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Welcome back to The Deep Dive. Today we are undertaking

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what might be, well, one of the highest stakes

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investigations possible. We're doing a really

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rigorous, in -depth exploration of the nature

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of truth itself. It's a huge topic. Yeah. And

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it's a debate that, you know, philosophers used

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to think was kind of contained safely in the

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academic ivory tower. Right. Just abstract thought

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experiment. Exactly. Yeah. But as our primary

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source today, Simon Blackburn's fantastic work,

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Truth, A Guide. really demonstrates this is a

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battlefield. It's spilled out into politics,

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into culture, science, everywhere, really. So

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we're going to be dissecting Blackburn's arguments

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pretty much chapter by chapter, and we'll supplement

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them with some classic and, well, contemporary

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counter theories, things like correspondence,

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coherence, pragmatism. Oh, the big ones. Yeah.

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Our mission really is to guide you through these

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core intellectual currents, identify the foundational

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questions, and maybe most importantly, show you

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why the answers you accept. Well, they fundamentally

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shape your view of the world. We're going from,

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you know, the classical recoil arguments of Socrates

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all the way up to modern ideas like conceptual

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engineering and pluralism. Yeah. It's quite a

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journey. So, yeah. Prepare to question maybe

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everything you thought you knew about fact and

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fiction. Let's unpack this. Okay, so Blackburn

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kicks off his book with this really powerful

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rejection of a historical assumption. The Enlightenment

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philosopher David Hume, he once sort of minimized

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the seriousness of academic errors. Yeah, he

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suggested that, well, errors in religion are

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genuinely dangerous, sure, but philosophical

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errors are merely ridiculous, he thought. Like

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a bad idea would just fade away on its own. Exactly.

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It would just wither on the vine. And Blackburn

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argues quite convincingly, I think, that this

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position is actually dangerously naive, especially

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in the modern world. How so? Well, today, these

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philosophical concepts, they aren't just kept

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in lecture halls, are they? The stakes have become

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culturally enormous. We're seeing ideas like,

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you know, deep relativism or certain kinds of

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postmodernism. They're being treated not just

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as interesting academic theories, but as, well,

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diabolical forces by some. Diabolical. That's

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a strong word. He uses that word. He does, quoting

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others using it. These theories get accused of

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corrupting and corroding the universities and

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the public culture and even, you know, rotting

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our precious civilization from within. Wow. OK,

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so when the language gets that charged, you know,

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the disagreement runs much deeper than just semantics.

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Absolutely. And the debates become so intense

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because it really centers on an epistemological

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issue. Epistemological meaning. Meaning it's

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about the relationship between belief, justification,

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and fact. How do we know what we know? And the

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goal of those attracted to strong relativism

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is often quite explicit. They want to destroy

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the pedestals that elevate some beliefs above

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others. So if there's no universal objective

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standard. Then all belief systems stand equally.

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Or perhaps equally without any real foundation.

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Depends on your perspective, I suppose. This

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immediately sets up our, well, our two main philosophical

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camps in these modern culture wars, right? Pretty

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much. On one side, you've got the absolutists.

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These are the folks who stand on what they see

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as plain, unvarnished, objective fact. They cherish

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reason, objectivity. They hold out for the possibility

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of absolute, non -negotiable truth. Simple common

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sense observations. But even they don't apply

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it everywhere, do they? No, rarely. Even the

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staunchest absolutists might readily accept absolute

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truth in, say, chemistry, but they often exclude

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fields like aesthetics or humor or deep moral

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judgments. Areas where the idea of a single fixed

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fact seems much harder to pin down. Yeah, if

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you press an absolutist, they might say something

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like, sure, 2 plus 2 to 4 is absolutely true,

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but whether Hamlet is the greatest play ever

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written? Well, it's just a matter of taste. Exactly.

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But that selective application, it already concedes

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some ground, doesn't it? It does. Okay, so then

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you have the other side, the relativists. And

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they position themselves as the tough -minded

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realists. Yeah. They look at the absolutist's

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position as a kind of innocent faith. Innocent

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faith. Yeah, claiming that absolutism just can't

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stand up to the sheer complexity of human history

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and cultural variety. The relativist aims to

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show that all standards of success and failure

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in belief systems are actually internally determined.

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Determined by the language game or the social

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group itself? Precisely. rather than being externally

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imposed by some mysterious universal reality

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out there. Okay, so this clash over foundational

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standards, it forces us right back to that most

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frustrating universal question. What is truth?

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It's the killer question. Yeah. Even historical

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figures like Pontius Pilate apparently treated

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it rhetorically, didn't he? Implying the answer

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was impossible or maybe just useless to find.

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And the philosopher Voltaire, he famously gave

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that platitude. Truth is simply a statement of

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the facts as they are. Sounds nice and simple.

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It does sound wonderfully straightforward, doesn't

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it? But it's a brilliant way to illustrate the

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philosophical quicksand we're wading into. If

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truth is correspondence to a fact, well, we then

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have to define fact and correspondence. Ah, and

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if we define fact as, say, a true state of affairs.

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You've used the very word true that you're trying

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to define. It's a classic circularity problem.

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Right. How do you analyze something so basic

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without referring back to itself? Exactly. If

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we can't define correspondence or fact without

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presupposing truth, then Voltaire's definition,

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well, it doesn't actually take us anywhere useful.

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It just asserts that truth exists without defining

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its nature. And that foundational challenge,

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that's why we have to ask, does truth even possess

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a discernible nature? And if it does, is it genuinely

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objective and absolute or is it somehow irreducibly

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subjective and relative? Big questions. Huge.

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And that's the rest of the book and our deep

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dive tries to grapple with. OK, so we've kind

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of framed this high stakes political and conceptual

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battlefield. Now, let's zoom in a bit on the

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the moral weight of what we choose to believe.

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Blackburn really forces us to think about our

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duty to truth. Yeah, this is a really crucial

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pivot because we often just assume that beliefs

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are judged by their truth or falsity. And that's

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the end of the story. Like it might be extremely

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comforting or maybe even useful for my career.

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To genuinely believe I'm incapable of failure.

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Right, but your comfort or the utility of that

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belief, that doesn't make it true, does it? Conventionally,

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truth seems to have rights and privileges that

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are independent of how comfortable it makes us

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feel. And this sets up that classic philosophical

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showdown, the one between W .K. Clifford and

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William James. That's right. Clifford took a

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really hard line. He argued for a strict moral

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duty to verify our beliefs. He argued fiercely

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against making what he called a leap of faith

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when an issue simply couldn't be decided by rational

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means. So no wishful thinking allowed. Basically,

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yes. And Clifford's argument wasn't just about

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individual intellectual rigor. It was intensely

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social. He was deeply concerned about the, quote,

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dire consequences of the social habit of irrational

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conviction. The famous ship owner example comes

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in here, right? Exactly. The ship owner who basically

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out of laziness or wishful thinking just wills

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himself to believe his ship is seaworthy, even

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though he hasn't really checked. He doesn't have

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the evidence. And then the ship sinks. And the

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ship sinks. Clifford says the owner is morally

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culpable, not just because he was wrong, but

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because the cost of his convenient, unverified

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belief was paid by society, by the sailors and

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their families who died. For Clifford, the public

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cost of widespread irrationality always outweighs

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any private comfort or benefit. That makes a

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lot of sense. It feels very responsible. But

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then William James, the pragmatist, he offered

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a critique that still resonates really deeply

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today, doesn't it? It does. He argued that this

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feeling of duty about either truth or error,

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as he put it, is really just an expression of

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our passional life, our desires, our hopes, our

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fears. So it's not about objective duty. It's

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about what we want to be true. In certain situations,

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yes. Jim's believed that, especially in situations

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where rational evidence is totally lacking, he

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was thinking particularly about religious hypotheses,

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we shouldn't be prevented from acting on a hypothesis

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that might lead to the blessings of real knowledge.

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Like sometimes the belief itself can create the

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fact. That was his controversial idea. His famous

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phrase was that our will must sometimes choose

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even when the intellect cannot provide certainty.

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OK, but the sources we're looking at, they point

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out that James's rhetoric, while it sounds inspiring,

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has some pretty significant flaws when you really

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pick it apart. Doesn't his argument basically

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rely on making belief a purely private affair?

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Exactly. That's the core critique. James completely

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privatizes the costs and benefits. He seems to

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ignore Clifford's central concern. the social

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consequences. If every shimoner is encouraged

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to just leap to convenient conclusions. The whole

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social fabric of trust just collapses, doesn't

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it? Furthermore, James often seems to imply that

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all these different religious or faith hypotheses

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are somehow equally probable, which is usually

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a massive, unwarranted assumption. So the critique

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is that James is essentially using the language

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of duty just to justify believing whatever he

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already wants to believe, regardless of evidence

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or social cost. That's the essence of the counter

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-argument, yes. It suggests his framework doesn't

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adequately account for the broader impact of

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belief. Okay, so if we step away from faith for

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a moment and look purely at how language itself

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functions, maybe we can find a nondescriptive

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way for statements to still hold power. This

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is where we bring in Hume's insight on performative

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language, maybe filtered through Wittgenstein.

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Right, we first have to acknowledge a bit of

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a puzzle here. Why do religious practitioners,

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for instance, use language that sounds told so

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like a recital of plain truth, language that

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seems explicitly descriptive if they aren't actually,

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in the philosophical sense, describing the world.

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They say God exists, not it would be useful for

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society if we acted as if God existed. Exactly.

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It sounds like a straightforward factual claim.

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Wittgenstein's suggestion here is incredibly

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helpful. He proposed that perhaps there is simply

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no better kind of language to use to accomplish

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the nondescriptive function they intend. What

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kind of function? Maybe expressing allegiance,

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creating community solidarity, guiding ethical

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practice, evoking certain feelings. The point

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is they might be using descriptive sounding language,

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but the job of that language is something else

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entirely. And this is where Hume's example comes

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in, the public performance idea. Yes, it illustrates

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this powerfully. Think about the words. I promise

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to pay you back tomorrow. or in a legal setting,

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I hereby transfer ownership of this property.

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Right. Those words, once you say them in the

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right context, they instantly create real world

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civil and moral consequences. How does that work?

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Hume suggests this power comes entirely from

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utility in public convention. Society has agreed

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these words perform these actions. And here's

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the crucial philosophical insight. The secret

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direction of a person's internal intention is

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not crucial to the validity of the public act.

