:34,269 off no matter how hard your self wants to. Exactly. 816 00:39:35,010 --> 00:39:37,010 Conscience is the ultimate ontological proof 817 00:39:37,010 --> 00:39:40,769 of oneself as another. It is the deep otherness 818 00:39:40,769 --> 00:39:43,710 residing at the very epicenter of selfhood. You 819 00:39:43,710 --> 00:39:45,889 are passive to the judgment of your own conscience. 820 00:39:46,210 --> 00:39:48,909 So what does this all mean? Let me try to synthesize 821 00:39:48,909 --> 00:39:51,769 this entire triad of passivity for a moment because 822 00:39:51,769 --> 00:39:54,690 it paints such a vivid picture of the human condition. 823 00:39:54,849 --> 00:39:58,239 Go for it. Ricoeur is saying that my own body surprises 824 00:39:58,239 --> 00:40:01,300 and betrays me. It gets sick. It ages. It reacts 825 00:40:01,300 --> 00:40:04,099 without my permission. Other people surprise 826 00:40:04,099 --> 00:40:06,840 me. They crash into my life. They demand things 827 00:40:06,840 --> 00:40:09,820 of me. They call me to responsibility. And my 828 00:40:09,820 --> 00:40:12,719 own conscience surprises me. It judges me. It 829 00:40:12,719 --> 00:40:14,760 restricts me. It speaks with a moral authority 830 00:40:14,760 --> 00:40:17,599 that I cannot control. Beautifully summarized. 831 00:40:17,920 --> 00:40:20,260 In all three of these foundational ways, my flesh, 832 00:40:20,679 --> 00:40:23,900 my neighbors, my conscience, I am fundamentally 833 00:40:24,630 --> 00:40:27,570 inescapably other to myself. That is the beautiful, 834 00:40:27,969 --> 00:40:30,170 broken certainty of Paul Ricoeur's ontology. 835 00:40:30,980 --> 00:40:33,000 The self is not a fortress with impenetrable 836 00:40:33,000 --> 00:40:37,119 walls. It is a crossroads. It is a porous membrane 837 00:40:37,119 --> 00:40:39,760 that only exists because things are constantly 838 00:40:39,760 --> 00:40:43,219 passing through it. What a staggering intellectual 839 00:40:43,219 --> 00:40:46,239 journey. We started with Descartes sitting completely 840 00:40:46,239 --> 00:40:48,980 alone in a room doubting the universe. trying 841 00:40:48,980 --> 00:40:52,019 to build an arrogant, isolated eye that thought 842 00:40:52,019 --> 00:40:54,940 it was the absolute center of reality. And methodically, 843 00:40:55,280 --> 00:40:56,940 through the grammar of our language, through 844 00:40:56,940 --> 00:40:59,300 the way we act, through the stories we weave, 845 00:40:59,340 --> 00:41:02,280 and the ethics we strive for, Ricoeur is dismantled 846 00:41:02,280 --> 00:41:05,099 that fortress brick by brick. He has left us 847 00:41:05,099 --> 00:41:07,539 with a vision of a self that only has meaning, 848 00:41:07,980 --> 00:41:10,579 that only possesses an identity, because it is 849 00:41:10,579 --> 00:41:13,780 in a constant, vulnerable dialogue with the other. 850 00:41:13,949 --> 00:41:17,289 It is a philosophy that demands we live in the 851 00:41:17,289 --> 00:41:20,190 messy, frictionless world rather than retreating 852 00:41:20,190 --> 00:41:24,360 into abstract thought. Identity requires participation. 853 00:41:25,159 --> 00:41:28,380 And realizing that leaves me with one final unscripted 854 00:41:28,380 --> 00:41:30,059 thought, something that has been lingering in 855 00:41:30,059 --> 00:41:31,599 the back of my mind as we've been discussing 856 00:41:31,599 --> 00:41:34,059 this, and something I think you, listening right 857 00:41:34,059 --> 00:41:36,280 now, should ponder as you step back into your 858 00:41:36,280 --> 00:41:40,369 day. What's that? Recore grounds our entire identity, 859 00:41:40,690 --> 00:41:43,090 our self -esteem, our narrative in this deep, 860 00:41:43,550 --> 00:41:46,349 necessary passivity of dealing with other human 861 00:41:46,349 --> 