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So even if I cross my fingers behind my back

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when I say I promise and I secretly have absolutely

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no intention of keeping that promise, I'm still

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bound by the public utterance. Precisely. Your

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mental reservation doesn't nullify the promise

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in the eyes of society or often the law. Why

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not? Because the action is binding. Because society

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has effectively agreed. based on sheer utility,

255
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that this public performance constitutes a legally

256
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and morally binding act. It has to work that

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way for promises, contracts, etc. to function.

258
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That's a really profound contrast to certain

259
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religious doctrines or even the legal systems

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that put heavy emphasis on the hidden, internal,

261
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true intention of the person performing the act.

262
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Exactly. This idea that... the public utility

263
00:12:01,600 --> 00:12:04,059
and function of language can sometimes override

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hidden internal belief or intention is really

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key to understanding how some statements that

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aren't strictly descriptive still function so

267
00:12:12,440 --> 00:12:15,120
powerfully in our social world. OK, so we've

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00:12:15,120 --> 00:12:17,980
established that this duty to truth or maybe

269
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the function of belief has these profound social

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implications. But now let's circle back to the

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raw logic of relativity itself. We need to zoom

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in on the well, the ancient source of so much

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skepticism. The sophist Protagoras. Ah, yes,

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Protagoras, who famously declared, man is the

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measure of all things. Which sounds democratic,

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empowering. It sounds like the ultimate expression

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00:12:40,029 --> 00:12:42,710
of radical subjectivity, yeah. It basically strips

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external objective reality of all its authority

279
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and places the ultimate authority for what counts

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00:12:47,009 --> 00:12:49,690
as true squarely with the individual. Or, by

281
00:12:49,690 --> 00:12:51,789
extension, maybe the local culture work. So,

282
00:12:51,990 --> 00:12:54,809
if I feel the wind is cold, then the wind is

283
00:12:54,809 --> 00:12:57,919
cold for me. If a society thinks an action is

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00:12:57,919 --> 00:13:00,340
moral, then that action is moral for them. End

285
00:13:00,340 --> 00:13:03,500
of story. That's the core idea. It seems wondrously

286
00:13:03,500 --> 00:13:06,440
freeing, perhaps. But Protagoras, in making this

287
00:13:06,440 --> 00:13:08,960
claim, set himself a kind of lethological trap.

288
00:13:09,299 --> 00:13:11,899
It's called the ancient recoil argument. And

289
00:13:11,899 --> 00:13:14,299
it was famously weaponized against him by Socrates

290
00:13:14,299 --> 00:13:16,799
and Plato. The recoil argument. Okay, how does

291
00:13:16,799 --> 00:13:19,360
that work? Well, it works like this. If Protagoras

292
00:13:19,360 --> 00:13:21,940
wants to argue for his position, if he wants

293
00:13:21,940 --> 00:13:24,779
to convince us that man is the measure, is correct.

294
00:13:25,320 --> 00:13:27,440
He has to use reason, right? He has to appeal

295
00:13:27,440 --> 00:13:31,120
to some shared principles of logic or observation.

296
00:13:31,519 --> 00:13:34,320
Exactly. He has to present his statement, man

297
00:13:34,320 --> 00:13:37,080
is the measure of all things, as something that

298
00:13:37,080 --> 00:13:39,120
ought to be accepted, presumably universally,

299
00:13:39,399 --> 00:13:41,600
because it is true in the traditional fixed sense

300
00:13:41,600 --> 00:13:44,419
he's trying to deny. Ah, so he's trying to deny

301
00:13:44,419 --> 00:13:46,779
universal standards of reasoning while at the

302
00:13:46,779 --> 00:13:49,259
same time relying on those very standards to

303
00:13:49,259 --> 00:13:51,679
make his case. Precisely. He's arguing for the

304
00:13:51,679 --> 00:13:53,860
denial of objective reason by using objective

305
00:13:53,860 --> 00:13:56,549
reason. It's a kind of intellectual self -contradiction.

306
00:13:56,690 --> 00:13:59,690
It recoils back on itself. Okay, and this argument

307
00:13:59,690 --> 00:14:01,909
gets updated in modern philosophy too, doesn't

308
00:14:01,909 --> 00:14:04,529
it? It becomes even sharper. It does. It becomes

309
00:14:04,529 --> 00:14:07,190
the modern self -refutation charge. Let's try

310
00:14:07,190 --> 00:14:09,509
and walk through that. Assume the relativist

311
00:14:09,509 --> 00:14:12,549
sentence, man is the measure, is indeed true.

312
00:14:12,789 --> 00:14:15,370
Okay, let's assume it's true. If it's true, then

313
00:14:15,370 --> 00:14:18,029
according to its own rules, its truth depends

314
00:14:18,029 --> 00:14:20,210
on whether it's assertible by the prevailing

315
00:14:20,210 --> 00:14:24,200
cultural norms. So... we must consider its assertibility

316
00:14:24,200 --> 00:14:27,360
by modern cultural norms, the norms of our current

317
00:14:27,360 --> 00:14:30,460
society. And our current norms, generally speaking,

318
00:14:30,740 --> 00:14:33,159
accept the importance of objective fact, especially

319
00:14:33,159 --> 00:14:35,580
in science and things like that. We don't generally

320
00:14:35,580 --> 00:14:38,580
operate as if man is the measure, is the final

321
00:14:38,580 --> 00:14:40,720
word on truth. Right. So if the relativist's

322
00:14:40,720 --> 00:14:43,320
core premise is that truth depends only on the

323
00:14:43,320 --> 00:14:45,899
cultural norms asserting it, and our current

324
00:14:45,899 --> 00:14:48,179
cultural norms don't actually assert this premise

325
00:14:48,179 --> 00:14:50,840
as a universal truth. Then the premise refutes

326
00:14:50,840 --> 00:14:53,600
itself. If the sentence is true, then by its

327
00:14:53,600 --> 00:14:55,480
own definition, because it's not universally

328
00:14:55,480 --> 00:14:59,539
assertible by us, it is not true. Exactly. Therefore,

329
00:14:59,820 --> 00:15:03,120
the conclusion seems unavoidable. It simply cannot

330
00:15:03,120 --> 00:15:05,639
be true in the way the relativist wants it to

331
00:15:05,639 --> 00:15:08,779
be. It collapses under its own logic. It's like

332
00:15:08,779 --> 00:15:12,080
a conceptual impossibility, a kind of logical

333
00:15:12,080 --> 00:15:14,940
black hole for anyone trying to claim that radical

334
00:15:14,940 --> 00:15:17,200
relativism is fundamentally true. Okay, that

335
00:15:17,200 --> 00:15:19,740
seems pretty devastating logically. So this forces

336
00:15:19,740 --> 00:15:22,080
the relativist into a corner, right? They often

337
00:15:22,080 --> 00:15:23,960
try to escape by saying something like, wait,

338
00:15:24,080 --> 00:15:25,899
wait, I'm not holding this as some kind of universal

339
00:15:25,899 --> 00:15:28,700
truth. I'm just voicing it as my interpretation,

340
00:15:29,000 --> 00:15:31,899
as my measure. Yes, that's a common move. But

341
00:15:31,899 --> 00:15:33,580
then they crash straight into another problem,

342
00:15:33,740 --> 00:15:36,600
the problem of action and success. Okay, what's

343
00:15:36,600 --> 00:15:39,279
that? If you claim this doctrine, man is the

344
00:15:39,279 --> 00:15:42,299
measure, as some kind of profound insight or

345
00:15:42,299 --> 00:15:45,059
a true representation of how things really stand.

346
00:15:45,789 --> 00:15:48,049
Well, you are implicitly holding yourself to

347
00:15:48,049 --> 00:15:49,990
some fixed standards of intellectual success.

348
00:15:50,509 --> 00:15:52,590
You believe you've actually achieved something

349
00:15:52,590 --> 00:15:55,230
intellectually significant by realizing this.

350
00:15:55,409 --> 00:15:57,470
It's like aiming for a target. If you truly believe

351
00:15:57,470 --> 00:15:59,570
in the insight of your relativist doctrine, you

352
00:15:59,570 --> 00:16:01,789
think you've hit some kind of intellectual bullseye.

353
00:16:01,889 --> 00:16:04,940
Right. But if truth really is relative in the

354
00:16:04,940 --> 00:16:07,600
way Protagoras suggests, then the bullseye is

355
00:16:07,600 --> 00:16:09,799
effectively placed wherever his arrow falls.

356
00:16:10,059 --> 00:16:13,360
If there's no external standard, no objective

357
00:16:13,360 --> 00:16:15,860
notion of intellectual failure or hitting wide

358
00:16:15,860 --> 00:16:18,519
of the mark, how can you possibly claim you've

359
00:16:18,519 --> 00:16:21,820
achieved genuine success or insight? So you can't

360
00:16:21,820 --> 00:16:24,399
have it both ways. You can't say there's no target

361
00:16:24,399 --> 00:16:27,419
and also I hit the target. That's the core dilemma,

362
00:16:27,480 --> 00:16:31,200
exactly. The relativist seemingly cannot both

363
00:16:31,200 --> 00:16:34,610
understand himself. only to have hit a bullseye

364
00:16:34,610 --> 00:16:36,909
that is placed wherever his arrow falls, and

365
00:16:36,909 --> 00:16:38,990
as having achieved an insight or understanding,

366
00:16:39,230 --> 00:16:42,250
a true representation of how things stand. Things

367
00:16:42,250 --> 00:16:44,350
you have to choose. Which seems to strip away

368
00:16:44,350 --> 00:16:46,549
any real intellectual weight from the relativist

369
00:16:46,549 --> 00:16:48,669
position. If they succeed, well, great, that's

370
00:16:48,669 --> 00:16:51,009
true for them. If they fail, well, that failure

371
00:16:51,009 --> 00:16:52,629
is also true for them. It doesn't seem to get

372
00:16:52,629 --> 00:16:55,009
us anywhere. And this translates directly into

373
00:16:55,009 --> 00:16:56,850
the practical effect, or maybe the function,

374
00:16:56,929 --> 00:16:59,190
of the relativist stance when it appears in actual

375
00:16:59,190 --> 00:17:01,980
conversation. Which, arguably, is often its real

376
00:17:01,980 --> 00:17:04,019
-world purpose. Okay, let's go back to that moral

377
00:17:04,019 --> 00:17:07,059
argument example. Tolerating historical figures,

378
00:17:07,220 --> 00:17:09,420
say Genghis Khan. Right. You have two people

379
00:17:09,420 --> 00:17:12,180
arguing. One says Genghis Khan's actions were

380
00:17:12,180 --> 00:17:15,619
objectively morally bad. The other says, no,

381
00:17:15,740 --> 00:17:18,799
hold on. Given the norms of his society, his

382
00:17:18,799 --> 00:17:21,200
actions were understandable, maybe even seen

383
00:17:21,200 --> 00:17:23,799
as good. It's a real debate about moral standards.

384
00:17:24,160 --> 00:17:27,180
Okay. Standard clash of views. Now, a relativist

385
00:17:27,180 --> 00:17:29,940
steps in. Let's call her Rosie again. And Rosie

386
00:17:29,940 --> 00:17:33,740
says, OK, look, tolerating Genghis is good is

387
00:17:33,740 --> 00:17:36,539
true for you and thinking he's bad is true for

388
00:17:36,539 --> 00:17:39,720
you. What has Rosie actually contributed to the

389
00:17:39,720 --> 00:17:43,200
substance of the moral debate? Nothing. She hasn't

390
00:17:43,200 --> 00:17:44,839
really engaged with the moral question at all,

391
00:17:44,880 --> 00:17:46,539
has she? She's just sort of stepped sideways.

392
00:17:46,700 --> 00:17:49,039
Exactly. She has effectively bowed out of the

393
00:17:49,039 --> 00:17:51,900
actual conversation. Her comment hasn't made

394
00:17:51,900 --> 00:17:54,559
Genghis Khan look one bit more or less likable

395
00:17:54,559 --> 00:17:57,180
or his actions one bit more or less devastating.

396
00:17:57,549 --> 00:17:59,329
She hasn't helped resolve the conflict about

397
00:17:59,329 --> 00:18:01,809
moral standards. So she's used a conceptual trick

398
00:18:01,809 --> 00:18:05,029
relativity to avoid engaging with the core moral

399
00:18:05,029 --> 00:18:07,349
claim being disputed. That's how Blackburn puts

400
00:18:07,349 --> 00:18:09,690
it. Her intervention is merely a distraction,

401
00:18:09,890 --> 00:18:12,349
a conversation stopper. It leaves the original

402
00:18:12,349 --> 00:18:14,769
argument about Genghis Khan exactly where it

403
00:18:14,769 --> 00:18:17,630
started. Whereas the absolutist, by contrast.

404
00:18:17,789 --> 00:18:20,549
The absolutist, rightly or wrongly, maintains

405
00:18:20,549 --> 00:18:23,549
that the person holding the opposing view is

406
00:18:23,549 --> 00:18:27,289
somehow out of touch or misled. or thinking wishfully

407
00:18:27,289 --> 00:18:30,789
or badly placed to judge. The absolutist believes

408
00:18:30,789 --> 00:18:33,589
they have latched on to a stable, objective moral

409
00:18:33,589 --> 00:18:36,529
standard that the other person has somehow missed.

410
00:18:36,940 --> 00:18:39,059
And that difference in attitude really highlights

411
00:18:39,059 --> 00:18:41,460
why the extreme relativist position is often

412
00:18:41,460 --> 00:18:44,339
seen as, well, potentially corrosive to genuine

413
00:18:44,339 --> 00:18:46,960
public debate and the search for shared understanding.

414
00:18:47,339 --> 00:18:49,519
It makes real argument seem pointless, doesn't

415
00:18:49,519 --> 00:18:51,559
it? Everyone's just measuring by their own ruler.

416
00:18:51,700 --> 00:18:54,160
OK, so the difficulty of actually defining truth,

417
00:18:54,299 --> 00:18:56,339
it's either circular, like Voltaire's attempt,

418
00:18:56,579 --> 00:18:58,559
or it gets tangled in these logical traps like

419
00:18:58,559 --> 00:19:01,099
the recoil argument for relativism. This difficulty

420
00:19:01,099 --> 00:19:03,099
has driven some philosophers towards a pretty

421
00:19:03,099 --> 00:19:04,819
radical conclusion, almost like an acceptance

422
00:19:04,819 --> 00:19:07,450
of defeat. Yeah, instead of endlessly trying

423
00:19:07,450 --> 00:19:09,950
to define the fundamental nature of truth, they

424
00:19:09,950 --> 00:19:12,410
suggest maybe we should just stop talking about

425
00:19:12,410 --> 00:19:15,009
it in that grand philosophical way. This is often

426
00:19:15,009 --> 00:19:18,190
called the quietist turn. Quietism, leaving truth

427
00:19:18,190 --> 00:19:22,210
alone. Exactly. Quietism, or sometimes minimalism,

428
00:19:22,289 --> 00:19:24,730
it's this impulse to just leave truth alone.

429
00:19:24,869 --> 00:19:27,750
It fundamentally denies that we even need a big

430
00:19:27,750 --> 00:19:30,089
philosophical conception of truth. So truth isn't

431
00:19:30,089 --> 00:19:32,410
some deep metaphysical concept requiring layers

432
00:19:32,410 --> 00:19:35,460
of metatheory. That's the claim. The Quietist

433
00:19:35,460 --> 00:19:37,980
argues it's more like a logical tool, a useful

434
00:19:37,980 --> 00:19:41,140
feature of language, but not some profound property

435
00:19:41,140 --> 00:19:43,859
of reality we need to analyze endlessly. Okay,

436
00:19:43,920 --> 00:19:46,440
so if you ask a philosopher in this camp, what

437
00:19:46,440 --> 00:19:48,940
makes these two completely different true statements,

438
00:19:49,000 --> 00:19:51,519
like, say, the price of petrol is rising and

439
00:19:51,519 --> 00:19:53,880
Tony Blair is a fantasist, what makes them both

440
00:19:53,880 --> 00:19:56,339
true? What do they have in common? The Quietist

441
00:19:56,339 --> 00:19:58,950
gives an answer that can feel... Well, a bit

442
00:19:58,950 --> 00:20:01,150
unsatisfying at first. They basically replied

443
00:20:01,150 --> 00:20:03,890
that there might be no single universal property

444
00:20:03,890 --> 00:20:06,369
they share beyond the mere fact that they are

445
00:20:06,369 --> 00:20:09,609
individually true. The explanation for why the

446
00:20:09,609 --> 00:20:12,069
petrol statement is true is probably empirical

447
00:20:12,069 --> 00:20:15,210
economic data. The explanation for why the Blair

448
00:20:15,210 --> 00:20:17,329
statement is true might be based on testimony,

449
00:20:17,450 --> 00:20:19,809
political analysis, interpretation of actions.

450
00:20:20,029 --> 00:20:22,769
So the reason why each is true is completely

451
00:20:22,769 --> 00:20:25,950
different. There's no shared essence of trueness.

452
00:20:26,170 --> 00:20:29,000
That's the minimalist idea. There's no single

453
00:20:29,000 --> 00:20:31,740
deep explanation for truth in general. There

454
00:20:31,740 --> 00:20:33,960
are just explanations for individual truths.

455
00:20:34,240 --> 00:20:36,319
It's a bit like asking, why is everyone using

456
00:20:36,319 --> 00:20:38,420
the Internet today? Because specific reasons,

457
00:20:38,579 --> 00:20:40,579
one person is working, another is socializing,

458
00:20:40,619 --> 00:20:43,160
someone else is watching cat videos, are vastly

459
00:20:43,160 --> 00:20:46,559
different. There's no single grand reason for

460
00:20:46,559 --> 00:20:49,000
Internet use. That's a good analogy. And this

461
00:20:49,000 --> 00:20:51,119
view hinges on a concept they call transparency.

462
00:20:51,599 --> 00:20:54,269
Transparency. Yeah. The idea is that... If a

463
00:20:54,269 --> 00:20:56,750
property of a sentence were robust or substantial,

464
00:20:57,029 --> 00:21:00,109
if it introduced some new metaphysical content

465
00:21:00,109 --> 00:21:02,990
beyond the sentence itself, it would create a

466
00:21:02,990 --> 00:21:06,210
new topic, a sort of second -order comment. For

467
00:21:06,210 --> 00:21:09,609
example, if I say P is a justified belief, I've

468
00:21:09,609 --> 00:21:11,450
definitely started a new discussion about the

469
00:21:11,450 --> 00:21:13,529
nature and standards of justification. Okay,

470
00:21:13,609 --> 00:21:15,230
that makes sense. Justification adds something.

471
00:21:15,509 --> 00:21:18,710
But the quietest, or minimalist, says truth is

472
00:21:18,710 --> 00:21:21,990
different. They argue that to say P is true is

473
00:21:21,990 --> 00:21:25,210
to introduce no new topic beyond simply asserting

474
00:21:25,210 --> 00:21:28,890
P itself. The concept of true is, in this sense,

475
00:21:28,970 --> 00:21:32,069
philosophically transparent. It doesn't add content.

476
00:21:32,309 --> 00:21:35,250
It's merely a mechanism we use to assert or endorse

477
00:21:35,250 --> 00:21:37,170
the original statement, Pete. Okay, so it's like

478
00:21:37,170 --> 00:21:38,809
pointing back at the original statement rather

479
00:21:38,809 --> 00:21:41,549
than adding a new layer. Exactly. And this idea

480
00:21:41,549 --> 00:21:44,130
of transparency is what underpins deflationism,

481
00:21:44,150 --> 00:21:46,329
which is probably the most famous, quietest position.

482
00:21:46,569 --> 00:21:48,990
The earliest form was Frank Ramsey's redundancy

483
00:21:48,990 --> 00:21:51,390
theory. Redundancy theory. Yeah. Ramsey suggested

484
00:21:51,390 --> 00:21:54,509
way back that the word true is often just used

485
00:21:54,509 --> 00:21:57,690
for emphasis or maybe stylistic reasons, saying,

486
00:21:58,170 --> 00:22:01,089
It is true that Caesar was murdered means exactly

487
00:22:01,089 --> 00:22:02,849
the same thing, carries the same information

488
00:22:02,849 --> 00:22:05,630
as simply saying Caesar was murdered. So the

489
00:22:05,630 --> 00:22:09,630
phrase, it is true that, is redundant. That was

490
00:22:09,630 --> 00:22:12,390
Ramsey's initial idea. It adds nothing to the

491
00:22:12,390 --> 00:22:15,490
factual content. Hmm. But if it's completely

492
00:22:15,490 --> 00:22:17,809
redundant, why do we even use the word true at

493
00:22:17,809 --> 00:22:20,430
all? It seems useful sometimes. This is where

494
00:22:20,430 --> 00:22:22,509
the more refined version comes in, right? Paul

495
00:22:22,509 --> 00:22:25,170
Horridge's minimal theory. Exactly. Horridge

496
00:22:25,170 --> 00:22:27,009
refined this idea. He claims that the essential

497
00:22:27,009 --> 00:22:29,150
facts about truth, everything important we need

498
00:22:29,150 --> 00:22:31,289
to know about it, are entirely exhausted by a

499
00:22:31,289 --> 00:22:34,210
single, surprisingly simple logical tool. It's

500
00:22:34,210 --> 00:22:36,549
called the equivalent schema, often abbreviated

501
00:22:36,549 --> 00:22:40,069
as ES. The equivalent schema. OK, what does that

502
00:22:40,069 --> 00:22:42,490
say? The schema states the proposition that P

503
00:22:42,490 --> 00:22:46,529
is true if P. OK, that sounds incredibly dry

504
00:22:46,529 --> 00:22:49,210
and logical. Let's break that down. If. Means

505
00:22:49,210 --> 00:22:51,589
if and only if, right? So the two sides are logically

506
00:22:51,589 --> 00:22:54,430
equivalent. Precisely. It means the two halves

507
00:22:54,430 --> 00:22:56,569
of that statement are logically interchangeable.