00:41:49,349 beings. The vulnerability of the flesh, the ethical 862 00:41:49,349 --> 00:41:52,289 demands of the face of the other, the autonomous 863 00:41:52,289 --> 00:41:55,710 voice of conscience. But what happens to oneself 864 00:41:55,710 --> 00:41:58,969 as another in an age where the others we interact 865 00:41:58,969 --> 00:42:01,670 with most frequently might soon be artificial 866 00:42:01,670 --> 00:42:05,670 intelligences? Oh, wow. That is a profound question 867 00:42:05,670 --> 00:42:08,190 to extrapolate from this text. Because think 868 00:42:08,190 --> 00:42:11,809 about it. An AI lacks flesh. It doesn't get sick. 869 00:42:11,949 --> 00:42:14,869 It doesn't age. It doesn't die. It lacks the 870 00:42:14,869 --> 00:42:17,849 intimate passivity of a body. And it lacks a 871 00:42:17,849 --> 00:42:21,070 true conscience. It has no internal moral voice 872 00:42:21,070 --> 00:42:24,150 that haunts it, only lines of programming and 873 00:42:24,150 --> 00:42:27,010 safety guardrails. It's an imitation of the other. 874 00:42:27,570 --> 00:42:31,130 Right. If an entity has no flesh and no conscience, 875 00:42:31,650 --> 00:42:34,449 can it truly function as the other we need to 876 00:42:34,449 --> 00:42:36,909 build our own narrative identity? If we spend 877 00:42:36,909 --> 00:42:39,369 our days in dialogue with algorithms designed 878 00:42:39,369 --> 00:42:41,909 merely to reflect our own preferences back to 879 00:42:41,909 --> 00:42:45,329 us, to agree with us, to serve us, are we losing 880 00:42:45,329 --> 00:42:47,969 that radical asymmetry that Levinas warned us 881 00:42:47,969 --> 00:42:51,329 about? The master that summons us to responsibility. 882 00:42:51,769 --> 00:42:53,829 The danger in it we might be reverting back to 883 00:42:53,829 --> 00:42:56,789 the Cartesian trap, but this time aided by technology. 884 00:42:57,639 --> 00:43:00,460 If the AI just acts as a perfect mirror for our 885 00:43:00,460 --> 00:43:03,119 own desires, we aren't experiencing true otherness. 886 00:43:03,400 --> 00:43:05,260 We are just experiencing an infinite loop of 887 00:43:05,260 --> 00:43:08,739 the same. Exactly. Well, a society that spends 888 00:43:08,739 --> 00:43:11,539 more time talking to machines than to vulnerable, 889 00:43:11,639 --> 00:43:14,480 unpredictable humans fundamentally alter what 890 00:43:14,480 --> 00:43:17,639 it means to be a self? Because if the diagnostic 891 00:43:17,639 --> 00:43:20,340 X -ray machine for human identity is already 892 00:43:20,340 --> 00:43:23,420 as murky as Recruit proves it is, introducing 893 00:43:23,420 --> 00:43:26,739 AI into the triad might just unplug the machine 894 00:43:26,739 --> 00:43:29,340 entirely. It forces us to ask a critical question 895 00:43:29,340 --> 00:43:32,110 about the future. Are we building tools that 896 00:43:32,110 --> 00:43:34,659 will enhance our solicitude for each other? Or 897 00:43:34,659 --> 00:43:37,360 are we building flawless mirrors that will permanently 898 00:43:37,360 --> 00:43:40,079 trap us in the very isolation Ricoeur spent his 899 00:43:40,079 --> 00:43:42,599 entire life trying to help us escape? And that 900 00:43:42,599 --> 00:43:44,300 is a question we will have to answer through 901 00:43:44,300 --> 00:43:47,300 our actions, not just our thoughts. Thank you 902 00:43:47,300 --> 00:43:50,179 for joining us on this intense, incredibly rewarding 903 00:43:50,179 --> 00:43:52,940 intellectual journey. This text is dense, but 904 00:43:52,940 --> 00:43:55,340 the payoff is a completely new way of viewing 905 00:43:55,340 --> 00:43:58,739 your own reflection. Keep exploring, keep questioning, 906 00:43:59,300 --> 00:44:01,400 and keep diving deep into the things that matter. 907 00:44:01,679 --> 00:44:02,340 We'll see you next time.