508
00:22:57,150 --> 00:23:00,069
If I state the proposition, the proposition that

509
00:23:00,069 --> 00:23:03,230
snow is white is true, that statement is logically

510
00:23:03,230 --> 00:23:05,529
equivalent in every way to simply stating the

511
00:23:05,529 --> 00:23:08,529
proposition snow is white. And this equivalence

512
00:23:08,529 --> 00:23:11,650
holds for every possible proposition P. That's

513
00:23:11,650 --> 00:23:13,819
the claim of the minimal theory. And Horwich

514
00:23:13,819 --> 00:23:16,740
argues that this relationship, this simple, almost

515
00:23:16,740 --> 00:23:19,200
trivial seeming equivalence, is all there is

516
00:23:19,200 --> 00:23:21,440
to understand about the concept of truth. Truth

517
00:23:21,440 --> 00:23:23,779
isn't a deep property. It's just this logical

518
00:23:23,779 --> 00:23:26,779
device captured by the schema. It's an insubstantial

519
00:23:26,779 --> 00:23:29,619
or thin property. So truth is basically just

520
00:23:29,619 --> 00:23:32,500
a way to endorse or assert a proposition without

521
00:23:32,500 --> 00:23:34,940
having to repeat the whole proposition. That's

522
00:23:34,940 --> 00:23:37,140
a good way to put it. It's primarily a logical

523
00:23:37,140 --> 00:23:39,299
device used for assertion and generalization.

524
00:23:39,539 --> 00:23:43,309
Ah, generalization. OK, if that's all truth is,

525
00:23:43,450 --> 00:23:48,089
this thin logical device, how do deflationists

526
00:23:48,089 --> 00:23:50,829
handle generalizations? Because we commonly use

527
00:23:50,829 --> 00:23:54,769
true to talk about vast sets of claims like everything

528
00:23:54,769 --> 00:23:57,049
the pope says is true or all theorems of arithmetic

529
00:23:57,049 --> 00:23:59,990
are true. I'm clearly not listing every single

530
00:23:59,990 --> 00:24:02,190
papal utterance or every theorem and asserting

531
00:24:02,190 --> 00:24:04,730
each one individually using the schema. How does

532
00:24:04,730 --> 00:24:06,869
the minimalist account for that kind of generalization

533
00:24:06,869 --> 00:24:09,650
without invoking some kind of substantial shared

534
00:24:09,650 --> 00:24:12,019
property of truth? That's a really important

535
00:24:12,019 --> 00:24:14,019
objection. And the minimalist response is actually

536
00:24:14,019 --> 00:24:16,799
quite elegant, proponents would say. They rely

537
00:24:16,799 --> 00:24:19,299
on the idea that we already possess the logical

538
00:24:19,299 --> 00:24:22,380
disposition to accept each individual instance

539
00:24:22,380 --> 00:24:24,740
of the equivalent schema for any given proposition.

540
00:24:25,099 --> 00:24:27,599
So I'm disposed to accept snow is white is true

541
00:24:27,599 --> 00:24:29,700
if snow is white and grass is green is true if

542
00:24:29,700 --> 00:24:31,700
grass is green and so on for everything. Right.

543
00:24:31,720 --> 00:24:33,920
And our allegiance to the overall claim like

544
00:24:33,920 --> 00:24:36,640
all theorems of arithmetic are true is explained

545
00:24:36,640 --> 00:24:38,839
by combining that fundamental disposition to

546
00:24:38,839 --> 00:24:42,220
accept individual instances of. Yes, with the

547
00:24:42,220 --> 00:24:44,460
normal rules of logical generalization that we

548
00:24:44,460 --> 00:24:47,920
use all the time. So the word true isn't some

549
00:24:47,920 --> 00:24:50,940
deep philosophical property uniting all those

550
00:24:50,940 --> 00:24:52,640
theorems. It's more like a piece of linguistic

551
00:24:52,640 --> 00:24:55,589
machinery. It's a tool that lets us efficiently

552
00:24:55,589 --> 00:24:58,250
group and assert potentially infinite numbers

553
00:24:58,250 --> 00:25:00,730
of statements without having to say them all

554
00:25:00,730 --> 00:25:03,890
out loud. It enhances our expressive power, but

555
00:25:03,890 --> 00:25:06,190
doesn't really deepen our metaphysical understanding

556
00:25:06,190 --> 00:25:09,250
of truth itself. That's the distillationist picture,

557
00:25:09,410 --> 00:25:11,569
precisely. It's about expressive convenience,

558
00:25:11,990 --> 00:25:15,470
not metaphysical depth. Okay. Yet, despite this

559
00:25:15,470 --> 00:25:17,869
really powerful simplification, the sources note

560
00:25:17,869 --> 00:25:19,849
that many philosophers, maybe even intuitively,

561
00:25:20,190 --> 00:25:24,109
still remain realists au fond. Deep down, there's

562
00:25:24,109 --> 00:25:26,670
still realists about truth. There's this enduring

563
00:25:26,670 --> 00:25:29,650
stickiness to the idea that truth has some real

564
00:25:29,650 --> 00:25:32,210
weight, some substance. Absolutely. That intuition

565
00:25:32,210 --> 00:25:34,549
is hard to shake. Why does it persist so strongly?

566
00:25:34,650 --> 00:25:37,289
Why doesn't deflationism just win the day? Well,

567
00:25:37,349 --> 00:25:39,109
it often comes back to the correspondence counter

568
00:25:39,109 --> 00:25:41,029
-argument, or at least the intuition behind it.

569
00:25:41,089 --> 00:25:43,430
There's this incredibly powerful, enduring feeling

570
00:25:43,430 --> 00:25:47,089
that a statement is true only if there is something

571
00:25:47,089 --> 00:25:49,710
in the world in virtue of which it is true. Right.

572
00:25:49,809 --> 00:25:51,990
There has to be something out there, a fact,

573
00:25:52,109 --> 00:25:55,250
a state of affairs, reality itself, that makes

574
00:25:55,250 --> 00:25:57,910
the statement true. The truthmakers. Exactly.

575
00:25:58,089 --> 00:26:00,650
These truthmaking elements are what the intuition

576
00:26:00,650 --> 00:26:03,910
latches onto. And even if we abandon the old,

577
00:26:03,970 --> 00:26:06,410
often cumbersome traditional correspondence theory

578
00:26:06,410 --> 00:26:09,109
of truth with all its problems, many people still

579
00:26:09,109 --> 00:26:12,150
feel that external reality must somehow ground

580
00:26:12,150 --> 00:26:15,410
truth. And deflationists, by denying truth any

581
00:26:15,410 --> 00:26:17,890
real metaphysical substance beyond that logical

582
00:26:17,890 --> 00:26:21,099
schema, Yes. They seem to actively reject these

583
00:26:21,099 --> 00:26:23,400
truth -making elements. They say the schema is

584
00:26:23,400 --> 00:26:25,759
all there is. And that rejection, that denial

585
00:26:25,759 --> 00:26:28,440
of a grounding in reality, just feels deeply

586
00:26:28,440 --> 00:26:31,400
unsatisfying, even wrong to someone with strong

587
00:26:31,400 --> 00:26:33,940
realist intuitions. They feel something crucial

588
00:26:33,940 --> 00:26:35,819
is being left out. All right. So if defining

589
00:26:35,819 --> 00:26:38,220
truth has proven maybe impossible for some, like

590
00:26:38,220 --> 00:26:40,819
the quietists, and if simply asserting it without

591
00:26:40,819 --> 00:26:43,099
grounding leads to logical traps, like for the

592
00:26:43,099 --> 00:26:45,359
relativists, then perhaps the focus needs to

593
00:26:45,359 --> 00:26:47,640
shift. Maybe we should stop looking at truth

594
00:26:47,640 --> 00:26:49,740
as just a static property of statements and look

595
00:26:49,740 --> 00:26:51,680
instead at how we actually acquire knowledge,

596
00:26:51,880 --> 00:26:54,740
how we form beliefs. Exactly. And this brings

597
00:26:54,740 --> 00:26:57,420
us to a major historical turning point in philosophy,

598
00:26:57,619 --> 00:27:00,240
what Blackburn calls the crisis of foundationalism,

599
00:27:00,240 --> 00:27:03,450
or maybe paradise lost. Paradise lost. Sounds

600
00:27:03,450 --> 00:27:05,809
dramatic. Well, it was a big shift for centuries,

601
00:27:05,910 --> 00:27:08,150
going back to thinkers like John Locke and Descartes.

602
00:27:08,329 --> 00:27:11,309
The big philosophical ambition was to build this

603
00:27:11,309 --> 00:27:14,730
perfectly rational hierarchy of belief, a solid

604
00:27:14,730 --> 00:27:17,490
foundational structure anchored by absolute certainty

605
00:27:17,490 --> 00:27:20,430
at the base. Like building a house on solid rock.

606
00:27:20,690 --> 00:27:23,130
Precisely. And this intellectual paradise, this

607
00:27:23,130 --> 00:27:26,029
foundationalist dream, had about four main hopes

608
00:27:26,029 --> 00:27:28,089
or pillars holding it up. Okay. What were those

609
00:27:28,089 --> 00:27:30,009
four anchors they were hoping for? They hoped

610
00:27:30,009 --> 00:27:33,430
for one. Proper use of senses, believing our

611
00:27:33,430 --> 00:27:35,809
senses could provide raw, uninterpreted data

612
00:27:35,809 --> 00:27:38,809
directly from the world. Two, canonical methods,

613
00:27:39,130 --> 00:27:41,369
universally agreed upon methods for evaluating

614
00:27:41,369 --> 00:27:43,910
theories, almost like a perfect scientific method

615
00:27:43,910 --> 00:27:46,549
for all knowledge. Okay, senses and method. Three,

616
00:27:46,730 --> 00:27:49,529
foundational logic relying on self -evident axioms

617
00:27:49,529 --> 00:27:51,769
and unbreakable rules of inference. And four,

618
00:27:52,029 --> 00:27:54,930
fixed meanings for our words, ensuring stable,

619
00:27:55,109 --> 00:27:57,710
unambiguous communication over time. Right. That

620
00:27:57,710 --> 00:27:59,609
really does sound like an intellectual paradise.

621
00:28:00,029 --> 00:28:04,009
Solid senses, clear methods, perfect logic, stable

622
00:28:04,009 --> 00:28:06,769
language. But you said it collapsed. What broke

623
00:28:06,769 --> 00:28:09,630
that foundation? Two major developments in 20th

624
00:28:09,630 --> 00:28:11,809
century philosophy were pretty fatal to this

625
00:28:11,809 --> 00:28:15,369
specific dream. First, the eventual demise of

626
00:28:15,369 --> 00:28:17,549
what philosophers call the myth of the given.

627
00:28:17,650 --> 00:28:20,170
The myth of the given. Yeah. This is the realization

628
00:28:20,170 --> 00:28:22,750
spearheaded by thinkers like Wilford Sellers.

629
00:28:22,809 --> 00:28:25,170
That experience does not actually provide us

630
00:28:25,170 --> 00:28:28,569
with pure, uninterpreted foundational data. Every

631
00:28:28,569 --> 00:28:31,329
perception, every sensation is already theory

632
00:28:31,329 --> 00:28:34,150
-laden. Our existing concepts, our language,

633
00:28:34,210 --> 00:28:36,569
our expectations, they shape what we perceive

634
00:28:36,569 --> 00:28:39,670
from the very start. There is no raw, unblemished

635
00:28:39,670 --> 00:28:41,730
input from the senses that we just passively

636
00:28:41,730 --> 00:28:44,829
receive. So the idea that my eyes just give me

637
00:28:44,829 --> 00:28:47,109
an objective picture of the world and my mind

638
00:28:47,109 --> 00:28:49,859
simply registers it like a camera? That's wrong.

639
00:28:49,960 --> 00:28:51,900
I'm already interpreting, filtering it through

640
00:28:51,900 --> 00:28:54,299
my existing knowledge and language, even at the

641
00:28:54,299 --> 00:28:56,559
most basic level. That's the core insight, yes.

642
00:28:57,019 --> 00:28:59,619
Perception is an active process, already structured

643
00:28:59,619 --> 00:29:02,200
by our conceptual scheme. The given is a myth.

644
00:29:02,400 --> 00:29:04,039
Okay, what was the second blow? The second major

645
00:29:04,039 --> 00:29:06,440
blow came from the widespread acceptance of holism,

646
00:29:06,519 --> 00:29:08,839
particularly associated with W .V .O. Quine.

647
00:29:09,660 --> 00:29:12,519
Holism is the idea, often summarized by Quine's

648
00:29:12,519 --> 00:29:15,160
phrase, that what we believe is not a single

649
00:29:15,160 --> 00:29:18,119
proposition, it is a whole system of propositions.

650
00:29:18,509 --> 00:29:20,750
Meaning we don't just test or revise our beliefs

651
00:29:20,750 --> 00:29:23,269
one by one in isolation. Exactly. We believe

652
00:29:23,269 --> 00:29:25,869
things in interconnected networks. When faced

653
00:29:25,869 --> 00:29:27,910
with conflicting evidence, we don't just discard

654
00:29:27,910 --> 00:29:30,849
one belief. Adjustments ripple through the whole

655
00:29:30,849 --> 00:29:33,589
system. As Quine famously put it, our statements

656
00:29:33,589 --> 00:29:36,150
about the external world face the tribunal of

657
00:29:36,150 --> 00:29:39,230
sense experience not individually, but only as

658
00:29:39,230 --> 00:29:41,549
a corporate body. So the collapse of the myth

659
00:29:41,549 --> 00:29:43,930
of the given no, pure input combined with wholism

660
00:29:43,930 --> 00:29:46,670
beliefs, form an interconnected web leaves that

661
00:29:46,670 --> 00:29:48,869
whole foundationalist project, that dream of

662
00:29:48,869 --> 00:29:51,069
a secure hierarchy built on certainty. In what

663
00:29:51,069 --> 00:29:53,630
Blackburn describes quite vividly as a disorderly

664
00:29:53,630 --> 00:29:56,470
muddle, the clean hierarchical structure is gone,

665
00:29:56,609 --> 00:29:59,569
replaced by a complex, interconnected, constantly

666
00:29:59,569 --> 00:30:03,220
adjusting web of belief. paradise was lost. Wow.

667
00:30:03,519 --> 00:30:06,140
Okay, so when that solid foundation crumbles,

668
00:30:06,299 --> 00:30:09,079
skepticism naturally starts to flourish, right?

669
00:30:09,460 --> 00:30:11,700
This sounds like the kind of environment that

670
00:30:11,700 --> 00:30:13,960
spawned someone like Richard Rorty and his famous

671
00:30:13,960 --> 00:30:16,180
critique of traditional philosophy. Absolutely.

672
00:30:16,400 --> 00:30:18,740
Rorty argued very forcefully that this whole

673
00:30:18,740 --> 00:30:21,819
traditional ambition to anchor our beliefs in

674
00:30:21,819 --> 00:30:25,319
some external certainty requires us to do the

675
00:30:25,319 --> 00:30:28,920
impossible. To somehow stand outside our own

676
00:30:28,920 --> 00:30:31,500
skin, outside our own language, history, and

677
00:30:31,500 --> 00:30:34,819
culture. To find that mythical Archimedean point

678
00:30:34,819 --> 00:30:38,420
or a view from nowhere. Precisely. He argued

679
00:30:38,420 --> 00:30:40,420
that since seeking such a God's eye view was

680
00:30:40,420 --> 00:30:43,000
logically impossible for creatures like us, we

681
00:30:43,000 --> 00:30:44,859
must simply abandon the whole quest for objective

682
00:30:44,859 --> 00:30:47,079
truth with a capital T. So what should we do

683
00:30:47,079 --> 00:30:49,400
instead, according to Rorty? Rorty suggested

684
00:30:49,400 --> 00:30:52,009
we should stop focusing on discovery. finding

685
00:30:52,009 --> 00:30:55,150
the one true way things are, and start prioritizing

686
00:30:55,150 --> 00:30:58,049
invention in solidarity. He often used the example

687
00:30:58,049 --> 00:31:00,049
of literary criticism. How does that work? Well,

688
00:31:00,069 --> 00:31:02,430
he argued that literary criticism moved away

689
00:31:02,430 --> 00:31:04,609
from searching for the one right reading of a

690
00:31:04,609 --> 00:31:07,670
text like the author's true intended meaning,

691
00:31:07,789 --> 00:31:10,950
the discovery model. Instead, it embraced having

692
00:31:10,950 --> 00:31:14,210
a plurality of voices, multiple interesting interpretations.

693
00:31:14,789 --> 00:31:17,410
So the goal isn't finding the single truth of

694
00:31:17,410 --> 00:31:20,680
the text anymore. No. For Rorty, in this model,

695
00:31:20,839 --> 00:31:23,880
the aim is an objective truth. It's achieving

696
00:31:23,880 --> 00:31:26,759
solidarity. It's about persuading your fellow

697
00:31:26,759 --> 00:31:29,539
critics, your community, to adopt your interpretation

698
00:31:29,539 --> 00:31:32,819
because it's useful or interesting or compelling

699
00:31:32,819 --> 00:31:35,940
within that specific conversation. It's about

700
00:31:35,940 --> 00:31:39,339
fertile invention, not discovery of a pre -existing

701
00:31:39,339 --> 00:31:41,869
fact. OK, but doesn't that just slide straight

702
00:31:41,869 --> 00:31:44,349
back into a kind of uncontrolled relativism where

703
00:31:44,349 --> 00:31:46,470
the external world, you know, reality seems to

704
00:31:46,470 --> 00:31:49,049
have zero input or constraint on what we believe

705
00:31:49,049 --> 00:31:50,769
if it's all just about persuading my buddies?

706
00:31:51,089 --> 00:31:53,490
That's the worry. And Blackburn argues Rorty

707
00:31:53,490 --> 00:31:55,890
makes a critical mistake here. Blackburn suggests

708
00:31:55,890 --> 00:31:58,390
Rorty confuses the rightly discarded myth of

709
00:31:58,390 --> 00:32:01,309
the given, the idea of pure, uninterpreted input

710
00:32:01,309 --> 00:32:03,490
from the senses, with something else, something

711
00:32:03,490 --> 00:32:05,609
necessary, which Blackburn calls the myth of

712
00:32:05,609 --> 00:32:07,430
the giving. The giving. OK, what's the difference?

713
00:32:07,529 --> 00:32:09,589
What is the giving? The giving for Blackburn.

714
00:32:09,950 --> 00:32:12,730
represents the necessary causal interaction with

715
00:32:12,730 --> 00:32:15,390
the world that constantly brings about and shapes

716
00:32:15,390 --> 00:32:18,670
our beliefs. We must acknowledge this continuous

717
00:32:18,670 --> 00:32:20,970
environmental input. We can't just ignore the

718
00:32:20,970 --> 00:32:23,569
world bombarding us with signals. Right. If you

719
00:32:23,569 --> 00:32:26,049
completely ignore this constant causal interaction,

720
00:32:26,430 --> 00:32:30,390
you are prone to disaster or, philosophically

721
00:32:30,390 --> 00:32:33,779
speaking, you drift into delusion. If I believe

722
00:32:33,779 --> 00:32:35,640
there's butter in the fridge, but there's absolutely

723
00:32:35,640 --> 00:32:38,519
no environmental input supporting that, no past

724
00:32:38,519 --> 00:32:41,099
memory of buying it, no visual evidence now,

725
00:32:41,220 --> 00:32:44,119
no testimony from anyone, then that belief is

726
00:32:44,119 --> 00:32:47,019
fundamentally detached from reality. It's ungrounded.

727
00:32:47,059 --> 00:32:49,039
So we have to account for the world giving us

728
00:32:49,039 --> 00:32:51,579
input, even if we accept that input isn't pure

729
00:32:51,579 --> 00:32:54,680
or given in the old foundationalist sense. Exactly.

730
00:32:54,720 --> 00:32:57,140
And Blackburn points out that the simple fact

731
00:32:57,140 --> 00:33:00,079
that representation itself is not mythical is

732
00:33:00,079 --> 00:33:02,500
illustrated by something as mundane as a map.

733
00:33:02,720 --> 00:33:05,099
A map, how does that help? Well, a map isn't

734
00:33:05,099 --> 00:33:07,519
some perfect philosophical foundation, obviously.

735
00:33:07,940 --> 00:33:11,880
But a good map clearly displays non -hidden objective

736
00:33:11,880 --> 00:33:15,960
virtues. Things like accuracy, care in its creation,

737
00:33:16,160 --> 00:33:18,900
the labor involved. These virtues are entirely

738
00:33:18,900 --> 00:33:21,400
relevant to whether the map is true or reliable.

739
00:33:21,869 --> 00:33:23,869
And if you just treat a map as merely a social

740
00:33:23,869 --> 00:33:27,150
construct with no connection to the actual territory...

741
00:33:27,150 --> 00:33:29,390
You're going to get lost. The map's connection

742
00:33:29,390 --> 00:33:32,349
to reality, its representational quality, matters

743
00:33:32,349 --> 00:33:35,630
profoundly. So representation itself isn't the

744
00:33:35,630 --> 00:33:38,509
myth we need to discard. Okay, so that whole...

745
00:33:38,730 --> 00:33:40,710
Crisis of foundationalism, the collapse of the

746
00:33:40,710 --> 00:33:43,309
old certainties. It created the perfect fertile

747
00:33:43,309 --> 00:33:46,130
soil for pragmatism to really take root, didn't

748
00:33:46,130 --> 00:33:48,349
it? Because pragmatism shifts the entire focus.

749
00:33:48,609 --> 00:33:50,829
It really does. It moves away from asking about

750
00:33:50,829 --> 00:33:53,170
static correspondence. Is this statement true

751
00:33:53,170 --> 00:33:55,670
right now? Does it match reality? And shifts

752
00:33:55,670 --> 00:33:57,869
towards dynamic inquiry. What are the practical

753
00:33:57,869 --> 00:33:59,849
consequences of believing this? Does it work?

754
00:34:00,049 --> 00:34:01,750
And the classical version of this comes from

755
00:34:01,750 --> 00:34:05,220
Charles Sanders Pierce, right? Yes, Pierce. He

756
00:34:05,220 --> 00:34:07,019
offered a definition of truth that wasn't about

757
00:34:07,019 --> 00:34:09,519
an instantaneous state, but about a future prediction,

758
00:34:09,760 --> 00:34:13,639
an endpoint of inquiry. For Pierce, truth is

759
00:34:13,639 --> 00:34:16,480
the opinion which is fated to be ultimately agreed

760
00:34:16,480 --> 00:34:20,260
by all who investigate. Fated. So the idea is

761
00:34:20,260 --> 00:34:22,639
that scientific inquiry, if pursued correctly

762
00:34:22,639 --> 00:34:25,960
and indefinitely, will inevitably converge on

763
00:34:25,960 --> 00:34:29,280
a single stable set of beliefs. That convergence

764
00:34:29,280 --> 00:34:32,840
is truth. That was Pierce's view. The goal, the

765
00:34:32,840 --> 00:34:36,219
very definition of truth. is rooted in this idealized,

766
00:34:36,260 --> 00:34:38,760
inescapable scientific consensus at the end of

767
00:34:38,760 --> 00:34:40,579
inquiry. Then William James offered a different

768
00:34:40,579 --> 00:34:42,980
flavor of pragmatism, more immediate, maybe more

769
00:34:42,980 --> 00:34:44,920
psychological. Yeah, James's version was much

770
00:34:44,920 --> 00:34:46,699
more focused on the individual and the present.

771
00:34:46,820 --> 00:34:49,739
For him, truth means an idea works. It leads

772
00:34:49,739 --> 00:34:52,420
to no frustration or contradiction in our experience.

773
00:34:52,500 --> 00:34:54,019
It helps us navigate the world successfully.

774
00:34:54,599 --> 00:34:56,539
And he famously claimed our obligation to seek

775
00:34:56,539 --> 00:34:58,300
truth is just part of our general obligation

776
00:34:58,300 --> 00:35:01,699
to do what pays. Like, true ideas bring intellectual

777
00:35:01,699 --> 00:35:03,900
or practical payoffs, and that's the sole reason

778
00:35:03,900 --> 00:35:06,199
we value and pursue them. That was his rather

779
00:35:06,199 --> 00:35:09,300
controversial take, yes. It ties truth very closely

780
00:35:09,300 --> 00:35:13,139
to usefulness and satisfaction. But the big problem

781
00:35:13,139 --> 00:35:15,940
with James's version, as you noted earlier when

782
00:35:15,940 --> 00:35:18,739
we discussed Clifford, is that it seems to risk

783
00:35:18,739 --> 00:35:22,139
opening the door right back to individual relativism.

784
00:35:22,510 --> 00:35:26,369
If what pays or works is purely subjective for

785
00:35:26,369 --> 00:35:29,170
each person. Then truth becomes subjective, too.

786
00:35:29,349 --> 00:35:31,929
And that's a conclusion many philosophers, even

787
00:35:31,929 --> 00:35:35,030
pragmatists, want to avoid. This is why contemporary

788
00:35:35,030 --> 00:35:37,469
pragmatists have had to refine the concept quite

789
00:35:37,469 --> 00:35:40,530
a bit to try and retain some notion of objectivity

790
00:35:40,530 --> 00:35:43,340
while still grounding truth in inquiry. Like

791
00:35:43,340 --> 00:35:45,480
Cheryl Misak's approach, using the subjunctive

792
00:35:45,480 --> 00:35:47,860
conditional. Exactly. That's a key move in modern

793
00:35:47,860 --> 00:35:50,559
pragmatism. It's an attempt to define truth in

794
00:35:50,559 --> 00:35:52,940
a way that makes it stable and objective, but

795
00:35:52,940 --> 00:35:55,019
still fundamentally rooted in the process of

796
00:35:55,019 --> 00:35:57,380
inquiry, rather than some static correspondence

797
00:35:57,380 --> 00:36:00,719
to facts out there. Okay, so how does that subjunctive

798
00:36:00,719 --> 00:36:02,980
conditional definition actually work? What does

799
00:36:02,980 --> 00:36:05,820
it state? It states that a belief is true if

800
00:36:05,820 --> 00:36:07,920
it would survive the process of ideal inquiry.

801
00:36:09,059 --> 00:36:11,820
Specifically, if it would fit coherently with

802
00:36:11,820 --> 00:36:14,260
all the evidence and our best epistemic standards,

803
00:36:14,539 --> 00:36:17,860
were inquiry pursued indefinitely, so far that

804
00:36:17,860 --> 00:36:20,300
no future evidence or reasoning would ever force

805
00:36:20,300 --> 00:36:23,260
us to revise that belief. So it's not about whether

806
00:36:23,260 --> 00:36:25,699
we will actually reach that state, but about

807
00:36:25,699 --> 00:36:28,099
whether the belief would withstand that idealized

808
00:36:28,099 --> 00:36:30,320
endless process of investigation and revision.

809
00:36:30,900 --> 00:36:33,019
Precisely. It maintains that there is a right

810
00:36:33,019 --> 00:36:35,719
answer, an objective truth of the matter, But

811
00:36:35,719 --> 00:36:37,820
that right answer is defined by its resilience

812
00:36:37,820 --> 00:36:41,559
within the process of idealized, endless, perfectly

813
00:36:41,559 --> 00:36:44,019
rational, self -correcting human investigation.

814
00:36:44,420 --> 00:36:46,719
So it tries to keep the objectivity, the idea

815
00:36:46,719 --> 00:36:49,000
that truth is stable and non -negotiable in the

816
00:36:49,000 --> 00:36:51,559
end, while rooting it firmly in the process of

817
00:36:51,559 --> 00:36:54,539
inquiry itself rather than in a potentially inaccessible

818
00:36:54,539 --> 00:36:57,920
external reality. That's the goal, yes. To find

819
00:36:57,920 --> 00:36:59,719
a middle ground between naive correspondence

820
00:36:59,719 --> 00:37:04,150
and potentially slippery subjectivism. Okay,

821
00:37:04,210 --> 00:37:05,909
so having surveyed all these different attempts,

822
00:37:06,070 --> 00:37:09,409
correspondence trying to match reality, deflationism

823
00:37:09,409 --> 00:37:12,510
saying truth is just a logical tool, pragmatism

824
00:37:12,510 --> 00:37:15,690
focusing on inquiry and consequences, many contemporary

825
00:37:15,690 --> 00:37:17,969
thinkers have looked at this landscape and basically

826
00:37:17,969 --> 00:37:21,090
concluded that the search for one single monolithic

827
00:37:21,090 --> 00:37:23,670
definition of truth might just be doomed from

828
00:37:23,670 --> 00:37:25,489
the start. Because none of them seem to work

829
00:37:25,489 --> 00:37:27,590
perfectly for everything we call true. Exactly.

830
00:37:27,610 --> 00:37:30,210
This leads us fairly naturally to the idea of

831
00:37:30,210 --> 00:37:33,530
truth pluralism. Pluralism. Meaning more than

832
00:37:33,530 --> 00:37:35,809
one kind of truth. That's the central idea, yes.

833
00:37:36,329 --> 00:37:39,090
Pluralism suggests that different kinds of propositions,

834
00:37:39,090 --> 00:37:41,190
different types of statements, are actually true

835
00:37:41,190 --> 00:37:43,429
by virtue of fundamentally distinct properties.

836
00:37:43,809 --> 00:37:46,250
There's no single one -size -fits -all definition

837
00:37:46,250 --> 00:37:48,949
of truth that covers every domain. Okay, can

838
00:37:48,949 --> 00:37:51,309
you give an example? Sure. A simple empirical

839
00:37:51,309 --> 00:37:55,420
fact, like snow is white, might be true by virtue

840
00:37:55,420 --> 00:37:57,679
of correspondence. It matches a fact about the

841
00:37:57,679 --> 00:38:01,289
external world. But a statement about, say, ethics

842
00:38:01,289 --> 00:38:03,829
or mathematics, something like stealing is wrong

843
00:38:03,829 --> 00:38:07,409
or 2 plus 2, 4, might be true by a completely

844
00:38:07,409 --> 00:38:10,360
different mechanism. Perhaps something like Super

845
00:38:10,360 --> 00:38:13,619
assertibility. Super assertibility. OK, that's

846
00:38:13,619 --> 00:38:15,719
a dense philosophical term we encountered earlier.

847
00:38:15,940 --> 00:38:18,300
Can you unpack that again in plain language?

848
00:38:18,440 --> 00:38:20,659
What does that really mean? Right. So super assertibility

849
00:38:20,659 --> 00:38:23,860
means roughly that the belief is not just currently

850
00:38:23,860 --> 00:38:26,280
warranted by our evidence and reasoning, but

851
00:38:26,280 --> 00:38:28,619
that it would remain warranted without ever being

852
00:38:28,619 --> 00:38:31,300
defeated or need in revision at every single

853
00:38:31,300 --> 00:38:33,800
successive stage of inquiry, no matter how much

854
00:38:33,800 --> 00:38:36,239
more information or reasoning we applied. So

855
00:38:36,239 --> 00:38:39,619
it's like truth based on perfect. unshakable

856
00:38:39,619 --> 00:38:42,400
coherence and stability within an idealized system

857
00:38:42,400 --> 00:38:44,659
of knowledge. It's the kind of belief you would

858
00:38:44,659 --> 00:38:46,780
never have reason to revise, even if you can

859
00:38:46,780 --> 00:38:48,860
investigate it forever. That's the basic idea.

860
00:38:49,119 --> 00:38:51,820
Its truth is ultimate rational stability within

861
00:38:51,820 --> 00:38:54,780
inquiry rather than correspondence to an external

862
00:38:54,780 --> 00:38:57,599
fact. Okay, so the motivation for pluralism is

863
00:38:57,599 --> 00:39:00,639
pretty clear, though. Monist theories, those

864
00:39:00,639 --> 00:39:02,920
insisting on a single definition for all truths,

865
00:39:03,019 --> 00:39:06,010
seem to fail. Correspondence works well for empirical

866
00:39:06,010 --> 00:39:08,690
facts. Snow is white. But really struggles with

867
00:39:08,690 --> 00:39:12,110
normative claims. Stealing is wrong. Or mathematical

868
00:39:12,110 --> 00:39:15,449
necessities. Two plus two equals four. Where's

869
00:39:15,449 --> 00:39:17,690
the fact in the world that makes two plus two

870
00:39:17,690 --> 00:39:21,269
equals true? Exactly. And conversely, epistemic

871
00:39:21,269 --> 00:39:24,030
theories like coherence or maybe super assertibility

872
00:39:24,030 --> 00:39:26,949
handle math and ethics better. But they struggle

873
00:39:26,949 --> 00:39:29,309
to explain how the mere coherence of our beliefs

874
00:39:29,309 --> 00:39:32,690
proves anything exists out there in the physical

875
00:39:32,690 --> 00:39:35,730
world. How does coherence guarantee correspondence?

876
00:39:36,289 --> 00:39:38,730
So pluralism seems like a neat solution. Just

877
00:39:38,730 --> 00:39:40,730
let truth wear different hats depending on the

878
00:39:40,730 --> 00:39:43,010
subject matter. Use correspondence for science,

879
00:39:43,090 --> 00:39:45,769
maybe supersortability for math and morals. It

880
00:39:45,769 --> 00:39:47,329
seems very appealing initially. It looks like

881
00:39:47,329 --> 00:39:49,530
it covers all the bases by allowing truth to

882
00:39:49,530 --> 00:39:51,349
have different natures and different domains.

883
00:39:51,550 --> 00:39:53,809
But there's a big challenge. Ah, there's always

884
00:39:53,809 --> 00:39:55,570
a but in philosophy, isn't there? What's the

885
00:39:55,570 --> 00:39:57,650
challenge for pluralists? The challenge becomes

886
00:39:57,650 --> 00:40:00,570
immediate and potentially devastating when you

887
00:40:00,570 --> 00:40:03,829
consider complex sentences. Especially conjunctions

888
00:40:03,829 --> 00:40:06,010
that mix different domains. Conjunctions meaning

889
00:40:06,010 --> 00:40:09,409
and statements, like? Like. Take the statement,

890
00:40:09,670 --> 00:40:12,309
waterboarding is painful and waterboarding is

891
00:40:12,309 --> 00:40:14,630
wrong. Okay, so the first part, waterboarding

892
00:40:14,630 --> 00:40:16,909
is painful. That seems like a straightforward

893
00:40:16,909 --> 00:40:20,550
empirical claim. Probably true by correspondence

894
00:40:20,550 --> 00:40:23,349
to physiological facts. Right. But the second

895
00:40:23,349 --> 00:40:25,329
part, waterboarding is wrong. That's a normative

896
00:40:25,329 --> 00:40:28,070
moral claim. A pluralist might say that's true

897
00:40:28,070 --> 00:40:31,050
by supersertability or some other non -correspondence

898
00:40:31,050 --> 00:40:33,739
property. Okay, so one part true by correspondence,

899
00:40:34,039 --> 00:40:35,920
the other part true by super -assertibility.

900
00:40:36,119 --> 00:40:39,849
What's the problem? The problem is, what single

901
00:40:39,849 --> 00:40:42,289
property makes the entire conjunction, the whole

902
00:40:42,289 --> 00:40:46,010
and statement, true? If the two parts are true

903
00:40:46,010 --> 00:40:48,250
in fundamentally different ways, by virtue of

904
00:40:48,250 --> 00:40:50,389
different properties, the conjunction itself

905
00:40:50,389 --> 00:40:52,989
doesn't seem to inherit any single unified truth

906
00:40:52,989 --> 00:40:55,610
property. How do these different truth properties

907
00:40:55,610 --> 00:40:59,050
combine? Ah, I see. If truth itself isn't one

908
00:40:59,050 --> 00:41:01,329
thing, how can a sentence combining different

909
00:41:01,329 --> 00:41:04,369
kinds of truth be true in a single way? Exactly.

910
00:41:04,949 --> 00:41:08,130
This difficulty, the problem of mixed conjunctions

911
00:41:08,130 --> 00:41:10,909
and other complex logical constructions, forces

912
00:41:10,909 --> 00:41:13,409
many philosophers to either abandon pluralism

913
00:41:13,409 --> 00:41:15,530
and go back to searching for a single global

914
00:41:15,530 --> 00:41:18,369
truth property after all, or perhaps to take

915
00:41:18,369 --> 00:41:21,170
an even more radical deflationary stance and

916
00:41:21,170 --> 00:41:24,230
deny that true propositions even form a genuine

917
00:41:24,230 --> 00:41:27,539
philosophical kind worth analyzing. So it seems

918
00:41:27,539 --> 00:41:29,619
we're kind of back where we started, facing these

919
00:41:29,619 --> 00:41:32,760
fundamental philosophical responses to an apparently

920
00:41:32,760 --> 00:41:35,840
intractable problem. We have the realist who

921
00:41:35,840 --> 00:41:38,019
still wants to stand on real facts and objective

922
00:41:38,019 --> 00:41:41,559
knowledge, maybe via correspondence. Right. Then

923
00:41:41,559 --> 00:41:43,940
we have the quietest minimalist who wants to

924
00:41:43,940 --> 00:41:45,960
deflate the whole problem and just use truth

925
00:41:45,960 --> 00:41:49,440
as a thin, logical tool without any deep metaphysical

926
00:41:49,440 --> 00:41:51,619
baggage. And then you mentioned the quasi -realist

927
00:41:51,619 --> 00:41:54,079
earlier. How do they fit in again? The quasi

928
00:41:54,079 --> 00:41:56,400
-realist, often associated with Simon Blackburn

929
00:41:56,400 --> 00:41:58,440
himself actually, takes an interesting approach.

930
00:41:58,639 --> 00:42:00,840
It's a form of constructivism, particularly focused

931
00:42:00,840 --> 00:42:03,619
on the function of language. The quasi -realist

932
00:42:03,619 --> 00:42:05,760
might accept that some areas of discourse, like

933
00:42:05,760 --> 00:42:08,340
ethics perhaps, aren't strictly descriptive of

934
00:42:08,340 --> 00:42:10,940
objective facts in the way science is. Okay,

935
00:42:11,000 --> 00:42:13,519
so they agree ethical statements don't just describe

936
00:42:13,519 --> 00:42:16,440
the world. They might concede that. But then

937
00:42:16,440 --> 00:42:18,679
they work backward to try and explain why we

938
00:42:18,679 --> 00:42:20,739
still use language that makes them sound like

939
00:42:20,739 --> 00:42:23,639
objective, factual claims. Why do we say stealing

940
00:42:23,639 --> 00:42:26,539
is wrong instead of I disapprove of stealing?

941
00:42:27,059 --> 00:42:29,699
They want a theory that successfully explains

942
00:42:29,699 --> 00:42:32,420
the practical function and the realistic grammar

943
00:42:32,420 --> 00:42:35,400
of that language. Even if they deny the traditional

944
00:42:35,400 --> 00:42:37,880
realist's underlying metaphysics, they still

945
00:42:37,880 --> 00:42:40,300
think a theory is needed, just not the realist's

946
00:42:40,300 --> 00:42:43,139
one. Okay, that's subtle. Finally, then, let's

947
00:42:43,139 --> 00:42:45,599
briefly touch on the ultimate conceptual mess

948
00:42:45,599 --> 00:42:49,039
that truth seems to generate, the paradoxes.

949
00:42:49,079 --> 00:42:51,900
Ah, the paradoxes. The most famous, of course,

950
00:42:51,920 --> 00:42:54,099
is the liar paradox, the sentence. This sentence

951
00:42:54,099 --> 00:42:56,480
is not true. Right. If you assume it's true,

952
00:42:56,579 --> 00:42:58,400
then what it says must be the case, meaning it's

953
00:42:58,400 --> 00:43:00,940
not true. But if you assume it's not true, then

954
00:43:00,940 --> 00:43:03,099
what it says is the case, which makes it true.

955
00:43:03,239 --> 00:43:05,099
Exactly. It leads to outright contradiction.

956
00:43:05,480 --> 00:43:08,739
True if and only if it's not true. Boom. And

957
00:43:08,739 --> 00:43:10,980
this kind of contradiction has fueled a very

958
00:43:10,980 --> 00:43:13,489
modern, quite radical movement in philosophy

959
00:43:13,489 --> 00:43:15,630
called conceptual engineering. That's right.

960
00:43:15,829 --> 00:43:18,250
Philosophers like J .C. Beale, Kevin Sharp, and

961
00:43:18,250 --> 00:43:21,510
others look at paradoxes like the liar and argue

962
00:43:21,510 --> 00:43:23,869
that they demonstrate something profound. Our

963
00:43:23,869 --> 00:43:26,710
ordinary, everyday concept of truth is actually

964
00:43:26,710 --> 00:43:29,809
defective. It's fundamentally inconsistent because

965
00:43:29,809 --> 00:43:32,090
it inevitably leads to these contradictions when

966
00:43:32,090 --> 00:43:35,159
pushed. Defective, like a faulty tool or a badly

967
00:43:35,159 --> 00:43:38,039
designed bridge. That's the analogy, yes. And

968
00:43:38,039 --> 00:43:39,840
if a concept is fundamentally defective, they

969
00:43:39,840 --> 00:43:42,280
argue we shouldn't keep using it for serious

970
00:43:42,280 --> 00:43:45,059
theoretical purposes, like in logic or semantics

971
00:43:45,059 --> 00:43:47,019
or metaphysics. So what should we do? Just throw

972
00:43:47,019 --> 00:43:49,719
out the concept of truth? Not exactly throw it

973
00:43:49,719 --> 00:43:52,719
out, but replace it. They argue we should engage

974
00:43:52,719 --> 00:43:55,619
in conceptual engineering, consciously design

975
00:43:55,619 --> 00:43:58,840
and adopt revised, consistent concepts of truth

976
00:43:58,840 --> 00:44:01,159
to replace our ordinary, messy, inconsistent

977
00:44:01,159 --> 00:44:03,719
one. Perhaps something like the specialized,

978
00:44:04,079 --> 00:44:07,059
carefully layered, unparadoxical truth predicates

979
00:44:07,059 --> 00:44:10,139
that the logician Alfred Tarski developed for

980
00:44:10,139 --> 00:44:13,039
formal languages. Use the engineered, clean concepts

981
00:44:13,039 --> 00:44:15,199
for theory, even if they're different from everyday

982
00:44:15,199 --> 00:44:18,039
truth. That's the core idea. For serious theoretical

983
00:44:18,039 --> 00:44:20,980
work, a demonstrably inconsistent concept shouldn't

984
00:44:20,980 --> 00:44:23,659
be used. We need better tools. Okay, but hang

985
00:44:23,659 --> 00:44:26,739
on. Can we really just redesign basic concepts

986
00:44:26,739 --> 00:44:29,320
in our language to fit the demands of formal

987
00:44:29,320 --> 00:44:32,610
logic? Isn't there a defense for keeping our

988
00:44:32,610 --> 00:44:36,269
messy, familiar, ordinary concept of truth even

989
00:44:36,269 --> 00:44:39,530
with its paradoxes? There is indeed, and it's

990
00:44:39,530 --> 00:44:41,889
sometimes called retentionism. Other thinkers

991
00:44:41,889 --> 00:44:43,969
push back against conceptual engineering here.

992
00:44:44,110 --> 00:44:46,650
They argue that complex, evolved, incredibly

993
00:44:46,650 --> 00:44:49,650
useful concepts like our ordinary notion of truth

994
00:44:49,650 --> 00:44:52,349
shouldn't necessarily be discarded simply because

995
00:44:52,349 --> 00:44:54,809
they lack perfectly clear foundational definitions

996
00:44:54,809 --> 00:44:57,409
or because they sometimes lead to paradoxes in

997
00:44:57,409 --> 00:44:59,789
abstract scenarios. What's their argument for

998
00:44:59,789 --> 00:45:01,909
keeping the potentially inconsistent concept?

999
00:45:02,289 --> 00:45:04,190
Well, they might argue that Tarski's proposed

1000
00:45:04,190 --> 00:45:06,289
solution, for example, which required establishing

1001
00:45:06,289 --> 00:45:09,269
this rigid hierarchy of languages, object language,

1002
00:45:09,489 --> 00:45:11,590
meta -language, meta -meta -language, etc., to

1003
00:45:11,590 --> 00:45:15,130
avoid paradox, is just conceptually far too complex

1004
00:45:15,130 --> 00:45:17,090
and artificial for ordinary people to actually

1005
00:45:17,090 --> 00:45:19,949
use in everyday communication. So the fixed version

1006
00:45:19,949 --> 00:45:22,369
might be logically pure but practically useless

1007
00:45:22,369 --> 00:45:25,590
for most purposes. That's the worry. They might

1008
00:45:25,590 --> 00:45:27,789
argue that our ordinary, perhaps technically

1009
00:45:27,789 --> 00:45:31,150
inconsistent notion of truth may still be indispensable

1010
00:45:31,150 --> 00:45:34,230
and perfectly functional for general human communication,

1011
00:45:34,630 --> 00:45:38,530
for our legal systems, for moral discourse, and

1012
00:45:38,530 --> 00:45:41,030
just for navigating everyday life, despite its

1013
00:45:41,030 --> 00:45:43,329
occasional logical flaws when examined under

1014
00:45:43,329 --> 00:45:46,329
a microscope. The sheer utility of the familiar

1015
00:45:46,329 --> 00:45:49,630
concept even with its potential defects, might

1016
00:45:49,630 --> 00:45:51,670
outweigh the intellectual elegance of replacing

1017
00:45:51,670 --> 00:45:55,429
it with a logically perfect but perhaps unusable

1018
00:45:55,429 --> 00:45:58,289
engineered substitute. Wow. Okay, so this deep

1019
00:45:58,289 --> 00:46:00,710
dive into the philosophy of truth, drawing heavily

1020
00:46:00,710 --> 00:46:03,389
on Blackburn but ranging much wider, it really

1021
00:46:03,389 --> 00:46:05,650
reveals that the debate is fundamentally about,

1022
00:46:05,769 --> 00:46:09,269
well, maybe two intertwined things, logic and

1023
00:46:09,269 --> 00:46:11,960
power. That sounds right. It focuses less and

1024
00:46:11,960 --> 00:46:13,940
less on finding one simple definition of what

1025
00:46:13,940 --> 00:46:16,300
truth is in the abstract and much more on how

1026
00:46:16,300 --> 00:46:17,760
the concept functions in all these different

1027
00:46:17,760 --> 00:46:19,860
domains we've talked about, in scientific inquiry,

1028
00:46:20,099 --> 00:46:22,639
in social practice, in the structure of our language,

1029
00:46:22,719 --> 00:46:24,619
and maybe crucially in its role in determining

1030
00:46:24,619 --> 00:46:26,960
whose standards get to count as authoritative

1031
00:46:26,960 --> 00:46:29,639
in society. So the key insight, perhaps, for

1032
00:46:29,639 --> 00:46:31,820
you, the listener, wrestling with all this, is

1033
00:46:31,820 --> 00:46:34,400
to recognize that truth isn't necessarily this

1034
00:46:34,400 --> 00:46:37,420
single, monolithic, easily pinned down property.

1035
00:46:37,639 --> 00:46:40,599
It's actual nature. might really determine by

1036
00:46:40,599 --> 00:46:42,480
the context, by the domain you're talking about.

1037
00:46:42,639 --> 00:46:44,559
Yeah. Do you define it through correspondence

1038
00:46:44,559 --> 00:46:47,059
with some external reality like the realists

1039
00:46:47,059 --> 00:46:49,780
often want? Or through coherence within a system

1040
00:46:49,780 --> 00:46:52,900
of beliefs? Or maybe, like the pragmatists suggest,

1041
00:46:53,239 --> 00:46:55,659
through his role in guiding successful action

1042
00:46:55,659 --> 00:46:58,599
or its place in an idealized endpoint of human

1043
00:46:58,599 --> 00:47:01,289
inquiry? The answer might depend on what you're

1044
00:47:01,289 --> 00:47:03,389
trying to do with the concept. And it's crystal

1045
00:47:03,389 --> 00:47:05,829
clear from our discussion and from Blackburn's

1046
00:47:05,829 --> 00:47:08,030
book that the philosophical temperature surrounding

1047
00:47:08,030 --> 00:47:11,309
this whole topic remains extremely high. It continues

1048
00:47:11,309 --> 00:47:14,889
to drive both intense academic rigor and, unfortunately,

1049
00:47:15,150 --> 00:47:18,349
sometimes bitter cultural conflict. Indeed. And

1050
00:47:18,349 --> 00:47:21,210
thinking back to pragmatism, we saw the pragmatist

1051
00:47:21,210 --> 00:47:23,480
view. particularly someone like Charles Sanders,

1052
00:47:23,619 --> 00:47:26,920
Pierce's definition, defines reality itself as

1053
00:47:26,920 --> 00:47:29,480
the object represented by that opinion, which

1054
00:47:29,480 --> 00:47:31,579
is fated to be ultimately agreed upon by all

1055
00:47:31,579 --> 00:47:34,519
who investigate. Truth is the end point of inquiry.

1056
00:47:34,800 --> 00:47:37,420
Right. So here is the provocative final thought

1057
00:47:37,420 --> 00:47:39,360
we want to leave you with, kind of combining

1058
00:47:39,360 --> 00:47:42,900
Pierce's long -run vision with a dose of modern

1059
00:47:42,900 --> 00:47:46,110
scientific skepticism. Okay. If we accept the

1060
00:47:46,110 --> 00:47:49,309
pessimistic meta -induction, that's the compelling

1061
00:47:49,309 --> 00:47:52,110
historical observation that even our most cherished

1062
00:47:52,110 --> 00:47:54,389
and sophisticated scientific theories seem inevitably

1063
00:47:54,389 --> 00:47:57,289
destined to be superseded, to be proven at least

1064
00:47:57,289 --> 00:48:00,829
partially false by future science. Well, If that's

1065
00:48:00,829 --> 00:48:03,510
true, does that mean that today's scientific

1066
00:48:03,510 --> 00:48:06,210
reality, what we currently take to be the objective

1067
00:48:06,210 --> 00:48:08,829
facts discovered by science, is itself merely

1068
00:48:08,829 --> 00:48:11,969
tomorrow's superseded consensus? And therefore,

1069
00:48:12,110 --> 00:48:15,269
is reality itself, as defined by inquiry, inherently

1070
00:48:15,269 --> 00:48:18,010
unstable? In other words, if inquiry is truly

1071
00:48:18,010 --> 00:48:20,949
endless and our current best theories will always

1072
00:48:20,949 --> 00:48:23,250
be overturned, does ultimate truth, the final

1073
00:48:23,250 --> 00:48:26,079
opinion. perpetually received just beyond our

1074
00:48:26,079 --> 00:48:28,480
grasp? Yeah. Is the end of inquiry always just

1075
00:48:28,480 --> 00:48:30,360
over the horizon? Exactly. Something to think

1076
00:48:30,360 --> 00:48:32,159
about as you continue your own investigations

1077
00:48:32,159 --> 00:48:33,739
into what you choose to believe and why.